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Dennis is a 15-year old boy. He was diagnosed with Ewing sarcoma in his left femur 6 months 
ago. He has been treated with chemotherapy and subsequently an operation. Since the tu-
mor did not respond well to the chemotherapy, the next step is treatment with high dose 
chemotherapy followed by autologous stem cell infusion. 
During the courses of chemotherapy, Dennis has gained ‘experience’ in feeling sick, nau-
sea and vomiting. Up to his admission for the high dose chemotherapy he never needed nasal 
tube feeding. He always recovered in time and had enough intake to not lose weight. Dennis 
is very motivated to prevent the need for nasal tube feeding.
Just before admission an informational meeting is planned with one of the treating pedi-
atric oncologists and Dennis’ parents. The physician explains the procedure and informs the 
parents that almost no children can undergo the treatment without the need for nasal tube 
feeding. The high dose chemotherapy gives so many side-effects, like mucositis, that most chil-
dren are not able to eat enough themselves. To prevent a daily battle over eating, nasal tube 
feeding is started early. Dennis’ parents again express their child’s opinion: Dennis definitively 
does not want nasal tube feeding, except when there is no other option.
During treatment Dennis develops severe mucositis and his intake deteriorates. Weight 
loss cannot be measured reliably due to hyperhydration and changing splints. The dietician 
calculates that his caloric intake is only 25% of his daily needs. Her conclusion is that Dennis 
needs nasal tube feeding. The matter is discussed with Dennis, his parents, the treating physi-
cians and the dietician. Although in the first instance Dennis and his parents respond nega-
tively, eventually they agree with the nasal tube feeding. The nasal tube feeding is continued 
up to the day of discharge, and has good results. 
At the day of discharge Dennis throws up and the nasal tube is dislocated. He refuses to 
have a new one brought in. The treating physician and the nurses, however, share the opinion 
that it is in the interest of Dennis that the tube feeding is continued at home. An alterna-
tive would be that Dennis stays admitted and shows that he can eat enough himself. A new 
meeting takes place with Dennis and parents, in which again emphasis is placed on the im-
portance of enough caloric intake.
Nonetheless, Dennis and his parents decide to go home without the nasal tube. They 
state that the family has gained enough experience with Dennis’ eating habits after chemo-
therapy. Especially the father calls himself an expert in cooking things that Dennis likes, and 
that because of that he will eat enough when he is at home.
The parents and the medical team do not reach an agreement. Eventually, the medical 
team wants the family to sign a statement that they leave the hospital against medical ad-
vice. Dennis and his parents however leave the hospital without saying good bye and without 
signing the statement. 
(Case published in De Vries et al 2005)
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Few medical specialties encounter so many ethical challenges as pediatrics does. It is a 
specialty that inherently has features that are morally charged. The above case shows in 
a concise matter the ethical issues which play a role when caring for severely ill children: 
what is in the best interest of a severely ill child, what influence does the child itself have 
on its treatment, what is the role of parents in decision making, and what is the role of 
the pediatrician and other health care professionals? In this thesis we will study these 
issues in the setting of pediatric oncology. Furthermore, insights gained in this particular 
setting will be translated, where possible and appropriate, to pediatrics in general. 
THE PHILOSOPHICAL QUINTESSENCE OF PEDIATRICS
Pediatrics is the discipline concerned with the well-being of infants, children, and ado-
lescents, focusing on their health; their physical, mental, and psychological growth and 
development; and their opportunity to achieve full potential as adults (Kliegman et al 
2011, p1). Although this description is short, it encompasses several important features 
that are philosophical in nature. The fact that pediatrics is a medical specialty, separate 
from adult medicine, reflects that children are considered as a special group in medicine, 
and that they cannot be treated as just small adults. But what is a child? How can we 
define childhood separate from adulthood? The description of pediatrics gives us some 
direction: it has to do with growth, development and hope to become a (healthy) adult. 
Growth relates to a dynamic process in which children develop from fully dependent 
infants to independent adults. This raises questions of (in)competence: at what stage 
in their development should children be allowed to make their own decisions and have 
them respected? The opportunity to achieve a full potential relates to the question what 
a full potential might be, and who decides in what direction a child should develop. The 
fact that pediatrics is concerned with these issues inevitably means that the medical pro-
fession takes a responsibility in facilitating and supporting the developmental process 
that a child undergoes to become an adult who can reach his full potential. But to what 
extent? And what is the responsibility of parents as protectors of and investors in the 
upbringing of their children? The responsibilities of parents and physicians intersect but 
do not necessarily coincide. What is then the scope of parental choice and authority and 
what are the responsibilities of physicians in medical decisions influencing the health 
and future opportunities of children?
According to Nelson Textbook of pediatrics, for many the world’s most trusted resource 
for best approaches to pediatric care, pediatricians should serve as advocates for all chil-
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dren, because ‘children cannot advocate for themselves’ (Stanton and Behrman 2011, 
p1). The statement that children cannot advocate for themselves means that someone 
else has to take care of them. In medical, but also daily practice, parents or legal guard-
ians1 are the obvious and (most of the times) appropriate caretakers for children. When 
surrogate decision making is at hand, as is often the case in pediatrics, questions arise 
about what the best interests of the child are, and how parental authority can be recon-
ciled with medical judgment on the best interests. These questions, that are ethical by 
nature, define pediatric practice. In general terms, the autonomy driven framework of 
adult medical ethics is replaced by a beneficent paternalism (or parentalism) in pedi-
atrics with an independent role for the pediatrician to protect and promote the health-
related interests of children (McCullough 2010, p11).
As pediatrics deals with growing and developing children, ultimately the patient 
population at some point reaches a developmental level at which they can decide for 
themselves (or at least we hope that they will). The issues of (in)competence of children, 
assent and informed consent are also central in pediatrics.
In conclusion, pediatric ethics examines the broad issues of (1) the concept of the 
child’s best interest; (2) parental responsibility and authority in decision-making about 
the life and health of a child; (3) the emerging desire and capacity for self-determination 
of an older child, and (4) the professional obligation of a pediatrician to act in the best 
interests of the child.
BACKGROUND AND AIMS OF THE PRESENT STUDY
Much is written about the concepts best interests, child participation and parental au-
thority. Most literature on these topics is either theoretical in nature (see for example: 
Elliston 2007; Diekema 2004; Kopelman 1997 and 2010; Miller 2003; Schapiro 1999), 
or casuistic (De Beaufort et al 2008). It remains difficult to utilize these concepts in the 
reality of pediatric practice. Our goal was to further reflect on the question how these 
concepts can and should be translated and made operational in the everyday encounter 
between parents, physicians and children. We therefore combined theoretical concep-
tions of the best interest standard, child participation and parental authority with a close 
look on how these concepts actually function in pediatric practice, and how they are 
conceived by actors in the pediatric field. The alliance with practice is a prerequisite for 
practicing ethics well-informed and pro-actively and for avoiding armchair philosophy 




(Bredenoord 2010, Borry et al 2005). Attention to the lived reality of pediatric practice 
however raises the question how to integrate experiences from clinical practice in ethical 
theory and analysis. Although intuitions and experiences are highly valuable as moral 
markers, it is generally stated that in ethics they need to be subjected to systematic, ratio-
nal analysis in order to prevent violation of the so-called ‘fact-value distinction’ (De Vries 
and Gordijn 2009). In other words, if one wants to use information from practice, one 
needs to reflect on the methodology applied to integrate this information in normative-
ethical analysis and decision making.
Aims and scope of this thesis
The aim of the study presented in this thesis is threefold. Our first concern is to find a 
method to integrate ethical theory (‘norms’) and information from practice (‘facts’, intu-
itions, experiences). Ethical theory is often used to give structure to the interpretation of 
moral experiences in a practice. It clarifies, in a deductive manner, the conditions under 
which theoretical ethical concepts can function in that practice (Gillon 1985). However, 
practical insights into a lived moral reality may also be a starting point for theory devel-
opment and change, sometimes even using inductive reasoning (Kon 2009). Taking the 
view that people’s actual moral beliefs, intuitions, experiences and reasoning in a (medi-
cal) practice yields information which is meaningful for the operationalization of ethical 
concepts, we will refine an existing methodology that successfully combines empirical 
research and ethical reflection, namely Reflective Equilibrium. 
Subsequently, we will use this methodology to study one specific pediatric medical prac-
tice, namely pediatric oncology (for reasons specified below). Our goal is to describe 
in detail the forms that the concepts of best interests, child participation and parental 
authority take in the studied pediatric oncology practice. In order to gather the empiri-
cal data for our ethical reflection, we use qualitative methods: observations and semi-
structured interviews with all actors involved. 
Finally, we will reflect on the question whether the insights gained in our particular re-
search setting can be translated to pediatric oncology in general and, where possible and 
appropriate, even to pediatrics in general. 
Central research questions
1.  Which method should we use to give voice to people’s actual moral beliefs, intuitions 
and reasoning in a (medical) practice? How can this method truly integrate ethical 
theory (‘norms’) and information from practice (‘facts’). In other words: how can we 
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use experiences of parents, children and doctors to develop our understanding of 
ethical concepts? 
2.  Using this method in a specific medical practice, namely pediatric oncology, can we 
further develop our understanding of the concepts of best interests of children, child 
participation and parental authority? 
In order to answer the central research questions the following subquestions will be ad-
dressed:
What methodology is needed to address the problems of best interests, child partici-1. 
pation and parental authority in a specific setting like pediatric oncology, especially 
when we want to incorporate the views of the relevant actors in the field? (Chapter 
2)
What makes the pediatric oncology setting special from an ethical point of view? 2. 
(Chapter 4)
What interpretations of best interests are found in pediatric oncology? (Chapters 4 3. 
and 5)
What is the role of parents in decision making in pediatric oncology? (Chapters 4, 5, 4. 
6 and 7)
What is the role of physicians in decision making in pediatric oncology? (Chapters 4, 5. 
5,6 and 7)
What is the view of the different actors on child participation in decision making in 6. 
pediatric oncology? (Chapters 6 and 7)
METHODS
Reflective Equilibrium
In the last decades, it has become increasingly clear that the study of people’s actual 
moral beliefs, intuitions, behavior and reasoning in (medical) practice yields informa-
tion that is meaningful for ethics (Borry et al 2004; Hope 1999; Solomon 2005). Adding 
intuitions and experiences from parties involved in ethically sensitive situations offers 
an important supplementation and enrichment of the scientific and scholarly debates, 
literature and theory. In ethics, the use of empirical data therefore has become more and 
more popular, even leading to a distinct form of applied ethics, namely empirical ethics. 
Especially in bioethics, this ‘empirical turn’ is visible (Borry et al 2005). Empirical ethics 
is a broad category, grasping different interpretations of integrating ethics and empirical 
15
General introduction
research. There is, however, one basic assumption in all sorts of empirical ethics: it de-
nies the structural incompatibility of empirical and normative approaches, and believes 
in their fundamental complementarity. It is an answer to the critique of bioethics for 
being too abstract, too general, too dogmatic, too top-down as well as too far removed 
from clinical reality, insensitive to the peculiarities of specific situations.
There are various ways of combining empirical research and ethical reflection (Solomon 
2005). In chapter 2 we will discuss the use of empirical data in Reflective Equilibrium 
(RE). Although inclusion of moral experiences in this specific model of RE can be well 
defended, their use in the application of the model still raises important questions. What 
precisely are moral experiences? How to determine relevance of experiences, in other 
words: should there be a selection of the moral experiences that are eventually used in 
the RE? How much weight should the empirical data have in the RE? And the key ques-
tion: can the use of RE by empirical ethicists really produce answers to practical moral 
questions? In this thesis we start to answer the above questions by using the method to 
reflect on the data gained in our interview study and observations. 
The study object: pediatric oncology
Until now, most studies using empirical data to discuss interpretations of best interests, 
parental authority, child participation and the physician’s fiduciary obligations have fo-
cused on neonatal care and end-of-life decision making (Kopelman 2010; Leuthner 2001; 
Placencia and McCullough 2011; Spence 2000). However, also outside these realms 
these ethical concepts have a role in daily practice. For our study’s purposes there was 
no absolute need for a specific medical diagnosis of the children studied. For principal 
reasons (relatively high density of decisions to be made, day-to-day, as well as high im-
pact decisions), as well as practical reasons (easy accessible study group due to prior 
pilot study), our study field became pediatric oncology. Although a first reflex could be 
to again study end-of-life (EoL) decision making in this group, we focused on day-to-day 
decision making. First, because EoL decision making has been described before (for ex-
ample: Kars et al 2011). Second, because we anticipated that day-to-day decision making 
could tell us more about how the ethical concepts function in everyday pediatric practice, 
i.e. also outside pediatric oncology.
Pediatric oncology: a short introduction
Cancer in patients below the age of 19 years is uncommon, with an age-adjusted annual 
incidence rate of 16.6/100.000, representing only about 1% of all new cancer cases in a 
year in the USA (Kliegman et al 2011). In the Netherlands, every year about 400 children 
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between 0-15 years of age are diagnosed with cancer (Integraal KankerCentrum Neder-
land 2011). Although relative 5-year survival rates have improved over the past 30 years 
from less than 20% to about 75% ((Ries et al 2007; Jemal et al 2003), malignant neo-
plasms remain the leading cause of disease-related (noninjury) mortality, namely 12.8%, 
among persons between 1-14 years of age (Kliegman et al 2011). 
Pediatric cancers differ markedly form adult malignancies in both prognosis and 
type of cancer. Lymphohematopoietic cancers (i.e. acute lymphoblastic leukaemia, lym-
phoma) account for 40%, nervous system cancers for 30%, and embryonal tumors and 
sarcomas for 10% of the broad categories of childhood cancers (Kliegman et al 2011). 
Epithelial tumors of organs such as lung, colon, breast and prostate, which are com-
monly seen in adults, are rare malignancies in children. The fact that childhood cancer 
is a rarity and that evidence from research with adults cannot be generalized to chil-
dren (due to the different cancer types) makes it inevitable that pediatric oncology has 
a strong research culture. If long delays in making evidence-based treatments available 
to children with cancer are to be avoided, it is important that trials in pediatric oncology 
recruit a much greater proportion of the patient population than adult cancer trials. As a 
consequence, most pediatric oncologists are investigators involved in both clinical care 
and research. Multi-institutional cooperative clinical trials investigate novel therapies 
and ways to improve survival rates through supportive care. In the Netherlands treat-
ment and research are coordinated by the Stichting Kinderoncologie Nederland (SKION, 
Dutch Childhood Oncology Group). As a result of these research efforts, a remarkable 
proportion of children with cancer - up to 70% of children in the developed world - en-
rolls in a study during their cancer treatment, as compared to only 1-4% of adult patients 
(Ablett and Pinkerton 2003; Bleyer 1997; Ablett et al 2004). Because increasingly more 
patients survive their disease, research is also focussing on the quality of life among 
survivors and the late outcomes of therapies experienced by pediatric and adult survivors 
of childhood cancer. In the Netherlands, every 1 out of 250 people aged 18-45 years is a 
survivor of childhood cancer (SKION Later 2010). Potential adverse late effects include 
subsequent second malignancy, early mortality, infertility, cardiomyopathy, osteoporo-
sis, neuro-cognitive impairment and altered social functioning. 
In the setting of pediatric oncology most treatments are given according to national 
or international protocols which describe in detail the treatment plan for each type of 
cancer. The treatment period varies depending on the cancer type, but stretches from 
months to years of invasive and intensive treatment. Clearly, childhood cancer has an 
enormous impact on the family. Whilst survival rates have improved dramatically, it is 
still a devastating, potentially life-threatening diagnosis for child and family members 
and an illness which severely disrupts the lifestyle of the family. Poder et al (2008) for 
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example showed that at commencement of treatment 33% of parents exhibit post-trau-
matic stress symptoms. Children show high levels of psychosocial and emotional stress 
at the start of treatment (Tsai et al 2012). Survivors of childhood cancer are at increased 
risk of various psychological and behavioral problems (Marcoux et al 2012). 
Gaining empirical data: observations and semi-structured interviews
In order to gather the empirical data we were going to use for the ethical reflection, we 
performed a qualitative multicenter project in which we explored patients’, parents’, and 
physicians’ experiences, roles, and considerations in treatment decisions in pediatric 
oncology. In this project we invited patients (aged 8-18 years) attending the pediatric on-
cology units of two Dutch university hospitals, their parents, and their physicians to par-
ticipate in one-to-one, semi-structured in-depth interviews. Interviews were conducted 
8-10 weeks after initial diagnosis or diagnosis of relapse. The project was approved by the 
Institutional Review Boards at both study sites (Leiden University Medical Center and VU 
Medical Center). Informed consent was obtained from all participants. 
All physicians, parents, and children were interviewed by the author of this thesis. Ini-
tial interview topics were formulated after examination of the relevant literature and a 
preliminary observational study, during which the interviewer spent three months in the 
children’s oncology ward of one of the university hospitals and observed the daily routine 
and the discussions between parents, children, and physicians. Consistent with standard 
qualitative research techniques, the interview topics evolved as the interviews progressed 
through an iterative process to ensure that the questions captured all relevant emerging 
themes (Britten 1995; Guest, Brunce, and Johnson 2006). The interviews contained gen-
eral topics and no closed-ended questions. Examples of interview questions are given in 
the following chapters, where the interview data are presented.
The physician interviews lasted between 30 and 60 minutes. The in-depth interview 
topics covered work experience; general goals of pediatric oncology; the physician–pa-
tient-parent relationship, especially concerning decision making during treatment; con-
siderations deemed important in treatment decision making; patient and parent auton-
omy; and physician’s ideas on what is in the best interest of a child. 
The child interviews lasted between 30 and 45 minutes. The parent interviews lasted 
between 60 and 90 minutes. Both were conducted at the hospital. The interview topics 
covered general characteristics of the patient; the history of the disease; discussions with 
physicians about the recommended treatment; parents’ and child’s attitudes to these 
discussions; considerations deemed important in treatment decision making; and the 
perceived role of parents and children in decision making during treatment. 
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All interviews were audio-taped and transcribed verbatim. Data analysis was based 
on the constant comparative method (Malterud 2001; Strauss and Corbin 1998).We 
used an iterative process wherein we continually went back to the field and interviewed 
new participants to collect more data. The following process of data gathering and analy-
sis was used: (1) interviews; (2) transcribing the interview data; (3) open coding, which 
involved identifying relevant concepts in the text; (4) constantly comparing open codes, 
looking for conceptual similarities and differences; (5) identifying emerging themes and 
a theoretical framework; (6) continued sampling and interviewing as theoretical catego-
ries emerged and novel questions arose; and (7) continued coding and comparison of 
codes until nothing new was added to the theoretical categories. The author of this thesis 
coded the full transcripts. An independent researcher coded five transcripts to check for 
consistency and adequacy of the framework. The author and the independent researcher 
engaged in a discussion on the themes each of them had identified from the transcripts. 
No inconsistencies were found. When no new thematic content was found in the inter-
views, subject enrollment was stopped. This process, called thematic saturation, is a 
well-described qualitative method to avoid unnecessarily large and repetitive data sets 
(Denzin and Lincoln 2000; Guest, Brunce and Johnson 2006).
We used qualitative software (Kwalitan 5.0) for multiple text management, including 
coding, locating, and retrieving key phrases (Peters 2000). Finally, representative quota-
tions were chosen to illustrate the themes identified. These quotations are included in 
the text of the various chapters. 
Age of child participants
The age of the children we wanted to study played an important role in shaping our 
research project. We specifically wanted to look at the role of the child in the decision 
making process. For this purpose it was necessary that the child could express its own 
views. Several studies have assessed and reviewed children’s capacity to participate in 
medical decision making (Dorn et al 1995, Mårtenson and Fägerskiöld 2008, Ondrusek 
et al 1998). The data on this topic have been ambiguous. All that these studies sug-
gest is that the major period of rapid change and individual variability in children’s ca-
pacities occurs between age 9 and 14 years. Some have concluded that relatively young 
children can participate meaningfully in the assent process (Committee on Bioethics 
1995), whereas others have raised doubts about what children can understand (Wendler 
and Shah 2003). When interpreting these studies, it is important to realize that the way 
in which researchers define assent drives their conclusions. It greatly depends on the 
capacities one requires for children to be deemed capable of providing assent (Miller 
and Nelson 2006). The closer the definition of these capacities comes to the capacities 
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needed to be an ideal adult, the older the child will be before it can meet the criteria. 
The ambiguity of the above mentioned studies shows that it is not so straightforward to 
select a specific age group for our study. Of course it was easy to exclude Neonatology, 
but every other age limit remains the object of debate. We decided to include children 
from the age of eight.
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Children 8-18 years with a new  
diagnosis of cancer or relapse  
between 1-1-2006 and 1-9-2007  
in two oncology centres 
n = 43 
NOT ASSESSED FOR ELIGIBILITY: 
• Refusal by own physician because of psycho- 
social situation 
                                        n=1 
Assessed for eligibility 
n = 42 
EXCLUDED (Total is 18): 
1. INELIGIBLE    (n=7) 
• child IQ < 75                                     n=3 
• critically ill          n=4 
 
 
2. ELIGIBLE BUT NOT RECRUITED  (n=11) 
• Refusal by child or parents              n=9 
• Unable to read/write Dutch             n=2 
Total recruited 
n = 24 children 
DATA AVAILABLE FOR ANALYSIS: 
• Interview child   n=21# 
• Interview parents  n=26± 
• Socio-demographic child  n=24 
• Socio-demographic parent n=26 
Figure 1: Enrollment, eligibility and recruitment of children and parents 
 
# In three families the child refused an interview, but one of the parents did participate (with the agreement of the 
child). ± In two families both parents were interviewed. 
Interviews Site A: 
- 12 children 
- 16 parents
Interviews Site B: 
- 9 children 
- 10 parents
Figure 1: Enrollment, eligibility and recruitment of children and parents
# In three families the child refused an interview, but one of the parents did participate (with the 
agreement of the child). ± In two families both parents were interviewed.
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Characteristics of the study sample
The sample consisted of 15 physicians, 24 children, and 26 parents of these children. 
Figure 1 shows eligibility criteria and the recruitment process for children and parents. 
Parents had a mean age of 40 years (range 32-50 years). Their children had a mean age of 
13.4 years (range 8-18 years). The parents’ occupations varied, indicating social diversity. 
All families were of Dutch origin. Demographic and clinical characteristics of the parents 
and their children are given in Tables 1 and 2. 
The group of physicians comprised the entire medical staff of both pediatric oncology 
units (9 and 6 physicians, respectively). They were the primary providers of care for the 
children who participated in the study. Physicians had a mean age of 42.1 years (range 
32-52 years) and worked in pediatric oncology for a mean of 7.6 years (range 1.5-20 years); 
7 (46.7%) were male. Characteristics of the physicians are shown in Table 3.
Table 1 Demographic and clinical characteristics of the children included in the present study (n = 24). 
Values are n (%) 
Sex
    Male 13 (54)
    Female 11 (46)
Age
    8-11 years   5 (21)
    12-14 years 10 (42)
    15-18 years   9 (37)
Cancer diagnosis
    ALL   5 (21)
    AML   3 (12.5)
    MDS   2 (8.5)
    Non Hodgkin Lymphoma   4 (17)
    Hodgkin   2 (8)
    Ewing Sarcoma   3 (12,5)
    Osteosarcoma   2 (8)
    Brain tumour   3 (12,5)
Treatment phase
    Initial cancer diagnosis 18 (75)
    Relapse   6 (25)




Table 2 Demographic characteristics of the parents included in the present study (n = 26). Values are n (%)
Sex
    Male 10 (38)
    Female 16 (62)
Marital status (n = 24 families) 
    Single / divorced   6 (25)
    Married / registered partnership 18 (75)
Education
    Primary school / lower level high school   4 (15)
    Middle level high school 12 (46)
    Advanced vocational / university   9 (35)
    Unknown   1 (4)
Table 3 Physician Characteristics
Physician 
number*
Profession Age (years) Sex
Working experience 
in pediatric oncology 
(years)
A1 consultant pediatric oncology 47 M 8
A2 consultant pediatric oncology 51 F 20
A3 consultant pediatric oncology 45 F 9
A4 consultant pediatric oncology 52 M 15
A5 consultant pediatric oncology 43 M 8
A6 consultant pediatric oncology 51 M 18
A7 consultant pediatric oncology 42 M 7
A8 clinical fellow 32 F 3
A9 consultant pediatric oncology 38 M 3
B1 clinical fellow 37 F 2
B2 consultant pediatric oncology 39 F 4
B3 consultant pediatric oncology 39 F 5
B4 consultant pediatric oncology 38 F 4
B5 consultant pediatric oncology 44 M 10
B6 clinical fellow 33 F 2
* A and B denote the two treatment centers. 
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OUTLINE OF THE THESIS
This thesis consists of four parts. Part A (Chapter 2) deals with the empirical ethical 
methodology used throughout the book. In chapter 2 we progress from the use of em-
pirical data only to clarify a morally laden situation, to the possible use of these data to 
justify action and even formulate policy. Part B sets the scene of pediatric oncology. We 
focus on the fact that pediatric oncology has a strong research culture. As stated above, 
most pediatric oncologists are investigators involved in clinical care as well as research. 
Consequently, various concepts studied in research ethics are relevant for our investiga-
tion. Chapter 3 is a theoretical introduction to the ethical concepts studied empirically 
in chapter 4. We describe the criteria for valid informed consent, and the concepts of 
equipoise and therapeutic misconception. In Chapter 4 we discuss the ethical conse-
quences of the unprecedented integration of research and care in pediatric oncology 
from the perspective of parents and physicians. We use an empirical ethical approach 
to answer the question whether this characteristic of pediatric oncology interferes with 
the parental task to promote the best interest of the child. Part C (Chapter 5) describes 
different interpretations by parents, children and physicians of the best interest of the 
child in pediatric oncology. Again, an empirical ethical approach is used to weigh these 
interpretations and formulate recommendations for communication. Part D deals with 
the role of children in medical decision making. Chapter 6 discusses child participation 
in decision making concerning research participation. We focus on pediatric oncologists’ 
attitudes towards involving adolescents in this decision making. In Chapter 7 we present 
the problem of fertility discussions as an example of involving children in decision mak-
ing. Both chapter 6 and 7 combine empirical data with ethical theory and principles to 
formulate a reflective approach to child participation in the pediatric oncology practice. 
Finally, in Chapter 8 the principal results of this thesis are put into perspective. We focus 
on two issues: first, we give methodological considerations: does our methodology prove 
valuable for answering ethical questions in practice, and what are the limitations?; and 
second, what are the implications of our study for our thinking about child participation, 
the use of a best interests standard and parental authority in pediatric oncology and in 
pediatrics in general? 
PART A
Methodology in Empirical Ethics

Chapter 2
REFLECTIVE EQUILIBRIUM AND EMPIRICAL DATA: 
THIRD PERSON MORAL EXPERIENCES 
IN EMPIRICAL MEDICAL ETHICS
 





In ethics, the use of empirical data has become more and more popular, leading to a 
distinct form of applied ethics, namely empirical ethics. This ‘empirical turn’ is especially 
visible in bioethics. There are various ways of combining empirical research and ethical 
reflection. In this chapter we discuss the use of empirical data in a special form of Reflec-
tive Equilibrium (RE), namely the Network Model with Third Person Moral Experiences. 
In this model, the empirical data consist of the moral experiences of people in a practice. 
Although inclusion of these moral experiences in this specific model of RE can be well 
defended, their use in the application of the model still raises important questions. What 
precisely are moral experiences? How to determine relevance of experiences, in other 
words: should there be a selection of the moral experiences that are eventually used in 
the RE? How much weight should the empirical data have in the RE? And the key ques-
tion: can the use of RE by empirical ethicists really produce answers to practical moral 
questions? 
In this chapter we start to answer the above questions by giving examples taken 
from our research project on understanding the norm of informed consent in the field 
of pediatric oncology. We especially emphasize that incorporation of empirical data in 
a network model can reduce the risk of self-justification and bias and can increase the 
credibility of the RE reached.
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INTRODUCTION: BIOETHICS, EMPIRICAL RESEARCH, REFLECTIVE  
EQUILIBRIUM
In ethics, the use of empirical data has become more and more popular, leading to a 
distinct form of applied ethics, namely empirical ethics. Especially in bioethics, this ‘em-
pirical turn’ is visible (Borry et al 2005).1 Empirical ethics is a broad category, grasping 
different interpretations of integrating ethics and empirical research. There is, however, 
one basic assumption in all sorts of empirical ethics: the study of people’s actual moral 
beliefs, intuitions, behaviour and reasoning in a practice yields information that is mean-
ingful for ethics (Borry et al 2004). It denies the structural incompatibility of empirical 
and normative approaches, and believes in their fundamental complementarity. It is an 
answer to the critique of bioethics for being too abstract, too general, too dogmatic, as 
well as too far removed from clinical reality, insensitive to the peculiarities of specific 
situations.
In this chapter, we wish to discuss the use of empirical data in a method of ethical 
reflection in which coherence is central: Reflective Equilibrium. 
Reflective Equilibrium (RE) was first (thoroughly) defined in the works of John Rawls 
(Rawls 1971). In contrast to other approaches in ethics on evaluating and justifying moral 
judgments, the RE approach allows an a priori equal status or weight to the various data 
used, like (background) theories, principles and considered moral judgments (and, in 
our form of the RE, empirical data; we’ll come to that). The RE approach liberates us in 
this way from the idea that we have to approach a moral question either ‘from theory’ 
or ‘from practice’. It tries to facilitate a real dialogue between theory and practice by not 
assigning a preferential status to either of them. Considerations on different levels of ab-
straction have an equal status at the start of the reflection. Rawls himself wrote: ‘(…) its 
justification is a matter of mutual support of many considerations, of everything fitting 
together into one coherent view’ (Rawls 1971, p21). Stated otherwise:
‘A reflective equilibrium process pays attention to our moral and non-moral beliefs at vari-
ous reflective levels (particular intuitions, moral principles, abstract theories), and ‘tests’ 
various parts of our belief system by revising and refining beliefs at all levels. In a process 
of mutual adjustment, we seek coherence among the widest possible sets of beliefs (…)’ 
(Van der Burg and Van Willigenburg 1998, p1) 
Coherence is achieved by interaction between the different elements in RE. This interac-
tion can have an effect on all these elements. Thus, some elements need to be altered or 
1 Because our research field is bioethics, we will mainly talk about this field.
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removed, others kept. The equilibrium reached is also a dynamic one; it can change due 
to new elements in the reasoning process. In RE the reasoning is normally done by one 
individual, whom we will call: ‘the thinker’.
VARIETIES OF RE-METHODS – THE NETWORK MODEL WITH THIRD  
PERSON EXPERIENCES 
There are various versions of the RE approach, each differing in the nature and amount 
of the elements used.2 Certain types of consideration are deliberately included or ex-
cluded, depending on the goal of the reasoning process.3 This pragmatic (and of course 
reasoned) selectivity in the light of specific purposes is also a response to the danger of 
all-inclusiveness, which could make a RE method unworkable.
We will not discuss all RE versions here. We will only talk about the version we use 
in our research project on understanding the norm of informed consent in the field of 
pediatric oncology. In the remainder of this chapter, we will give examples taken from 
this research project to illustrate how we use RE to give answers to our research ques-
tions. The RE version we use is an adjusted form of the ‘Network Model’, first introduced 
by Van Willigenburg and Heeger (1989). They formulated an equilibrium which consists 
of considered moral judgments (they called it ‘intuitions’), applicable moral principles 
and the morally relevant facts of a case. Considered moral judgments are defined here as 
judgments containing specific ideas and particular situations. This form of RE is particu-
larly useful if one uses RE for justifying a specific course of action in an individual case, 
as, in order to judge a situation, we must distinguish between the morally salient fea-
tures of that situation. It is important to notice that in this model facts are not regarded 
as merely passive objects to which moral judgments or principles have to be applied, but 
as factors in the equilibrium process itself. There is a genuine interplay between facts, 
principles and moral judgments (intuitions).
We used The Network Model, but with two adjustments. First, we added background 
theories (on the moral status of a child and on developmental psychology) to the RE.4 
This was done because these theories provide the normative background of the princi-
ples used. Without background theories, the focus would be exclusively on the individual 
case (as in the Network Model), instead of on developing a (modest) theory which is 
2 For an overview of the various versions, see: Van der Burg and Van Willigenburg 1998, p12-17.
3 This goal can be establishing a (modest) moral theory, selecting moral principles or deciding a specific 
moral problem
4 Van der Burg called this Network Model, supplemented with background theories, the wide or extended 
Network Model. See: Van der Burg 1991. 
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applicable in a concrete field of ethical considerations and judgments, like Pediatrics.5 
Furthermore, their prescriptive or performative nature makes background theories par-
ticularly fit to correct for the tendency towards moral conservatism, as Norman Daniels 
(1979) suggests. Second and the topic of this chapter, the moral experiences6 of others 
than ‘the thinker’ were integrated in the Network Model. This means that the experi-
ences with a case or practice in the relevant moral community – collected by empirical 
research – are brought into the RE process. A basic assumption of this suggestion is the 
idea that the experiences people have in a practice7 are potentially morally relevant. The 
judgments and behaviors of these people give us unique insights in the practice at hand 
and should be taken into account in ethical reflection (Van Delden 1993, 19998). The ex-
periences are used in order to enrich the deliberation of ‘the thinker’ with the norms and 
practical wisdom of the field. The deliberation process remains that of the ‘thinker’, not 
necessarily of all the individual people in the practice. But because of the resemblance of 
the justification process in RE to the day-to-day moral reasoning within the moral com-
munity, the judgment reached will be more readily accepted and acted upon in practice 
(Van Willigenburg and Heeger 1989, p61).
To sum up our approach: the dialogue between theory and practice will consist of 
going back and forth between information stemming from practice (morally relevant 
facts and moral experiences of people in the practice) and from theory (principles and 
background theories). Figure 2 shows the different elements of our ‘Network Model with 
Third Person Moral Experiences’ in a model. 
The idea that empirical research on moral views is relevant to reflective equilibrium 
methods has been suggested by various authors (Van der Burg and Van WIlligenburg 
1998, p15). But applying RE this way in empirical bioethics also raises questions and criti-
cism. What precisely are moral experiences? How to select the moral experiences that are 
eventually used in the RE? How much weight should the empirical data be given in the 
RE? And the key question: can the use of RE by empirical ethicists really produce answers 
to practical moral questions? 
In this chapter we will address the reasons for including empirical data, and we will 
try to give an answer to the above questions and to criticism. As mentioned earlier, we 
5 Although we aim at a modest theory, we still talk about concrete cases. With ‘concrete’ we mean that we 
do elaborate on real persons in real situations. We do not hold a theoretical debate, but we deal with specific 
situations in which decisions have to be made that affect real people. 
6 When elaborating on the input of persons other than the ‘thinker’, we talk about experiences rather than 
intuitions or considered moral judgments. This is to distinguish them from the judgments of the ‘thinker’. In 
the paragraph on moral experiences we will come back to this preference.
7 We use MacIntyre’s definition of ‘practice’: ‘a practice is a coherent and complex form of socially established 
cooperative human activity’ (MacIntyre 1984, p187) 
8 Van Delden used the considered judgments of practitioners in the medical field in RE to construct a set of 
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Figure 2: The different elements of the ‘Network Model with Third Person Moral Experiences’. 
(Adapted from: Daniels 1996, p51)
will illustrate this by giving examples taken from our research project on understanding 
the norm of informed consent in the field of pediatric oncology. The examples are to be 
found throughout the text, but in separate textboxes. Our aim is to show how empirical 
information can practically be incorporated in a network model. 
Let us also mention what we are not going to do. Our focus will be entirely on the 
use of empirical data in the RE process. We will not discuss other (also fundamental) 
elements of the RE, like principles or background theories. Neither will we discuss criti-
cism on these elements or on coherentism as justifying principle. This has been done 
elsewhere and falls beyond the scope of this chapter.9
9 On coherentism: Daniels 1979. For a summary of the different elements: Van der Burg and Van Willigenburg 
1998. See also: Van Delden et al 2005. 
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MORAL EXPERIENCES 
In Rawls’ RE the considered judgments are only those of the ‘thinker’. In our use of RE 
we also include the judgments of people acting in the studied practice, namely the pedi-
atric oncology ward. For this purpose, we have added some notions from the empirical 
ethical approach used in phenomenology to the standard use of RE. Instead of using 
concepts like considered judgment or intuitions concerning the people in the field, we 
use the term moral experience. This is to emphasize the importance of the conscious 
events that make up an individual life and the events that make up the conscious past 
of a community.10 Phenomenologically speaking, moral experiences show the normative 
structure of the historical social reality in which they take place. In this, we follow Richard 
Zaner and his interest in ‘narratives’ (Zaner 1988). With the use of moral experiences, we 
want to emphasize the notion that moral life is rooted in the context in which it is lived. 
Every encounter is interpreted in terms of acquired understandings, shaped by previous 
experiences and the prevailing cultural system.
In epistemology, the central role of perceptual experience in grounding knowledge 
and justification is widely recognized. In ethical theory literature, there is not much atten-
tion given to the moral counterpart of this perceptual experience. Robert Audi attempts 
to fill the gap. According to him, moral experiences are the basis of knowledge or justified 
belief regarding one’s moral obligations. He attributes a significant epistemic (eviden-
tial) role to moral experience in grounding knowledge and justified belief of both singular 
moral judgments and general moral principles. On the difference between intuitions and 
moral experience he says: 
‘(…) far from reducing to a keen awareness of intuited propositions, moral experience may 
be a ground of such intuitions in the first place. We may intuitively judge that a deed is 
wrong because our experience of it is one of moral revulsion; the intuition may be a prod-
uct, not a cause, of the revulsion.’ (Audi 1998, p360) 
And on considered moral judgments as formulated by John Rawls: 
‘(…) one kind of intuitive moral judgment – a kind that for intuitionists and other moral 
theorists plays an epistemically basic role in ethics – is often not only a cognitive appraisal 
but also a response to a moral experience.’ (p362)
 
10 With this view we commit ourselves to a social basis for morality, instead of a psychological one.
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Audi moreover states that the practice of moral judgment epistemically depends on 
moral experience (p362). 
Moral experience is also connected with another concept of pre-logical knowing: ‘tac-
it knowledge’. This concept, introduced by Michael Polanyi (1967), comprises a range 
of conceptual and sensory information and images that can be brought to bear into an 
attempt to make sense of something. Tacit knowledge can be understood to be culturally 
embedded knowledge (including regional culture, organizational culture or social cul-
ture) and is difficult to share with people not embedded in that culture. It involves learn-
ing and skills in a way that cannot solely be prescribed or written down. The knowledge 
of how to ride a bike is an example: one cannot learn to ride a bike by reading a textbook; 
it takes personal experimentation and practice to gain the necessary skills, as well as a 
valuation of cultural norms. Much experience of a personal and normative character in 
medical practice resembles forms of tacit knowledge.
Acquiring the moral experiences of people in a practice 
In our study we try to grasp the moral experiences of children, parents and physicians on 
treatment and research decisions in a pediatric oncology practice and the role of informed 
consent. We based our study on a qualitative design with in-depth semi-structured inter-
views with patients (age 8-18 years), their parents and physicians. As our study aimed to 
explore views, motives and practices, a qualitative interview design seemed most appropri-
ate. The interview topics that structured the interviews were formulated after examining 
the relevant literature and after preliminary observational studies had been performed. All 
the families and physicians were interviewed by MdV, who kept a reflexive diary to record 
contextual details of the interviews and her reflections on the research process. The moral 
experiences thus obtained expressed the internal norms of the physicians on decision mak-
ing and gained insight in the problems children and parents faced during the decision 
making process.
WHY USE EMPIRICAL DATA TO FIND ANSWERS TO PRACTICAL MORAL 
QUESTIONS?
One cannot answer a practical moral question unless one knows the facts. Therefore, the 
need for ‘fact-finding’ by empirical research seems evident. As indicated earlier, in our 
model, the data about the practice (the moral experiences of third persons involved in a 
practice) have a special position. They are not merely the object about which statements 
are formulated, but they themselves can have an input into the process of formulating 
arguments. 
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There are good reasons for including empirical data in RE, and thus using them as 
independent input.11 First, it acknowledges the fact that every practice (in our case the 
medical practice) contains in itself special characteristics that should be involved in ethi-
cal reasoning. It brings ethics closer to beliefs that play a role in daily life. Second, it en-
riches moral reasoning because it illuminates relevant aspects of the case or solutions 
that one wouldn’t have thought of when starting from theory. Moreover, moral experi-
ences reflect the internal norms, the practical wisdom and the subtle, context-driven 
paths that practitioners follow when specifying abstract principles in concrete cases; 
and therefore they constitute a good deal of the internal norms and wisdom included in 
moral reasoning. Empirical research opens large sources of relevant expertise and thus 
generates potentially important information on the normative structure of reasoning and 
acting. Outside a practice it is difficult, if not impossible, to grasp these sources. Third, 
the chance of implementing the outcome of moral reasoning is increased when it is 
better applicable to the particularities of a practice. Fourth, it enhances moral thinking 
by taking into account the difficulties and problems that a certain moral dilemma poses 
in practice. Hereby we want to stress the importance of elaborating on the difficulties 
and problems encountered by patients, not only by medical workers. The target groups 
of patients and their relatives have been neglected for a long time in the profession-
ally oriented ethics discussions in health care. Patients and their relatives have at best 
been considered as topics of theoretical or problem-oriented medical ethics, but not real 
partners in ethical discourse. Focus on patients broadens the scope and therefore the 
credibility of the equilibrium reached. Reiter-Theil calls this: ‘Interest Groups-Related 
Medical Ethics’ (Reiter-Theil 2004). Related to this fourth reason is the final reason to 
include empirical data in the RE (especially third-person experiences): one reduces the 
risk of self-justification and bias by the ‘thinker’. The risk of self-justification is one of the 
main weaknesses of the RE model: coherence is not a sufficient guarantee for credibility 
or moral truth. As in legal practice and theory, facts and norms need to be combined in 
a search for truth. By including third-person experiences, one reduces the risk of self-
justification in two ways: since the experiences of many are brought into the RE process, 
there is a good chance of getting a pluralistic view on the matter at hand. Furthermore, 
minority positions can also gain attention in the process of reasoning. 
When addressing the problem of credibility and self-justification, we will have to ex-
plore more specifically the considered moral judgments of the ‘thinker’.
11 For these reasons, see also: Van Delden JJM and Van Thiel GJMW 1998; Van Delden et al 2005, p45.
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CONSIDERED MORAL jUDGMENTS AND CREDIBILITY
In every form of RE, considered moral judgments of the ‘thinker’ (sometimes called: 
intuitions)12 play an important role. They are the foundation stones of the equilibrium.
Rawls (1971) takes considered judgments to be judgments in which our ‘moral ca-
pacities are most likely to be displayed without distortion because they are given under 
conditions favorable for deliberation and judgment in general.’ The judgments are moral 
convictions that the ‘thinker’ has and that tells him which goods, situations and acts 
are (prima facie) good or bad. The judgments are well considered in the sense that they 
are not the result of an impulse or emotional reaction. They are made under conditions 
conducive to avoiding errors of judgment and therefore the holder of the judgment is 
relatively confident.
In our study, the considered moral judgments of the ‘thinker’ are the judgments of 
the primary researcher (MdV). For us, these judgments function as a basic assumption, 
a practical (in the sense that it refers to a specific practice, namely pediatric oncology) hy-
pothesis. The practical hypothesis originates from (initial) theoretical deliberation about 
known facts of the practice, applicable principles and known norms within the practice. 
After the deliberation, the ‘thinker’ reaches some sort of ‘hypothetical equilibrium’. In 
our research, the data used to formulate the hypothetical equilibrium were obtained by a 
literature search and observations in the (outward) pediatric oncology clinic. From these 
data we formed a theoretical framework, from which eventually an empirical study could 
be developed into decision-making in pediatrics, the various moral experiences of the 
actors involved and the weight of parental authority and child assent.
One of the hypotheses of our research was formulated as follows:
Considering that: 
The ethical ideal of respect for all persons supports respect for the developing autono-- 
my of children and adolescents in decisions about their participation in research.
In pediatric oncology, almost every treatment is combined with research, ranging from - 
evaluations of the current treatment protocols to randomized clinical trials; and
For this research, Dutch law requires the informed consent of children above the age - 
of 12, as well as parental permission.
12 In most literature on RE, the terms considered judgments and moral intuitions are used synonymously. 
Some authors want to separate the two terms. See for instance: Van Willigenburg 1991. 
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The hypothetical equilibrium could be:
‘Children aged 12 years and older should always be fully informed about research and give 
independent consent before entering a trial’
This hypothetical equilibrium is the starting point for reaching a new, reflective, equi-
librium, which is based on the dialogue between information stemming from practice 
(morally relevant facts and moral experiences of people in a practice) and from theory 
(principles and background theories). 
In our study, facts about the pediatric oncology practice are for example that discussions 
regarding diagnosis and treatment almost always include dialogue about participation 
in research, ranging from evaluations of the current treatment protocols to randomized 
clinical trials. This makes it difficult for physicians, parents and children, to determine 
whether research or clinical issues are at hand (for example when talking about goals and 
risks) and makes obtaining informed consent for the research a difficult task. Moreover, 
in pediatric oncology, the complex treatment- and research-related decisions arise against 
a background of acute, serious medical illness and extraordinary psychological and emo-
tional strain. Then, treatment and research protocols, because of their complex scientific 
structure, are difficult for laymen to understand. And finally, decisions about research 
participation often need to be made within hours or days. Still, a remarkable proportion 
of children with cancer – about 70% - participate in a trial during their illness. 
Important principles in pediatric research include: respect for autonomy (obtaining 
both parental permission and the child’s assent for research purposes is promoted, be-
neficence (can research be good for the child / in its best interests?) and non-maleficence 
(do we harm a child by letting it participate in research, or do we harm it when it cannot 
participate?). 
We want to emphasize the ‘deliberative’ starting point of the RE process, because no 
‘thinker’ enters an equilibrium process with a tabula rasa. His judgments are based on 
certain premises. Often, especially in bioethics, there is a great deal of activism in this 
starting point, in the sense that bioethical research presupposes that there exists some 
kind of moral wrongdoing in practice, and one accordingly strives to change the practice 
into something one believes to be good. To improve the transparency of the process 
of RE and to prevent self-justification, it is important to show one’s premises. The con-
36
Chapter 2
sidered judgment, or: hypothetical equilibrium of the researcher is formed out of these 
premises and the known facts and norms of the practice. As has been said, it’s the start-
ing point for the subsequent RE process. 
The subjective character and therefore the credibility of considered judgments are of-
ten questioned.13 Many authors note that nothing prevents one’s considered judgments 
from expressing only the arbitrary commitments and sentiments of a prejudiced view-
point (Van der Burg and Van Willigenburg 1998, p8). With our interpretation of a judg-
ment as a hypothetical equilibrium we at least try to be transparent about what elements 
or premises constitute this first judgment. Furthermore, judgments can alter during the 
RE process. In this way, the RE process itself can function as a filter, which can separate 
reliable from unreliable judgments. The process of weighing and balancing judgments, 
principles and background theories can let us identify judgments that are apparently 
wrong or prejudiced. Reasoning in RE means precisely this: the consideration of judg-
ments in the light of principles and theories (Van Delden et al 2005, p44).
Michael DePaul proposed a similar solution. He called it: a radical conception of RE 
(DePaul 1993,p40). In DePaul’s view, the considered moral judgments at the beginning 
of the reasoning process can differ substantially from the judgements which eventually 
end up in equilibrium with principles and theories. Initial beliefs or judgments may start 
the process of reflection, but they will in no sense determine the direction of the reflec-
tive process. His method may lead to ‘a very great shift in moral view’ of the researcher, 
which he called ‘conversion’ (p40-42). Typically, a person can acquire the ability to make 
relevant discriminations in judging and arguing only after a considerable amount of 
experience and training. Philosophical deliberations along the lines of the RE method 
should not only be thought of as affecting our beliefs and arguments, but should also 
be expected to cause ‘changes in a person’s judgmental faculties, so that these faculties 
no longer function in the same way, yielding the same beliefs and theories, as they previ-
ously did’ (p211). The radical conception of RE may therefore demand the expansion of 
one’s range of experiences, for example ‘real-life’ experiences through submersion in a 
certain practice, or by listening to voices in the practice. Of course: selecting the experi-
ences and the views that people express in this practice, remains difficult. There is a sig-
nificant risk that (in order to ‘prove’ the hypothesis of the ‘thinker’) certain experiences 
are left out and others are emphasized. It is therefore very important that the ‘thinker’ 
describes the reasons for including and excluding experiences. Of course, reflection on 
background and tenability of moral experiences is always necessary, before we can use it 
13 The question of how to reconcile the perspective of a particular person on a subject with an objective view 
on the same subject is a fundamental issue in ethics, knowledge theory and theories on the relation of mind to 
the physical world. For an introduction, see: Nagel 1986.
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as an insight in practice. But eventually, the process of reasoning towards an equilibrium 
should culminate in that reflection. As soon as experiences are further examined, the RE 
process has started. This means that in the RE process itself, experiences are selected 
as tenable or not. This selection should be transparent and documented in a descriptive 
qualitative approach.14 
When philosophical deliberations that lead to an equilibrium can guarantee that some 
(seemingly wrong) judgments are abandoned by the researcher during the process, then 
the problem of restricted credibility of moral judgments at the start of the process is 
reduced. As long as radical changes in someone’s judgments (and, according to DePaul, 
judgmental faculties) are possible, there is less danger of systematically wrong judg-
ments in an equilibrium. It is remarkable, that in bioethics, various researchers describe 
a ‘conversion’, especially when confronted with empirical data (e.g. The 1999a, 1999b).
Using moral experiences to reach RE
The moral experiences relevant to the above mentioned hypothetical equilibrium were as 
follows: almost every physician stated that full informed consent from adolescents > 12 
years, although required by Dutch Law, is difficult to achieve. In discussing treatment as 
well as research, physicians relied on proxy consent and their ideas on how to protect the 
best interests of the child. They acted in this way because in their opinion a child (even aged 
12 or older) is not capable of deciding, especially in a stressful situation. Furthermore, they 
themselves conformed to the research protocol. And, since they had proxy consent from 
parents, a positive IRB-review15 and their own investigator integrity, they felt confident 
that the research project protected the children from harm. Parents and children found it 
difficult to distinguish research from treatment and were preoccupied with survival, not 
with research participation. Children often felt comfortable that their parents made the 
decisions about research issues. Parents found it difficult to refuse research participation 
because they were afraid to offend the physician that had to save their child.
These internal norms, problems and views were subsequently included in moral rea-
soning using RE. We asked ourselves whether the internal norms of the physicians were 
compatible with the ‘theoretical’ norms expressed in the hypothetical equilibrium. Fur-
thermore, we deliberated on the views of parents and children and on how to integrate 
them in a coherent way. In other words: we readjusted the hypothetical equilibrium into 
14 For the reader of empirical ethical research it can sometimes be easy to see trough a biased selection. 
Certain respondents would be mentioned often, others never. 
15 An Institutional Review Board (IRB) is a group that has been formally designated to approve, monitor, and 
review biomedical and behavioral research involving humans with the alleged aim to protect the rights and 
welfare of the subjects.
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an empirical reflective equilibrium. To reach a new equilibrium, we compared the data 
on the moral experiences of the different actors with the existing interpretations of the 
principle of respect for autonomy (on which informed consent is based) and with the 
theories and ideals lying behind these interpretations. This can be described as follows: 
At first sight, it seems quite safe to rely on proxy consent and physicians’ ideas on how to 
protect the best interests of the child. But discussion should focus on the appropriateness, 
in the research setting, of this substitute for the adolescent’s consent. This model needs 
to be balanced in a RE with the moral weight of the principle of autonomy. We have to 
be aware that there is a difference between the treatment relationship and the research 
relationship, and that this difference remains valid in pediatric oncology. In the research 
relationship, the researcher seeks to advance knowledge to improve the care of future 
children. Any therapeutic benefit to the individual is in principle secondary to the over-
riding goal of obtaining new knowledge. Because of the fundamental differences between 
the research- and treatment-relationships, we claim that, although this is sometimes ac-
ceptable for treatment decisions, informed consent by adolescents (and their parents) in 
the research setting can never be ignored. Adolescents deserve a reasonable opportunity 
to make decisions about what happens to them within a research setting. To do so, both 
clinicians and researchers need to do more in explaining to adolescents the differences be-
tween experimental research and standard care. This can turn out to be a laborious task, 
especially in pediatric oncology, as much research is intertwined with clinical care and 
it may therefore be difficult to define clearly what portion of a given protocol is research 
rather than clinical care. But the mere fact that this intertwinement is an important 
feature of pediatric oncology, and that treatment centres conform to research protocols, 
is not an excuse to omit the effort. Furthermore, one of the background theories, devel-
opmental psychology (e.g. Piaget 1965), shows that a firm lower age limit of 11 years can 
be set, at which children achieve the capacity for abstract thought and gain the ability to 
understand the risks and benefits of research. Well-crafted information materials could 
aid investigators in explaining to potential child research participants and their parents 
exactly which elements of their care are research, and therefore optional (for example ad-
ditional blood samples or spinal taps). If we take informed consent (and therefore respect 
for patient autonomy) seriously, we have to develop an understanding of this norm that 
takes into account the complex setting of pediatric oncology and the limits herein of au-
tonomous decision-making by child patients and their parents. 
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CONCLUSION
Different aspects can strengthen the credibility of the moral judgments of the ‘thinker’ 
and can make the resulting RE free of bias. All these aspects have to do with using em-
pirical data. We think that the best answer to the question of how to identify non-biased 
moral judgments is that there needs to be space for a moral conversion, a radical shift 
in judgments, just as DePaul described. It is the duty of the ‘thinker’ to stay susceptible 
to various moral experiences. In our opinion, this means three things for the methodol-
ogy of an empirical study.16 First, the ‘thinker’ needs to have gained relevant experiences 
in the field studied and with this experience a relevant moral sensitivity on the subject. 
Second, when entering a practice, the thinker should investigate the norms and facts of 
the studied field, and the moral experiences of the people in the practice, until a state of 
saturation is reached. The search and subsequent analysis of data should be transparent 
and documented in a descriptive qualitative approach.17 Moreover, the search should be 
described in such a way that it is repeatable. Third, we should strive for intersubjectivity. 
This can be done by discussing the steps taken in RE, openly and with the utmost trans-
parency, with other researchers and by making explicit the arguments used to reach RE. 
It does not mean that a consensus has to be reached on the facts and judgments that will 
eventually be used in RE. The intersubjectivity should be based on reasonableness (Van 
Delden et al 2005). Other researchers should be able to understand why the ‘thinker’ 
selected certain judgments and facts, although they perhaps would have selected other 
judgments.
The RE model we embrace, The Network Model with Third Persons Experiences, 
gives us many opportunities to involve the context of a moral problem and therefore em-
pirical data in ethical thinking. As long as the ‘thinker’ stays susceptible to a wide range 
of experiences and facts, and accepts that his own judgments can change due to the RE 
process (the ‘conversion’), we expect this model to work very well for problem solving 
in specific cases.
 
16 We can learn a lot from the social sciences and their experience with the methodology of qualitative research. 
There is extensive literature on validity, reliability and generalizability. For an overview, see: Denzin and Lincoln 
2000. 
17 During our analysis, we used computer software (Kwalitan 5.0; see: Peters 2000) for multiple text 
management, including coding, locating, and retrieving key materials, phrases, and words.
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Chapter 3
THE ETHICS OF MEDICAL RESEARCH: 
INFORMED CONSENT AND 
THE THERAPEUTIC MISCONCEPTION
Parts of this chapter have been published in Dutch:
De Vries MC, Van Leeuwen E. Ethiek van medisch-wetenschappelijk onderzoek. 
Informed consent en de therapeutische misconceptie. 
Ned Tijdschr Geneesk. 2008; 152(12): 679-683.
De Vries MC, Zwaan CM. Mogelijkheden tot uitbreiden van geneesmiddelenonderzoek 
bij kinderen. Afweging van risico’s en belasting en de informed consent-procedure in 




Pediatric oncology has a strong research culture. Most pediatric oncologists are involved 
in clinical care as well as research. Consequently, various concepts analyzed in research 
ethics are also relevant when studying the pediatric oncology practice. This chapter of-
fers a theoretical introduction to the ethical concepts studied empirically in chapter 4. 
Medical-ethical approval of research involving human beings is based on two 
pillars: 
(1) ‘assessment’ by an institutional review board (IRB) or by a Central Committee of the 
scientific merit of the research and the risks and burdens for the research subject, and 
(2) ‘informed consent’ by the research subject or his legal representatives. 
Discussions on the ethical acceptability of research generally focus on the 1st pillar, as-
sessment by an IRB or Central Committee. Much less frequently there is concern about 
the 2nd pillar, obtaining informed consent from the research subject. In this chapter we 
analyze some ethical concepts which play a role when asking informed consent. We de-
scribe the criteria for valid informed consent: knowledge, competence and voluntariness. 
We especially focus on the concept of ‘therapeutic misconception’: the misconception 
that participating in research is the same as receiving individualized treatment from a 
physician. We assess this concept in the light of the fundamental difference between the 
research relationship (between investigator and subject) and the treatment relationship 
(between physician and patient). We argue that understanding the concept of ‘thera-
peutic misconception’ is essential to explaining why it is often difficult to obtain valid 
informed consent from patients or parents for medical research.
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INTRODUCTION
Pediatric oncology has a strong research culture. Most pediatric oncologists are involved 
in clinical care as well as research. Consequently, various concepts analyzed in research 
ethics are also relevant when studying the pediatric oncology practice. This chapter offers 
a theoretical introduction to the ethical concepts studied empirically in chapter 4. We de-
scribe the criteria for valid informed consent: knowledge, competence and voluntariness. 
We pay extra attention to the concept of therapeutic misconception, i.e. the tendency to 
mistake the scientific aim of the trial for the therapeutic aim of a treatment.
RESEARCH ETHICS IN THE MEDIA
On the 23rd of January 2008, the medical center of the University of Utrecht (UMC 
Utrecht) announced that during a randomized study on the effects of probiotics on pa-
tients with acute pancreatitis an unusually high mortality rate occurred among the group 
of patients who received treatment with probiotics (UMC Utrecht 2008). In total, twenty-
four patients (16%) from the study group died, as compared to only nine patients (6%) 
from the control group (Besselink et al 2008a; 2008b).
There were various responses to the press release. Some people wondered whether there 
had been a stratification problem in the inclusion phase. Others raised doubts about how 
the research was performed. Still others expressed worries about the way in which the 
participants were informed about the trial. The media openly asked the question whether 
this outcome could have been prevented and whether the research had been performed 
in the proper way. The government health care inspectorate announced an investigation 
into the execution of the research. At the talk show Pauw en Witteman a patient who 
had participated in the trial stated that he had not been sufficiently informed during the 
informed consent procedure (show of January the 24th 2008; http://pauwenwitteman.
vara.nl). In his perception, he had not been told about the possible risks involved in par-
ticipating in the trial. He claimed that the doctors had told him that the medication was 
´as safe as one of those probiotic drinks from the supermarket´. Moreover, he ´might as 
well have been buying a house´ when he signed the informed consent form, indicating 
that he did not know what he was signing for.
The responses to the news from the UMC Utrecht reflected the two pillars on which the 
ethical acceptability of medical research involving human subjects is based, namely: 










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The ethics of medical research
the subjects by an institutional review board (IRB) or by a Central Committee, and (2) 
the obtainment of informed consent from the subject or from his or her legal representa-
tive (see figure 3). In the Netherlands, these 2 pillars have been laid down in the Medical 
Research with Human Subjects Act (WMO, Wet Medisch-wetenschappelijk Onderzoek 
met Mensen).
This chapter will examine some of the ethical concepts involved in the pillar of informed 
consent. As mentioned above, the focus will be on the concept of ‘therapeutic miscon-
ception’. This concept is crucial to understanding why it is so difficult to obtain valid 
consent for medical research from subjects.
INFORMED CONSENT AS PILLAR OF ETHICAL ACCEPTABILITY OF RESEARCH
In discussions on the ethical acceptability of research, the focus is generally on the first 
pillar: supervision by a review board. The second pillar, the obtainment of informed 
consent for research approved by an IRB, rarely gets questioned. But this second pil-
lar requires discussion as well. For example: do subjects actually understand what the 
research entails? Are they able to weigh the risks and burdens themselves? Is it at all 
possible to obtain valid consent in emergency situations? 
According to the researchers from the UMC Utrecht, their research was conducted in 
compliance with the prevailing regulations and with the law. They point at the method-
ological soundness of the research and at the approval obtained from the local review 
board of every participating hospital. This means they mainly base their claim on the first 
pillar. They are supported by peer reviewers of the scientific article on the research results 
(Van Santen 2008). But what about the second pillar? Was informed consent obtained 
in a valid way as well?
CRITERIA FOR INFORMED CONSENT 
The principle of informed consent does justice to the ethical ideal of respecting a pa-
tient’s autonomy, and his right to self-determination. A valid informed consent meets 3 
criteria (see figure 3): knowledge, competence, and voluntariness.
Knowledge requires that the subject is supplied with sufficient information to be able 
to make a deliberate choice. Knowledge transfer, however, may be problematic. For in-
stance, research shows that a large number of patients find the written information they 
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receive hard to read and to understand (Paasche-Orlow et al 2003; Grossman et al 1994; 
Tarnowski et al 1990). Even after explanation by the physician, many of the patients who 
agree to take part in a trial still have misconceptions about the research procedures 
(Greenley 2006; Wendler 2004). In many cases, they do not have sufficient insight in 
necessary elements of informed consent, such as risks, burdens, possibility of alternative 
treatments, duration of the trial, the right to withdraw, and the voluntariness of participa-
tion. 
Competence means that the subject is able to understand the information he receives 
and that he realizes the consequences of his choice to either participate in the trial or de-
cline participation. When the decision whether or not to participate in research occurs at 
the onset of treatment for a severe illness, patients may be under extreme psychological 
and emotional pressure. One may question their competence under such circumstanc-
es. The subjects in the UMC Utrecht trial all came in with an acute pancreatitis which 
was predicted to take a serious course - not an ideal situation to be in when one needs 
to weigh information and make a deliberate choice. In hindsight, patients may start to 
doubt their apparent competence at the time, as did the patient in the talk show Pauw 
en Witteman.
Voluntariness means that the subject is able to give his or her consent without being 
coerced or influenced. However, it is easy to influence a patient. By the way in which the 
information is given or by not mentioning some of the information, physicians even un-
consciously manipulate the choice of the patients or their representatives. The emotional 
circumstances surrounding a serious disease foster reliance on the doctor who brings 
up the treatment and the trial (Ong et al 1995). In pediatric trials, parents indicate that 
they find it difficult to oppose the physician’s proposal because they are afraid this will 
have an adverse effect on their child’s treatment (Heneghan et al 2004). Moreover, they 
may be under the pressure of having to decide on participation in the trial within a few 
hours or days. 
THERAPEUTIC MISCONCEPTION
One aspect of the informed consent procedure which merits separate attention is the 
so-called ‘therapeutic misconception’: the tendency to mistake the scientific aim of the 
trial for the therapeutic aim of a treatment. This therapeutic misconception was first 
described in 1982 as the misunderstanding that taking part in a trial is the same as re-
ceiving individualized treatment (Appelbaum et al 1982; Appelbaum et al 1987). Subjects 
may have difficulty to recognize that the aim of a trial is to obtain scientific information 
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(even if this will contribute to enabling better care in the future); they may not under-
stand that potential benefits for the subjects themselves are formally a mere by-product 
of gaining such information, and that research participation may involve the sacrifice of 
some degree of personal care.
Research shows that 40-80% of study participants express inaccurate beliefs regard-
ing the degree of individualization of their treatment, or regarding the likelihood of ben-
efit, given the methods of the study (Appelbaum et al 2004). Current medical practice, 
in which research and treatment may be closely interrelated, leaves much room for such 
misunderstandings. For instance, participants in a randomized trial may think that they 
can decide for themselves which arm they will be assigned to, or that a physician will 
decide on the basis of what seems best for them. It may not always be clear that the as-
signment will actually be random. 
Physicians, too, may suffer from the therapeutic misconception. They may, for exam-
ple, experience tension between their role as a clinician and as a researcher. Two studies 
show that oncologists, even those with plenty of research experience, mostly adopt the 
perspective of clinician instead of that of researcher when they discuss participation in 
a trial (Joffe et al 2002; Taylor 1992). They often sincerely think that clinical trials pro-
vide a perfect harmony between the aims of patient care on the one hand and scientific 
advancement on the other. The best possible treatment then seems to be offered in the 
strict set-up of a research protocol (Joffe et al 2002).
TREATMENT RELATIONSHIP AND RESEARCH RELATIONSHIP 
A fundamental point of departure in medical ethics, however, is the important distinc-
tion between the treatment relationship which exists between clinician and patient, and 
the research relationship which exists between researcher and subject (National Com-
mission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research 
1979). In the treatment relationship, the individual well-being of the patient prevails. The 
ethical principles of beneficence and non-maleficence are important here. Incidentally 
obtained new information is secondary to the overriding goal of the medical activity, 
i.e. treating the patient. The treatment is often conducted without explicit consent from 
the patient. This is called implicit or presumed consent and is exemplified in a patient’s 
stretching of an arm for a vena puncture. Concerning children, pediatricians routinely 
carry out medically indicated procedures on children without obtaining consent or as-
sent. Indeed, many procedures are even performed over the child’s vigorous objections. 
This is acceptable because it is the interest of the child which is the sole motivation 
prompting the intervention (Lee et al 2006).
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In a research relationship, by contrast, the aim of the researcher is to obtain new 
knowledge and thus enable the improvement of future treatments. Potential therapeutic 
advantages are secondary to the prevailing aim of obtaining information. Therefore, ev-
ery act of research requires explicit consent. 
It is sometimes claimed that in randomized trials the basic requirement of thera-
peutic benefit is met because of the so-called ‘clinical equipoise’; the researcher sin-
cerely does not know which of the trial arms will turn out to be the best for the group 
of patients as a whole at completion of the trial. However, the fundamental difference 
between a treatment and a research relationship is that the experienced clinician selects 
and conducts the treatment – in accordance with individual, patient-specific consider-
ations – while the researcher refrains from patient-specific considerations and opts for 
randomized assignment in order to obtain general results for the group of patients as 
a whole, with no importance given to individual traits or preferences. And even though 
the benefits and risks of participating in a trial may seem to be at least as favorable as 
those of undergoing a standard treatment, a characteristic of randomized trials remains 
precisely that researchers may never positively know in advance what the actual benefits 
and risks will turn out to be – as the UMC Utrecht study clearly shows. If one, in spite of 
this, communicates the absolute equality of the arms of a trial to potential subjects, this 
will increase the chance that they will fall prey to the therapeutic misconception (Miller 
and Brody 2003).
DISCUSSION
Obtaining valid consent is not an easy task. The informed consent procedure should 
start with a clarification of the situation: subjects who think they will receive individual-
ized treatment, while in reality they will be treated according to the research protocol, 
cannot give their valid consent. Subjects have the right to a fair opportunity to make a 
deliberate decision on whether or not to participate in a trial. Therefore, clinicians and 
researchers should clearly explain the difference between the standard treatment and the 
treatment administered in the trial (Appelbaum 2002). This may take a fair amount of 
time, especially in a setting where research and treatment are closely interrelated. When 
the research pertains to an acute disorder and when the intervention involves taking a 
nutritional supplement, as was the case in the UMC Utrecht study, it seems natural to 
rely on the argument of clinical equipoise. However, approval by an IRB and the reason-
able expectation of clinical equipoise may never replace the consent procedure.
51
The ethics of medical research
Well-formulated written information may help researchers in explaining which ele-
ments of a treatment protocol are in fact part of research and therefore optional (Ungar 
et al 2006). In a study in pediatric oncology, parents themselves were asked for advice 
on how to improve the informed consent procedure (Eder et al 2007). They stated that 
the information should be based on the individual situation of the subjects and not on 
legal requirements – the latter often leading to long and complicated patient information 
forms. Parents also wanted a clearer distinction, in time and/or in spokesperson, be-
tween consultations regarding the treatment on the one hand and the trial on the other. 
Finally, they desired more time to decide. It is precisely this last point which is hard to 
realize if the trial has to start immediately after the diagnosis and the patients are criti-
cally ill, as in the probiotics study. 
A first step towards solving this problem might be to always have a close relative of 
the patient present, who listens in on the informed consent procedure. Moreover, the 
informed consent procedure should be seen more as a process than as one decisive mo-
ment. During the course of a trial, there should be multiple moments in which patient-
participants are again informed of what the trial entails, what the risks are, and what the 
difference is with regular treatment.  This will prevent them from afterwards feeling that 
they have not been sufficiently informed. 
Notably, most researchers indicate hardly having received any training in conducting 
consent consultations or in the requirements that such consultations should meet. And 
IRBs are confined to assessing the written information, and do not monitor the actual 
informed consent procedure with patients.
CONCLUSION
The above proves that the informed consent procedure is full of pitfalls, and that it is 
difficult to obtain consent that is actually valid, especially when it comes to trials in-
volving acute disorders. It therefore seems necessary to provide physicians involved in 
such trials with additional training in this area. The focus should then be at perceiving 
the informed consent procedure as a process in which the subject gains more insight 
throughout the study into what the trial actually entails.

Chapter 4
ETHICAL ISSUES AT THE INTERFACE OF CLINICAL 
CARE AND RESEARCH PRACTICE IN PEDIATRIC 
ONCOLOGY: A NARRATIVE REVIEW OF PARENTS’ 
AND PHYSICIANS’ EXPERIENCES
 
De Vries MC, Houtlosser M, Wit JM, Engberts DP, Bresters D, Kaspers GJL, Van Leeuwen E.




Background. Pediatric oncology has a strong research culture. Most pediatric oncologists 
are investigators, involved in clinical care as well as research. As a result, a remarkable 
proportion of children with cancer enrolls in a trial during treatment. This chapter dis-
cusses the ethical consequences of the unprecedented integration of research and care 
in pediatric oncology from the perspective of parents and physicians.  
Methodology. An empirical ethical approach, combining (1) a narrative review of (primar-
ily) qualitative studies on parents’ and physicians’ experiences of the pediatric oncology 
research practice, and (2) comparison of these experiences with existing theoretical ethi-
cal concepts about (pediatric) research. The use of empirical evidence enriches these 
concepts by taking into account the peculiarities that ethical challenges pose in prac-
tice.
Results. Analysis of the 22 studies reviewed revealed that the integration of research 
and care has consequences for the informed consent process, the promotion of the 
child’s best interests, and the role of the physician (doctor vs. scientist). True consent 
to research is difficult to achieve due to the complexity of research protocols, emotional 
stress and parents’ dependency on their child’s physician. Parents’ role is to promote 
their child’s best interests, also when they are asked to consider enrolling their child in 
a trial. Parents are almost never in equipoise on trial participation, which leaves them 
with the agonizing situation of wanting to do what is best for their child, while being fear-
ful of making the wrong decision. Furthermore, a therapeutic misconception endangers 
correct assessment of participation, making parents inaccurately attribute therapeutic 
intent to research procedures. Physicians prefer the perspective of a therapist over a 
researcher. Consequently they may truly believe that in the research setting they promote 
the child’s best interests, which maintains the existence of a therapeutic misconception 
between them and parents. 
Conclusion. Due to the integration of research and care, their different ethical perspec-
tives become intertwined in the daily practice of pediatric oncology. Increasing aware-
ness of what this means for the communication between parents and physicians is es-
sential. Future research should focus on efforts that overcome the problems that the 
synchronicity of research and care evokes. 
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BACKGROUND
Children treated for cancer are increasingly likely to survive. For all childhood cancers 
combined, 5-year overall survival has improved over the past 30 years from less than 20% 
to about 75%, due to improved treatment and supportive care (Ries et al 2007; Jemal et 
al 2003). A major factor contributing to these advances is the systematic research effort 
in pediatric oncology. Pediatric oncology has a strong research culture. This is instigated 
by two circumstances: evidence from research with adults with cancer cannot be general-
ized to children and childhood cancer is a rarity. If long delays in making evidence-based 
treatments available to children with cancer are to be avoided, it is important that trials in 
pediatric oncology recruit a much greater proportion of the patient population than adult 
cancer trials. As a consequence, most pediatric oncologists are investigators involved in 
both clinical care and research. 
In the setting of pediatric oncology most treatments are given according to national 
or international protocols which describe in detail the treatment plan for each type of 
cancer. Protocols represent the best available treatment at a given moment according 
to the published medical literature, but may also include research components which 
contain potential improvements of the treatment. Table 4 shows different types of re-
search which are often performed during treatment. As a result of these research efforts, 
a remarkable proportion of children with cancer – up to 70% of children in the developed 
world - enrolls in a study during their cancer treatment, as compared to only 1-4% of 
adult patients (Ablett and Pinkerton 2003; Bleyer 1997; Ablett et al 2004). Due to the 
integration of research and care the pediatric oncology practice always faces ethical chal-
lenges inherent to research participation. 
The aim of this chapter is to describe the ethical consequences of the fading boundary 
between research and care from the perspective of parents and physicians. We present 
an empirical ethical approach using a narrative review of existing empirical research evi-
dence on parents’ and physicians’ experiences of the integration of research and care. 
The use of empirical evidence enhances moral thinking by taking into account the pecu-
liarities and difficulties that ethical challenges pose in practice. The results therefore re-
main much closer to the particular reality of the ethical consequences than a theoretical 
analysis would permit (De Vries and Van Leeuwen 2010).
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Table 4: description of different types of research in pediatric oncology
Type of research Description
Randomized Controlled Trials (RCT) The random allocation of different treatments to 
patient-subjects. The best available treatment is 
compared to one or more regimens that are expected 
to either improve overall survival or lessen toxicity 
with equivalence of outcome. Most ‘front-line’ 
pediatric cancer studies are phase III randomized 
controlled trials.
Clinical Controlled Trial (CCT) Evaluation of singe-arm treatment protocols by 
clinical and epidemiological data collection and 
systematic analysis of disease characteristics, actual 
treatment, treatment results and side-effects. Current 
treatment results are compared to historical results 
and to results obtained by other research groups.
Laboratory research using tissue from 
patients
Unraveling the pathogenesis of childhood cancers, 
characterization of tumor biology, detection of 
new treatment targets and identification of novel 
prognostic factors. For this purpose left over blood, 
bone marrow or cerebrospinal fluid is used, or 
additional biological specimens are taken at defined 
moments during treatment. In fact, permission is 
often asked for storage of biological materials in a 
cell bank for future, as yet not specified research.
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METHODOLOGY
A narrative review within empirical ethics
In ethics, the use of empirical evidence has become more and more popular, leading to 
a distinct form of applied ethics, namely empirical ethics. Especially in bioethics, this 
‘empirical turn’ is visible (Borry et al 2005). Empirical ethics is a broad category, grasping 
different interpretations of integrating ethics and empirical research. There is, however, 
one basic assumption in all sorts of empirical ethics: the study of people’s actual moral 
beliefs, intuitions, behavior and reasoning in a practice yields information that is mean-
ingful for ethics (Borry et al 2004). It denies the structural incompatibility of empirical 
and normative approaches, and believes in their fundamental complementarity. It is an 
answer to the critique of bioethics for being too abstract, too general, too dogmatic, as 
well as too far removed from clinical reality, insensitive to the peculiarities of specific 
situations.
To gain empirical information, we conducted a narrative review of (primarily) qualita-
tive studies on experiences of parents and physicians in the pediatric oncology research 
practice. We subsequently confronted these experiences with existing theoretical ethical 
concepts about (pediatric) research, namely goals of research, informed consent, best 
interests, equipoise and therapeutic misconception. In other words, the theoretical ethi-
cal concepts were the starting point and were subsequently enriched by the emergent 
themes from the narrative review. The experiences of parents and physicians give us 
unique insights in the research practice and the way ethical concepts function in this 
practice. Because we use empirical findings we come much closer to the reality of the 
ethical challenges faced than a theoretical essay could (De Vries and Van Leeuwen 2010; 
Denzin and Lincoln 2000).
Literature search
An initial work-up established that the literature was too heterogeneous to permit a sys-
tematic review of qualitative studies along the lines proposed by Dixon-Woods (Dixon-
Woods et al 2001). Furthermore, a systematic review would not permit a wide and com-
prehensive scope and the opportunity to cover a wide range of issues (concepts) within 
the topic of pediatric oncology research ethics (Collins and Fauser 2005). For these rea-
sons, a narrative review was undertaken.
Studies included in the review were identified by keyword searches of Web of Science, 
Picarta, Pubmed, Cochrane and EMBASE. Keywords searched included ‘oncology’, ‘clini-
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Table 5: Summary of study characteristics
Author & Date Setting Methodology
Sample 
characteristics
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cal trials’, ‘pediatric*’, ‘decision making’, ‘informed consent’, ‘parents’, randomized con-
trolled trials’ in combination with ‘qualitative study’, ‘semi-structured’, ‘ethnograph*’ 
and ‘experiences’. Manual searches of other relevant journals (JCO, Pediatric Blood and 
Cancer, Journal of Pediatric Hematology and Oncology, Pediatrics) and reference lists of 
primary articles found from initial searches were also conducted. 
The focus of the review was on the research types described in Table 4. Other types of 
research, especially phase I and II studies, are also performed in the pediatric oncology 
setting.  However, the described three types of research have typically become integrated 
into pediatric oncology practice in such a way that, in contrast with phase I and II stud-
ies, almost all patients and their parents are confronted with them at the start of initial 
treatment. The ethical challenges of phase I and II studies fall beyond the scope of this 
chapter, because these studies are usually applied in second line treatment and are not 
part of initial treatment protocols. 
The median age of children diagnosed with cancer is below 6. Therefore it is as-
sumed in this chapter that the child is not competent, and that parental authority and 
the physician’s care are the main factors in determining the best interest of the child. 
We discuss the difficulties of obtaining assent and consent for research from older chil-
dren elsewhere (Chapter 6). Studies focusing on children’s experiences were excluded. 
In common with other narrative reviews, evaluations of methodological quality were not 
used to exclude papers.
The search revealed 20 qualitative studies, 1 quantitative study, and 1 combination of a 
quantitative questionnaire and qualitative interviews. Not all studies focus (only) on the 
pediatric oncology research context, but (also) on adult and clinical context. These stud-
ies were still included because they provided important information on especially physi-
cians’ attitudes towards research and their conflicting professional roles of physician 
and investigator. For this topic, it was not necessary to have a pediatric setting. Table 5 
summarizes the 22 study characteristics, including setting (pediatric vs. adult, research 
vs. clinical context), methodology applied (interviews, observations, questionnaire) and 
perspective (parents, physician).  
The existing (theoretical) ethical concepts about research were studied using ETHX on 
the web, Philosopher’s Index and Bioethics Line. We focused on ‘research goals’, ‘in-
formed consent’, ‘best interests’, ‘equipoise’ and ‘therapeutic misconception’.




Analysis of the 22 studies reviewed revealed four main themes: intertwinement of re-
search and treatment goals, problems with informed consent, promoting best interests 
in a research setting and therapeutic misconceptions.
Goals of research and care: who’s best interest? 
One of the consequences of the fading boundary between research and clinical care is 
that the goals of research and treatment become intertwined. From an ethical point of 
view, the goals of treatment and research are fundamentally different (National Commis-
sion for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research 1979; 
Miller and Brody 2003). In the treatment relationship, the best interests of the individual 
child prevail when treatment options are discussed. Generation of new knowledge is in-
cidental compared to the overriding goal of providing optimal therapy. In the context of 
research, the researcher seeks to advance knowledge about what could be the best care 
of children, as well as to serve other interests like academic merit. Therapeutic benefits to 
the individual child are, in the research perspective, secondary to the overriding goal of 
obtaining robust data and new knowledge. Children therefore may have to undergo pro-
cedures that are not determined by the goals of treatment, like additional blood samples, 
spinal taps and (PET-) scans. 
The different ethical perspectives of treatment and research can also be illustrated by 
the different types of ethical principles governing the two activities (National Commis-
sion for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research 1979; 
Miller and Rosenstein 2003; Council of Europe 1997). In the context of pediatric treat-
ment the principles of beneficence and non-maleficence dictate the practice, translated 
in the statement that treatment should be in the best interest of the individual child. 
Usually parents and physicians share the same ideas on what constitutes the child’s best 
interest, making it possible to use the concept of implicit consent. 
In the context of research, however, beneficence also involves benefits to others. The 
prevailing principle therefore is respect for autonomy. Respect for autonomy incorpo-
rates two ethical convictions: firstly, that individuals should be treated as autonomous 
subjects, and secondly, that persons with diminished autonomy are entitled to protec-
tion (National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and 
Behavioral Research 1979). Respect for autonomy demands that subjects voluntarily 
participate in research, with adequate information and only after explicit consent. In the 
case of incompetent subjects, like young children, there should be vigorous protection 
against abuse, and substitute permission should be sought. 
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Due to the integration of research and care, their different ethical perspectives must 
simultaneously be applied in the daily practice of pediatric oncology. This has conse-
quences for the informed consent process, the promotion of the best interest of the child 
by parents, and the role of the physician (doctor vs. scientist).
Informed consent in the pediatric oncology research setting
Joffe and all have shown that the context of pediatric oncology contains many obstacles to 
a good informed consent process (Joffe et al 2006), especially when discussions regard-
ing diagnosis and treatment include dialogue about participation in research. Parents 
have the difficult task to differentiate between research and clinical issues, for example 
when talking about goals and risks. Informed participation in decision making requires 
adequate understanding of treatment options, but simultaneously the understanding of 
the distinction between research and therapeutic intent and of difficult research-related 
concepts, such as randomization, voluntariness and the risk–benefit ratio. The consent 
forms involved, explaining concepts and methods, are complex by nature and difficult to 
understand (Berger et al 2009; Paasche-Orlow et al 2003; Tarnowski et al 1990; Gross-
man et al 1994).  Studies show that parents frequently have an incomplete understand-
ing of the necessary elements of informed consent in research, especially of the risks, 
the procedures, the possibility of alternative treatments, the duration of participation, 
their right to withdraw, and the voluntariness of participation (Kodish et al 2004; Wiley 
et al 1999; Stevens and Pletsch 2002). A reason for this incomplete understanding might 
be that the standard treatment protocols often include research interventions, like extra 
blood draws, or a randomization, as if these research elements were an integral part of 
the treatment. For example, the Dutch protocol for acute lymphoblastic leukemia (ALL) 
states in the parent information form: 
‘Almost all children with ALL are treated according to a national protocol of the Dutch 
Childhood Oncology Group or according to an international protocol. A protocol contains 
guidelines for research and the mode of treatment’. (Dutch Childhood Oncology Group 
2007, p61) 
This can make parents think that when they consent to the protocol, they consent to the 
treatment as well as to the research elements, and that it is not an option only to accept 
the treatment and to decline research participation (Chappuy et al 2010). 
The literature also shows that physicians find it difficult to obtain truly informed con-
sent for complex treatment and research proposals from parents who are emotionally 
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distressed because their child has a life threatening condition (Joffe et al 2006; Derma-
tis and Lesko 1990). The extraordinary psychological strain influences physician-parent 
communication and limits its potential effectiveness, especially when decisions about 
research participation need to be made within hours or days (Levi et al 2000). The emo-
tional setting of (pediatric) oncology puts in this way great trust on the acting physician 
who raises treatment and research options (Ong et al 1995; Van Stuijvenberg et al 1998). 
In fact, consent for research is often based on the relationship of trust which exists in the 
care setting between the physician and the parents (Dermatis and Lesko 1990; Shilling 
and Young 2009). 
Consequently, in the pediatric oncology setting true consent from parents for re-
search is difficult to obtain. 
Promoting best interests from a parental point of view
The primary responsibility of parents is to care for and protect their child, also when 
parents are asked to consider enrolling their child in a pediatric clinical trial (Tait et al 
1998). This responsibility makes it difficult for them to think of a research setting as 
detached from the best interests of their child. Of course parents often state that they 
are motivated to support research that may improve the chances of future patients. They 
acknowledge that the participation of other children in former trials has improved treat-
ment to the benefit of their own child and they are prepared to do likewise. But protect-
ing their child is fundamental to the parental role and this shapes how they think about 
trials (Shilling and Young 2009). Some form of altruism can play a role in deciding to 
let a child participate in research, but only with the firm conviction that the research will 
not pose any harm to the child, and even more, with the prospect that the research will 
benefit the child (Singhal et al 2002; Reynolds and Nelson 2007).
Parents will take many different factors into account when deciding whether or not to 
let their child enter an RCT and will not simply accept randomization because an ethics 
committee has deemed it permissible. For some parents, randomized trials may repre-
sent the prospect of receiving a new treatment with a potentially important direct benefit 
to their child (Kupst et al 2003). If this new treatment is only available within a trial, par-
ents may consent to their child’s entry for the chance of receiving the assumed benefits 
(Snowdon et al 1997). It can cause them to anticipate regret for not at least trying to get 
this new treatment through research participation, all from their perspective as guardian 
of the interests of their child.
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The question whether a potential benefit will become available through participation in 
research is particularly germane. It can be hard for parents to understand that a study 
involves a new, and in their view potential better therapy for their child, but that research 
methodology involves randomization, and that the child can also draw the standard 
therapy (Eiser et al 2005). On finding that their child has been allocated to the standard 
arm, parents sometimes report a sense of missed opportunity, as if the child has been 
deprived of a known beneficial treatment (Shilling and Young 2009). This may lead to 
unwanted tensions between parents and physicians at the outset of a long treatment 
relationship.
On the other hand, parents can also hesitate to participate because of fears for an ‘ex-
perimental’ arm, of being used as a ‘guinea pig’, or of a computer choosing what therapy 
will be given (Kupst et al 2003).
The treating physician and the investigator are often the same person. This can make 
parents fear that refusal will have consequences for their future relationship with the 
physician. Parents frequently indicate that they find it difficult to oppose the proposal 
of the physician, because they are afraid that this might jeopardize the relationship with 
the physician, even though consent forms explicitly state the opposite (Appelbaum et al 
2009; Heneghan et al 2004).
  
Whatever arm of a trial parents think is better for their child, their preference shows 
that the idea of clinical equipoise held by the expert medical community is not directly 
transferable to the parent setting. For parents the different arms of a trial are often not 
in equipoise. Firstly, because they can hold the conviction that one arm is medically 
superior (Kupst et al 2003; Snowdon et al 1997; Eiser et al 2005). Secondly because the 
arms may differ in duration or in the amount of extra visits or blood draws. The personal 
context of a family then determines whether or not a trial arm fits to this family. For ex-
ample, parents may prefer one trial arm because they live long distance from the hospital 
and the preferred arm contains less extra visits. Parental equipoise would be the point at 
which the parents are ‘maximally uncertain’ regarding the relative efficacy, safety and fit-
tingness to their personal situation of comparator interventions. Parental equipoise has 
not been described before, but could be seen as the ‘proxy version’ of patient equipoise. 
When Freedman defined (clinical) equipoise, he stated that it is the expert medical com-
munity that ought to be in equipoise (Freedman 1987). In the literature however, it is 
argued that not only the medical expert community should be in equipoise, but also the 
trial participants themselves (London 2007; Veatch 2002). London argues that this has 
consequences for the informed consent process:
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‘There may be reasons that might lead a potential trial participant to prefer one treat-
ment over another even though expert opinion is conflicted. (…) When this is the case, 
participating in a clinical trial may not be a permissible option for that patient. (…) This 
example (…) provides a clear focus for the goals of the informed consent process: to ensure 
that only those individuals participate in research who see the clinical trial as a reason-
able option in light of the conflict or uncertainty that exists in expert medical opinion.’ 
(London 2007, p584).
This resembles Hans Jonas’ argument that the people who should be enrolled in a clini-
cal trial should be the ones who most identify with the cause of research (Jonas 1969). 
The mentioned literature shows that parental equipoise is often very difficult to reach, 
which leaves parents with the agonizing situation of wanting to do what is best for their 
child, while not knowing whether research participation is the best course of action to 
achieve this and being fearful of making the wrong decision (McKenna et al 2010). 
Therapeutic Misconception
Parents can mix up research and treatment goals (Kodish et al 2004; Wiley et al 1999; Ste-
vens and Pletsch 2002; Chappuy et al 2010). Failure to appreciate the difference between 
the context of research and treatment, and therefore inaccurately attributing therapeutic 
intent to research procedures is called ‘the therapeutic misconception’ (Appelbaum et al 
1982; Appelbaum et al 2004). It refers to the research subject’s failure to appreciate that 
the aim of research is to obtain scientific knowledge, and that any benefit to the subject 
is a side product of that goal. Though the data are scarce, there is evidence that many 
trial participants in oncology hold therapeutic misconceptions (Kodish et al 2004; Joffe 
et al 2001). One study found that 40-80% of subjects show basic misunderstandings of 
the research trial design (Appelbaum et al 1987). 
Due to the fading boundary between research and care in pediatric oncology thera-
peutic misconceptions can easily arise. This puts another burden on the process of in-
formed consent during which parents will have to be made aware that the proposed 
treatment is not selected only because of the individual needs of the patient.
The physician’s perspective: doctor vs. scientist
Not only parents find it difficult to distinguish treatment and research goals. Physicians 
and other health personnel may also experience problems when research and clinical 
care are performed simultaneously. The traditional division of tasks in clinical or re-
search-related is challenged by the emergence of randomized controlled trials (RCTs) 
and clinical controlled trials (CCTs, see also Table 4) (Taylor 1992). Physicians may ex-
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perience tension between their roles as clinicians and scientists, since the latter defies 
the traditional definition of their core task to place the best interests of patients first. As 
a solution most oncologists, even those with substantial trial involvement, focus first of 
all on the possible benefit to their immediate patient and not on the theoretical benefit 
of future patients. In this way they adopt the perspective of a therapist rather than that 
of a researcher (Taylor et al 1994). Studies show that many oncologists really feel that 
research participation is in the best interest of the individual child (De Vries et al 2010; 
Joffe and Weeks 2002). This can be understood in two ways. Firstly, physicians feel con-
fident that trials are not harmful, and that control by an Institutional Review Board (IRB) 
protects the child. Secondly, physicians believe that being in a trial, independently of the 
arm the patient is in, is even better than receiving the same treatment outside of the trial 
(De Vries et al 2010). Enrolling children in clinical trials would ensure that they receive 
the best treatment. The website of the M.D. Anderson Cancer Center, one of the leading 
centers for cancer research and care, states underneath a list of diseases for which clini-
cal trials are available:
 
‘When you are offered to participate in a clinical trial, your doctor has decided that the 
best treatment for your condition is provided in that trial’ (MD Anderson Cancer Center 
2011).
This suggests that trials are viewed not only as a way to improve treatment in the future, 
but also as the best treatment for current patients. Pediatric oncologists tend to view trial 
protocols as clinical practice guidelines (Joffe and Weeks 2002). The statements by many 
leaders in oncology that clinical trials represent the optimum care for cancer patients are 
also an expression of this view (Bailes 2000; American Federation of Clinical Oncology 
Societies 1998). 
It could be argued that a RCT does preserve the basic duty to act in the best interest of 
the child because of clinical equipoise. After all, no subject is randomized to a treatment 
known to be inferior to the standard treatment. But the fundamental difference between 
research and treatment is that the treatment setting requires an experienced clinician 
who selects and monitors the treatment taking into account individual, person-specific 
factors. The setting of a RCT requires that once a child is thought eligible for participa-
tion, the investigator renounces patient specific considerations and uses randomization 
and a meticulously followed protocol in order to get generalizable results. (Of course 
taking into account that a child will be removed from a study if it is not in its interests to 




Especially when experimental treatments are evaluated, the risks and benefits in ran-
domized trials are less fixed than those in standard medical care. It is the hallmark of 
randomized studies that it is never known in advance what the actual risks and benefits 
will be: only after the completion of a study one genuinely knows which arm of the trial 
showed the best results and whether or not participants were exposed to extra risks and 
burdens in the intervention arm. Kumar et al (2005) described 126 RCTs within the set-
ting of the Children’s Oncology Group. They showed that new (experimental) treatments 
are as likely to be inferior as they are to be superior to standard treatments. Most pediat-
ric oncology trials have Data and Safety Monitoring Plans (DSMP) and suspension rules 
for the very purpose of dealing with unexpected risks and outcomes. 
It has been argued that trial participation is beneficial as compared to non-partici-
pation because of the strict adherence to well-defined protocols. Various authors have 
shown that the use of a treatment protocol improves the end result of that treatment 
(Stiller and Eatock 1999; Karjalainen and Palva 1989). This would be due to the explicit 
description of treatment phases and follow up and to strict guidelines indicating how to 
deal with side effects and relapses.  For CCTs one could conclude that participation is 
beneficial, since CCTs are single arm studies in which the best available treatment is laid 
down in a protocol (to be able to compare treatment results to historical results). But it 
is more difficult to apply this to RCTs. A Cochrane review assessed whether there were 
beneficial effects from participating in RCTs (Vist et al 2008).  The outcomes of patients 
who participated in RCTs were compared with outcomes of patients who received similar 
clinical interventions outside the RCT. On average, the outcomes were similar, suggest-
ing that participation in RCTs does not result in improved outcomes. Peppercorn et al 
(2004) therefore state: 
‘Despite widespread belief that enrollment in clinical trials leads to improved outcomes 
in patients with cancer, there are insufficient data to conclude that such a trial effect ex-
ists. Until such data are available, patients with cancer should be encouraged to enroll in 
clinical trials on the basis of trials’ unquestioned role in improving treatment for future 
patients’. 
The belief that enrolling children in RCTs ensures that they receive state-of-the-art treat-
ment and that participation is best for the individual child is therefore an example that 
the therapeutic misperception may also be fostered by physicians (Instone et al 2008).  
In conclusion, the physician-investigator has a ‘hybrid’ identity. He serves two different 
goals: the best interest of the patient and scientific progress (and thereby the best inter-
67
The interface of clinical care and research practice
est of future patients). Physicians are more likely to prefer the perspective of a therapist 
over that of a researcher, and consequently they may truly come to believe that in the 
research setting they promote the child’s best interests. With this position physicians 
potentially promote the existence of a therapeutic misconception between them and 
parents.  
Some authors contend that, to reduce misunderstandings about the nature and pur-
pose of research, physician-investigators should restrict themselves to being scientists 
only and not doctors (Joffe and Miller 2008). In this way the ethical insistence on a clear 
boundary between research and clinical activity can be secured. This could also partially 
be achieved by letting research nurses carry out informed consent conversations with 
parents and children. In both situations, the role of the researcher and the goal of re-
search may be clearer. This solution would however require a fundamental change in 
the pediatric oncology practice and as such might raise its own problems, for instance 
regarding the available health personnel and communication problems between physi-
cians and researchers.
Limitations
The studies included in the narrative review have limitations that should be acknowl-
edged. Most studies are interview or questionnaire studies using a retrospective design. 
In this design there can be uncertainty whether the parents’ and physicians’ recollections 
were accurate representations of how they felt and what their thoughts were at the time 
of diagnosis and inclusion in a trial. Only 3 studies used a prospective design (see Table 
5). Most studies have small sample sizes.
Future research with larger samples and a prospective design will be able to ascertain 
the relationship between the specifics of the informed consent discussion and parental 
and physician recollection. 
CONCLUSION
There is an urgent need for high-quality research in children, to ensure that drugs used 
in the pediatric setting are both safe and effective (Klassen et al 2008). Pediatricians 
must often rely on evidence that has been generated in adult populations (Cramer et al 
2005), although both the safety and efficacy profiles of drugs may be significantly differ-
ent for children (Kearns et al 2003).  Therefore it is of vital importance to enroll children 
with cancer in clinical studies. The pediatric oncology practice shows that general imple-
mentation of clinical research continuously improves outcomes for children with cancer. 
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However, when research and clinical care coincide as much as in the pediatric oncology 
setting, several ethical problems can come up. 
Firstly, parental equipoise is almost never reached. Parents cannot (and are not sup-
posed to) think beyond the scope of the best interests of their child. To consider the 
goals of research per se is very difficult, if not impossible for them. Due to the diminish-
ing boundary between research and care, parents are confronted with alleged options 
and treatment choices, which eventually turn out to be only accessible through research. 
Some parents are confronted with anticipated remorse when not participating in (prom-
ising) research. Others fear trials because of the experimental nature. Many experience 
a lack of freedom to reject participation. Secondly, the therapeutic misconception may 
endanger a correct assessment of the pros and cons of participation, because parents 
might inaccurately attribute therapeutic intent to research procedures. Their focus on the 
therapeutic effect may hamper understanding of the research purposes. All this could 
lead to a feeling of emotional stress and limited voluntariness that is reinforced by the 
trust that is often inherent to the relationship between physician and parents, especial-
ly in pediatric oncology (Council for International Organizations of Medical Sciences 
2002).  
Physicians too are constrained in their options because of their conviction that re-
search constitutes the best available treatment, thereby passing over the greater uncer-
tainty of the risk-benefit ratio as compared to standard medical care.
The challenges that a lack of parental equipoise and the therapeutic misconception 
pose may be very difficult to overcome. Thorough attention to the quality of communica-
tion of research information could improve understanding of the research perspective 
(Miller and Rosenstein 2003; Appelbaum 2002). In Table 6 we summarize points of 
awareness with respect to research discussions and give recommendations to improve 
communication. But even in the case of an enormous communication effort, the ques-
tion remains whether it is truly possible to explain the nature of research and thereby 
overcome the emotional conflict of parents who feel responsible for their child’s wellbe-
ing. Future research should focus on special efforts that might achieve this. 
As it stands today, physicians are bound to react to the individual needs and expecta-
tions of parents and children within the context of research. The physician-investigator 
needs to be convinced that the best interests of the child are warranted. This means that 
both a therapeutic and a scientific orientation are appropriate, and the physician needs to 
shuttle between clinical care duties and research duties. To do this ethically, he continu-
ously needs to be aware of the potential conflict between research and treatment goals 
(see Table 6). Having considered all this, professional integrity requires the physician 
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to treat both the patient’s interests and the scientific interests in an honest way without 
backsliding into a form of therapeutic misconception. After all, he has committed him-
self to serve both. 
Table 6: awareness points and recommendations for communication in relation to type of research 





The potential for a therapeu-
tic misconception: 
- differences between clinical 
research and standard care
- potential conflict between 
research and treatment goals
Consent to treatment does 
not imply consent to an RCT
Provide information about collection of data 
and measures taken to protect confidentiality 
and privacy.
Clarify how the physician-investigator / 
patient-subject relationship differs from the 
traditional physician-patient relationship.
Mention alternatives to research participation 
explicitly.
Discuss clinical and parental equipoise.
Mention voluntariness.
Indicate research interventions that are solely 
performed to measure trial outcomes.
Assure freedom to withdraw from the study.
Discuss research participation with subjects 
before, during and after the study.
Ask explicit consent with a separate consent 
form than the consent form for treatment. Ask 
consent for treatment first, and for research 
later, preferably by a different person than 
the treating physician, for example a research 







Consent to treatment does 
not imply consent to collect 
patient data
Provide information about collection of data 
and measures taken to protect confidentiality 
and privacy.
Ask explicit consent with a separate consent 
form than the consent form for treatment. Ask 
consent for treatment first, and for research 
later, preferably by a different person than 
the treating physician, for example a research 










No therapeutic goal; com-
pletely distinct from thera-
peutic interventions
The obligation of non-malef-
icence in this setting differs 
from that in clinical medicine 
Consent to treatment does 
not imply consent to using 
or storing human tissues for 
research purposes
Provide information about collection of data 
and measures taken to protect confidentiality 
and privacy.
Mention voluntariness.
Indicate that all research interventions to gain 
tissues are solely performed to gain scientific 
knowledge.
Indicate that risks to a patient are justified 
not because they are outweighed by potential 
benefits to the patient, but because they are 
outweighed by the value of the knowledge to 
be gained from the research.
Ask explicit consent with a separate consent 
form than the consent form for treatment. Ask 
consent for treatment first, and for research 
later, preferably by a different person than 
the treating physician, for example a research 
nurse (with the opportunity to consult with 
the treating physician)
* Confidentiality and privacy are not explicitly discussed in this chapter. Apparently, parents and 
physicians do not experience these concepts as problematic or are not aware of them. Still, confi-
dentiality and privacy are basic concepts in research ethics and should be discussed with parents. 
For completeness they are mentioned in the Table, in order for the Table to be used as a list to ‘tick 
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Background. In pediatrics, the ‘best interest’ standard has become the prevailing stan-
dard in decision-making even though it proves difficult to apply in practice. Differences 
in values can lead to different views by families and physicians of what is in the interest 
of a child. Our aim was to gain insight into the views of parents, children, and physicians 
in a pediatric oncology setting. 
Methods. We conducted a qualitative multi-center study, using in-depth semi-structured 
interviews with 21 children aged 8-18 years undergoing cancer treatment, 26 parents, and 
15 pediatric oncologists. 
Results. At the onset of treatment, parents, children, and physicians had the same views 
on what is in the interest of the child: survival by following the treatment protocol. In the 
course of treatment, however, a transition takes place. For families, what constitutes the 
best interests expands beyond medical considerations, to include the wish to lead a nor-
mal life, having control over certain aspects of treatment, and maintaining one’s identity 
( e.g., through religion). These aspects sometimes collide with medical aspects, leading 
to different professional and familial views about what course of action is appropriate. 
Conclusions. In order to recognize personal views and avoid conflicts, physicians should 
explicitly discuss parent and family concerns and opinions in the course of treatment. 
We present a model of ‘communicative ethics’ to make these issues a subject of discus-
sion. The role of the family in determining what is in the best interest of the child should 
only be limited when it implies a substantial medical risk of (irreversible) harm to the 
child.
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INTRODUCTION
In pediatrics, the ‘best interest’ standard has become the prevailing standard in deci-
sion-making (Kopelman 1997). Often there is no discussion about what constitutes this 
standard. It is used as if its meaning is self-evident and uncontroversial.  For a number 
of reasons, however, the best interest standard proves difficult to apply (Diekema 2004; 
Elliston 2007). Close examination of the standard reveals significant problems with its 
definition and application in practice (Elliston 2007). First, the standard seems incoher-
ent, in that it invokes an absolute duty to do the best for each patient (Veatch 1995). 
Buchanan and Brock (1989, p88), in their statement of the standard, define absolute 
duty as ‘acting so as to promote maximally the good of the individual.’ The best inter-
est standard would then require the surrogate to act so as to always make the decision 
most favorable to the child. This is impossible because children have conflicting claims, 
needs, and interests, and often ‘the best’ is not attainable. Some therefore suggest that 
the best interest standard should not be used as a maximizing principle, but rather as 
a minimum threshold of acceptable care (Archard 2003, p41; Diekema 2004). To act in 
the best interest of the child then means that the care provided should not fall below this 
threshold (Kopelman 2007). 
The best interest standard is also criticized for being too individualistic, attending to 
the interests of only one person, making their interests paramount, and placing burdens 
on the interests of others. Moreover, the standard would be blind to the fact that children 
exist in families and their individual interests are not clearly divisible from those of the 
family. A child’s interests cannot be completely distinguished from those of his or her 
parents, but are always intertwined with those of parents and siblings. Parents may have 
competing duties to themselves or other children that should also be considered, as 
Ruddick (1979, 1989) points out. 
Kopelman (1997) tries to invalidate these criticisms by defining the best-interest stan-
dard as a standard of reasonableness. This means that it is used to find the most accept-
able of the available choices. It instructs us to try to pick the option that most informed 
rational people of good will would regard as maximizing the child’s net benefits and 
minimizing the net harms to the child without ignoring the rights, needs, and interests 
of others. Used in this way, the best interest standard does not require people to act in 
accord with what is literally best for a child. Sometimes this means that the least bad 
alternative for the child should be selected.  In this way, a best interest standard seems 
reasonable to use, when its purpose is to offer good and practical guidance about how to 
make decisions for those unable to decide on their own (Kopelman 2010).
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However, problems can still arise in the use of this standard, namely when reason-
able and informed people of good will cannot agree on the interpretation of what is in 
the best interest of a child. Little controversy exists regarding the interpretation of what 
is good when medical interventions are available that are reliably expected to prevent 
serious, far-reaching loss of the patient’s health at a reasonable cost (McCullough 2010; 
Placencia and McCullough 2011), such as treating a bacterial pneumonia with antibiot-
ics. Often, there is professional agreement about these sorts of paradigmatic cases, the 
relevant outcome data, and the physician’s best medical judgment to determine the 
interpretation of what is best for the child (Leuthner 2001; Pellegrino 1987; Placencia and 
McCullough 2011; Tan 2002). In other situations it may be more difficult. For instance, it 
is not easily determined whether it is in the best interest of a child to be vaccinated, cir-
cumcised, or treated with complementary therapies. In these and other cases, the notion 
of best interests is inherently a matter of balancing different values, and not just medi-
cal judgment (De Vries, Houtlosser and Egeler 2005; Elliston 2007; Lindemann Nelson 
and Lindemann Nelson 1995; Kopelman 1997). Best interests are determined not only 
by outcome data and physician assessment but also by the moral values of the various 
stakeholders. Introduction of these non-medical facts, values, and preferences may lead 
to differences in interpretation by parents, children, and physicians, and may result in 
conflicts (Hinds et al 2000).
Until now, most discussions of the best interest standard have focused on neonatal 
care and end-of-life decision making (Kopelman 2010; Leuthner 2001; Placencia and Mc-
Cullough 2011; Paddeau 2012). Within pediatric oncology the standard has not received 
much attention, except when it focused on the end-of-life and the palliative phase (Hinds 
et al 2005; Kars et al 2011). When there are no curative options left, family values and 
preferences become very important. Outside this palliative phase, however, personal val-
ues and preferences of parents and children can also play a role in the pediatric oncology 
setting, when decisional problems related to treatment and care are encountered and it 
is not directly clear what is best for a child (Masera et al 1998).
The purpose of this study was to gain insight into the views of parents, children, and 
physicians on what is best for the child in a pediatric oncology setting during the curative 
treatment phase. Specifically, we focus on (1) describing what medical and non-medical 
factors are important for families and physicians when thinking about what is good for a 
child and (2) the eventual role of these factors in decision-making. By ‘medical’ we mean 
the interpretation from a biomedical view, taking only objective medical data (e.g., out-
come data) and the physician’s best medical judgment into account. By ‘non-medical’ 
we mean an interpretation which takes into account the personal situation of the patient 
and family values of what is deemed important.   
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METHODS
Our analysis was based on a data set that was part of a larger qualitative multicenter 
project in which we explored patients’, parents’, and physicians’ experiences, roles, and 
considerations in treatment decisions in pediatric oncology. In this project we invited 
patients (aged 8-18 years) attending the pediatric oncology units of two Dutch university 
hospitals, their parents, and their physicians to participate in one-to-one, semi-struc-
tured in-depth interviews. Interviews were conducted 8-10 weeks after initial diagnosis 
or diagnosis of relapse. The methodology of the overall project has been described ex-
tensively elsewhere (De Vries and van Leeuwen 2010). The project was approved by the 
Institutional Review Boards at both study-sites (Leiden University Medical Center and 
VU Medical Center). Informed consent was obtained from all participants. 
All physicians, parents, and children were interviewed by the first author. Initial inter-
view topics were formulated after examination of the relevant literature and a preliminary 
observational study, during which the interviewer spent three months in the children’s 
oncology ward of one of the university hospitals and followed the daily routine and the 
discussions between parents, children, and physicians. Consistent with standard quali-
tative research techniques, the interview topics evolved as the interviews progressed 
through an iterative process to ensure that the questions captured all relevant emerging 
themes (Britten 1995; Guest, Brunce, and Johnson 2006). The interviews contained gen-
eral topics and no closed-ended questions. Examples of interview questions relevant for 
the results reported here are given in Table 7.
The physician interviews lasted between 30 and 60 minutes. The in-depth interview 
topics covered work experience; general goals of pediatric oncology; the physician–pa-
tient-parent relationship, especially concerning decision making during treatment; con-
siderations deemed important in treatment decision making; patient and parent auton-
omy; and physician’s ideas on what is in the best interest of a child. 
The child interviews lasted between 30 and 45 minutes. The parent interviews lasted 
between 60 and 90 minutes. Both were conducted at the hospital. The interview topics 
covered general characteristics of the patient; the history of the disease; discussions with 
physicians about the recommended treatment; parents’ and child’s attitudes to these 
discussions; considerations deemed important in treatment decision making; and the 
perceived role of parents and children in decision making during treatment.
All interviews were audio-taped and transcribed verbatim. Data analysis was based on 
the constant comparative method (Malterud 2006; Strauss and Corbin 1998).We used 
an iterative process wherein we continually went back to the field to collect more data. 
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Table 7 Examples of interview questions
Children
Can you remember when you were first told that you had cancer? Who told you and what was 
said?
Can you remember what was said about possible treatments? How was eventually decided 
what treatment you would get? Was there any choice?
What were important issues for you during discussions about treatment? Do you think the 
medical team knew what was important for you?
Do you think that you should have an influence in what is decided about your treatments?
Do you have regular meetings / talks with your physician? What do you talk about?
Can you tell me what is important for you now, while on the way in your treatment? Are there 
things the medical team has to take into account? If yes, do you feel you can discuss these 
things with the medical team?
Parents
Can you describe the conversations you had with the physician about the cancer diagnosis 
and treatment options?
What considerations were important for you when treatment options were discussed? Did you 
discuss these considerations with the medical team?
Did you have any influence in the decision making process? Did your child have any influence 
in the decision making process?
Now your child is receiving treatment, do you have regular meetings with the treating 
physician? What do you talk about? Are there important issues for you that the medical team 
has to take into account? If yes, do you feel you can discuss these things with the medical 
team?
Physicians
Can you describe the topics discussed when you talk to parents and children about the cancer 
diagnosis and treatment options?
What considerations are important when treatment options are discussed for a child with 
cancer? Are there other considerations, next to medical ones?
Do you know the considerations parents and children have? Do you explicitly ask for their 
considerations?
How much influence do parents get in the decision making process?
How much influence do children get in the decision making process?
Do you ever experience conflict between yourself and a family, or within families about 
treatment decisions?
Can you describe the topics discussed when you talk to parents and children during the 
treatment phase?
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The following process of data gathering and analysis was used: (1) interviews; (2) tran-
scribing the interview data; (3) open coding, which involved identifying relevant concepts 
in the text; (4) constantly comparing open codes, looking for conceptual similarities and 
differences; (5) identifying emerging themes and a theoretical framework; (6) continued 
sampling and interviewing as theoretical categories emerged and novel questions arose; 
and (7) continued coding and comparison of codes until nothing new was added to the 
theoretical categories. Two authors independently coded the full transcripts. An inde-
pendent researcher (not one of the authors) coded two transcripts to check for consis-
tency and adequacy of the framework. The two authors and the independent researcher 
engaged in a discussion on the themes each of them had identified from the transcripts. 
No inconsistencies were found. When no new thematic content was found in the inter-
views, subject enrollment was stopped. This process, called thematic saturation, is a 
well-described qualitative method to avoid unnecessarily large and repetitive data sets 
(Denzin and Lincoln 2000; Guest, Brunce and Johnson 2006).
We used qualitative software (Kwalitan 5.0) for multiple text management, including 
coding, locating, and retrieving key phrases (Peters 2000). Finally, representative quota-
tions were chosen to illustrate the themes identified. These quotations are included in 
the text. Quotes were translated from Dutch to English by a native English speaker.
RESULTS
Characteristics of the sample
The sample consisted of 15 physicians, 24 children, and 26 parents of these children. 
Figure 1 (page 19) shows eligibility criteria and the recruitment process for children and 
parents. Parents had a mean age of 40 years (range 32-50 years). Their children had a 
mean age of 13.4 years (range 8-18 years). The parents’ occupations varied, indicating so-
cial diversity. All families were of Dutch origin. Demographic and clinical characteristics 
of the parents and their children are given in Tables 1 and 2 (page 20-21). 
The group of physicians comprised the entire medical staff of both pediatric oncology 
units (9 and 6 physicians, respectively). They were the primary providers for the children 
who participated in the study. Physicians had a mean age of 42.1 years (range 32-52 
years) and worked in pediatric oncology for a mean of 7.6 years (range 1.5-20 years); 7 
(46.7%) were male. Physician characteristics are shown in Table 3 (page 21).
Framework of the results
The concepts that were identified in the qualitative analysis resulted in a framework that 
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comprises the following three themes: best interest as deference to medical judgment, 
transition in the views of what is good for a child, and non-medical goals as a part of the 
best interests of the child. 
Best interest as deference to medical judgment 
At the onset of treatment, parents, children, and physicians had the same ideas on what 
is in the best interest of the child: survival by following the treatment protocol.
[In the beginning] I just wanted to get all the courses of chemotherapy. I just wanted to be 
sure that the cancer would stay away. Now at the end of treatment I sometimes think ‘I 
don’t want this course [of chemotherapy], it takes so long and it is so hard.’ But I just have 
to do it.  – Male patient, 12 years, Acute Myeloid Leukemia (AML)
I always tell parents and children that it is essential that we are a team. And that we, as 
a team, have one main goal: to fight the cancer. –Physician 1
At diagnosis, choices seem limited as there is typically a standard treatment approach, 
described in (inter)national protocols.  All study participants felt there was no choice in 
treatment options. The way to proceed is to follow the medical protocol.
There was no choice. Well, there was a choice, but that would have been weird. There was 
only one right choice, to follow the protocol. If I had chosen not to do it, that would have 
been suicide. – Male patient, 15 years, AML
There is a clear distinction between the medical responsibility and the parental responsi-
bility. It is not that parents have no say in the matter, but in the end the treatment deci-
sion is taken on medical grounds, so it is a decision by the medical team. – Physician 6 
Physicians state that it is very difficult or even impossible for parents and children to 
fully discuss treatment options in the period after diagnosis. Parents and children feel 
ill-equipped to judge all medical information, and put their trust in the physicians, who 
are seen as experts. 
The first twenty-four hours after you have told the diagnosis, parents are numb and hear 
nothing anymore. And it is exactly then that we have to discuss treatment options. But 
whatever you say, it doesn’t reach them. – Physician 6 
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We had to let go, although we found that hard to do. But the disease was something we 
were not able to manage ourselves, it is an area we didn’t know anything about. We had 
to let go, and just trust the physicians in their good intentions. – Mother of male patient, 
15 years, with Ewing Sarcoma
I let the people decide who know best and have my interests in mind. These people are 
my parents and the physicians. If I were to choose myself I would take the easy way, for 
example skipping one of the chemo courses, because of the side effects. That’s why it is 
better that other people decide. – Male patient, 13 years, with osteosarcoma
Because parents and children feel they have no choice but to follow and agree with the 
physicians, it comes as a shock to them when they do have to decide on certain issues 
such as fertility preservation.   
That he had to think about the question whether he could produce semen or not, that was 
really shocking. […] Of course, to hear that you have cancer is also very shocking. But in a 
way that just happens to you. It’s just a fact. While for this issue we had a choice, we had 
a choice what to do. – Father of male patient, 13 years, Ewing Sarcoma
Transition in the views of what is good for a child
In the course of treatment, when parents and children regain some control over the 
situation, other objectives emerge, in addition to the goal of survival. They start to dis-
tinguish between the treatment protocol in the strict sense and the care surrounding it. 
The treatment itself is not questioned. The surrounding care, however, makes parents 
and children feel that choices can be made in the course of treatment. This leads to a re-
evaluation of what they think is important.
At the start of treatment there was no choice. But at some point real choices came up. 
And at that point we wanted to be heard. (…) It is not up to the physicians to determine 
how much influence parents get. It is up to the parents themselves. We needed time to 
get things sorted out, but at one point we realized that, well this is it and we have to make 
the best of it. And at that point we noticed things we wanted to be done differently. It’s a 
process all parents go through. – Mother of male patient, 15 years, with Ewing Sarcoma
Three weeks ago I had to get a new course of chemotherapy. Normally you cannot choose 
whether you will stay on the ward or in a private room. But it was a new medicine for me 
and I did not know how I would react. Maybe I would vomit all day, so I refused to be put 
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on the ward with three other children and maybe a bunch of visitors. Furthermore, it was 
close to my birthday, so I wanted to come to the hospital earlier, to be home in time to 
celebrate. In the beginning, I was afraid to ask these sorts of things, but now I just want 
control over these things. – Male patient, 14 years old, with Ewing Sarcoma
 
The interpretation of physicians is quite different. They feel that parents and children 
have limited influence on medical care.
  
It’s only the little things that parents can get a grip on. We’re tied to the protocol. That 
is the only way protocols can function. If everyone would do it in a slapdash manner, we 
wouldn’t have any answers whether we do better than before. Small changes can easily 
be a violation of protocol, even little logistic changes like starting chemotherapy later due 
to a birthday or holiday. There is not much room for change. – Physician 3
Non-medical goals within the best interest of the child
Parents and children stated that next to the medical treatment, which is aimed at surviv-
al, they develop other goals, namely ‘to lead a life as normal as possible’ and to protect 
their identity and (family) values. In the course of treatment, families pick up on their 
own routines, like their ways of raising their children. This can interfere with the rules 
and the way things are normally done on the hospital ward. Parents have their own ideas 
about how to handle their child, but often little room is left for their views.
We know our child best. Better than all nurses and physicians on the ward. Of course we 
know him best, but this is not recognized. They just don’t react to our comments. They do 
as they think is right.   – Father of male patient, 11 years, with ALL
The physiotherapist was just teasing my son. He tried to make my son do nice things. But 
what is nice for him [the physiotherapist] is not nice for us. We are not used to watching 
television for a bit of distraction. My son needs to be addressed fitting his environment.  
Disco, soccer and television are not his environment. To really connect with my son you 
need to come up with something else. So I asked the physiotherapist why he wanted so 
badly to provide my son with distraction this way. Although it is not normal for us and we 
don’t like it. – Mother of male patient, 13 years, osteosarcoma
Parents also experience disagreement with physicians on whether or not certain aspects 
of care belong to the treatment protocol in the strict sense or not, and thus whether they 
have an influence on it. For example, in the case of nutrition and nasal tube feeding, 
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there is often disagreement between families and medical team about what is best for 
the child. Their child’s diet is one of the few areas where parents feel they can exert some 
direct influence or control. Some parents have specific beliefs about the role of nutrition 
in recovery from disease. 
Certain juices, like carrot juice, beetroot juice, have a positive influence on his blood count 
and his immune system. So he drinks these juices every day, we are really onto that. Just 
as a support. They [the physicians] have no problem with that. But when I asked one of 
them whether she uses the positive influence of nutritional supplements, she said: no, 
because we do not believe in it.  – Father of male patient, 13 years, Ewing Sarcoma
Whether or not to start nasal tube feeding is also an important aspect of care where 
parents want to exert control.
After the treatment the medical team wanted [patient] to go home with nasal tube feed-
ing. But we refused. We had gained enough experience with her eating habits after che-
motherapy.  I call myself an expert in cooking things that [patient] likes. She eats enough 
when she is at home. In the end we really had a fight with the physician and the nurses 
about the nasal tube. But we left the hospital without. – Father of female patient, 14 
years, Ewing Sarcoma
Physicians, however, think of nasal tube feeding as part of medical treatment and there-
fore consider it to be their responsibility.
Nasal tube feeding is a medical procedure and I think physicians need to decide on start-
ing it. There is enough evidence that a good nutritional state adds to the chance of sur-
vival, so I think it is a medical decision. Chemotherapy is better tolerated for example. Of 
course we consult the parents, but I think it is part of treatment to secure the nutritional 
state of the patient. – Physician 3
Children therefore often feel there is no real choice when nasal tube feeding is pro-
posed.
I asked whether I could try and eat more. But they [physicians] said it was better to have 
the tube feeding, because I wouldn’t succeed in eating enough. That’s what they told me. 
And anyway, even if I had refused, they would have put in the nasal tube, I’m sure of that. 
– Female patient, 14 years, ALL
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For some parents and children, religion is an important aspect of their identity and how 
they cope with illness. Religion opens a different (non-medical) perspective to the dis-
ease, which parents want to share with their physician. 
Some friends say that it is stupid to talk about God with a physician who doesn’t believe. 
But for me it is very important. He [the physician] tells me what he thinks, so I tell him 
how I think about it. This physician for example tells my son repeatedly that the cancer 
is just bad luck. So I felt that I had to tell him [the physician] that we don’t see it as just 
bad luck. There is a meaning in it, although I don’t know which. And the progress my 
son makes is of course due to the drugs and the treatment, but also because he is in the 
prayers of our friends and because God is watching over him.  – Mother of male patient, 
14 years, Ewing Sarcoma
Religious beliefs sometimes become a factor in (curative) medical decision making. 
Well the nurse came to take him to the operating room. But I said I won’t have it. The 
portacath cannot be removed. It was a religious thing for us, he had prayed all night 
and the fever had subsided. He was convinced that prayer is helpful. And then the nurse 
said they were going to remove the portacath anyway. My first thought was that my son 
would never trust God again. So I asked the nurse to take the temperature again and 
to consult with the physician. The nurse slammed the door in anger. But the physician 
reluctantly gave us the benefit of the doubt and the portacath didn’t have to be removed 
at that moment. And the fever didn’t come back. – Mother of male patient, 13 years with 
osteosarcoma1 
As a consequence of differing views between the medical team and the families, some 
parents feel that they have to stand up for their child to get things arranged the way they 
think is best.
I have become like a lioness fighting for her cub. Oh, yes, I’m not nearly as friendly as I 
was at the start of treatment! I developed an aspect of myself I knew I had in me, but I 
never needed before. At the start of treatment I let things happen, I thought that it was 
all alright. But now I’m more onto things. I question whether certain things are necessary. 
You grow into that. – Mother of female patient, 10 years, Hodgkin
1 Because of persistent fever, the patient’s portacath, as a potential locus of infection, was scheduled to be 
removed. 
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DISCUSSION
At diagnosis, choices are limited as there is typically a standard treatment approach, de-
scribed in (inter)national protocols.  Because parents are often in shock by the diagnosis, 
and time is of the essence in terms of making treatment decisions, the most common 
reaction is to defer to what the pediatric oncologist views as necessary to act in the best 
interests of the child, which is providing life saving treatment.  However, as children and 
parents become familiar with the treatment and medical environment, as shock sub-
sides, and as additional choices to the treatment become apparent, children and parents 
begin to more actively participate in decision-making. At that point, a transition takes 
place with regard to the views of what is best for the child.  Factors other than medical 
considerations become important.
This study shows that at the start of treatment children, parents, and physicians have 
the same view on what is best for the child: being treated according to the best available 
treatment protocol. Parents and children feel ill-equipped to judge the medical informa-
tion, and most of the time they let physicians decide on treatment options. Deference 
to physician authority is a common rule of thumb, especially at the start of treatment. 
Reinforced by the technological character of the cancer treatment and the psychologi-
cal turmoil due to the diagnosis, the medical view on what is best for a child prevails. 
Accordingly, children and parents experience a lack of control. This is also reported by 
other authors (Levi et al 2000; Lowe, Bravery and Gibson 2008; Patiño-Fernández et al 
2008).
In the course of treatment, parents and children become ‘layman-experts’ in the treat-
ment protocol. That changes their opinions. Parents and children regain some control 
and become partners in discussions with physicians. In contrast to the initial ‘submis-
sion’, families become to feel more certain, and think of themselves as more or less 
equal discussion partners when talking to the physician (De Vries et al 2005). This phe-
nomenon is also described by Decker, Phillips, and Haase (2004), and Tuckett et al 
(1985). Parents no longer focus only on the protocol, and the way children are generally 
treated, but also on their child with his or her own ways to cope with the situation. This 
leads to a re-evaluation of what they think is important. Also, children were able to dis-
cuss their considerations in the decision making process. The interpretation of what con-
stitutes best interests starts to contain more than only the medical perspective (see e.g. 
Kirschbaum 1996). As reported by Young et al (2002), parents discover that their child’s 
interests are also affected by control over certain aspects of care (e.g., nutrition), the 
wish to lead a life as normal as possible (e.g. particulars in upbringing and schooling), 
and the wish to maintain one’s identity and family values (e.g. through religion). These 
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values can sometimes collide with medical protocols, leading to different professional 
and family views as to what course of action is appropriate. 
Physicians regard parents and children as having limited influence within the treat-
ment protocols. For families, however, it is no longer taken for granted that the best 
interest of their child can be determined objectively on medical grounds. Best interests 
turn out to encompass spheres other than the medical, including part of the life per-
spectives of parents and child (Carroll et al 2012; Ruddick 1979, 1989). The influence of 
this family perspective in the decision-making process initially concerns mostly minor 
medical decisions, like timing the administration of drugs,  placing a new nasal tube, or 
planning new admissions (e.g. not on the child’s birthday). Such routine actions in fol-
lowing protocols may become major issues for patients and parents. Fried et al (2002) 
and Spinetta et al (2009) showed that it is important to recognize how these personal 
aspects in decision making help parents and children to regain some control over the 
situation, and that respect for those issues may be equivalent to the respect for more 
fundamental views on life and its meaning.
Sometimes the views of parents and children and the medical perspective differ wide-
ly. In our examples, this concerned whether or not to start nasal tube feeding and the 
removal of a portacath. As described by Hinds et al (1997), and Hinds et al (2000), such 
differences may lead to dissatisfaction or even conflicts between parents, the child, and 
the medical team. Coyne (2007) found that health professionals held the view that par-
ents and children were supposed to follow implicit rules of the ward. Parents who held 
a view that is not congruent with these rules disrupted the organization of the ward and 
were labeled ‘problem’ parents. James and Hilde Lindemann Nelson (1995) even spoke 
of a ‘rivalry of care’ regarding the conflict between the ethical approaches of families and 
physicians.
When family and professional views differ widely, the question inevitably arises whose 
perspective should prevail. In order to avoid discussions about who is in power to ap-
ply an abstract standard of best interests, ‘communicative ethics’, such as described by 
Moody (1992) can be followed, meaning that all parties involved, including the patient 
(when possible), come to an agreement about shared goals and talk about decisions to 
be made. The aim of the communicative ethics approach is to develop and maintain a 
shared vision on the course of treatment (D’Aloja 2010; Elwyn et al 2000). The central 
questions are ‘What is best for this patient at this moment?’ and ‘How to share deci-
sions?’ instead of ‘Who should decide?’. In the model of communicative ethics, the vari-
ous views of what is best for a child are given a prima facie character (Beauchamp and 
Childress 2009, 14; Kopelman 1997, 276). It is the duty of all actors to reach consensus 
about the resulting definition of the best interest of the child. The emergence of personal 
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views that are potentially different from the professional perspective can be recognized, 
understood, and, if necessary, dealt with (Coyne 2007). This model is in line with models 
of family-centered care and shared decision-making 
Due to the complex and high-tech character of oncology treatments the physician has 
a substantial role in the decision-making process. Young et al (2002) showed that par-
ents are reluctant to act as advocates for their own views in this setting. To recognize the 
personal views of parents and children, physicians need to actively discuss parents’ pref-
erences, customs, and concerns, especially in circumstances when there are tradeoffs 
possibly involving individual values and preferences (Elliston 2007; Hardart 2000; Tan 
2002; Whitney 2006). The physician can also discuss limits to these wishes, as long as 
mutual understanding, awareness, and reasoning are maintained (D’Aloja 2010; Bens-
ing 2000; Kai 1996). 
In some particular circumstances, parental views of what is good for their child may 
lead to actions that inflict harm. Dedication to their child, which is the prerequisite of 
good parenting, may then stand in the way of making a responsible, correct decision 
(Baines 2008). An absolute focus by parents on the survival of their child may, for in-
stance, lead to the demand that painful treatment be continued long after any prospect 
of cure. In cases like this, parental interpretations can constitute a substantial medical 
risk of irreversible harm, and then a limit to their influence is reached (Diekema 2004; 
Kopelman 1997). The moral and legal focus should then be on the professional’s point of 
view of what is medically in the best interest of the child. In these situations, it must be 
acknowledged that the pediatrician’s responsibility to the patient exists independently of 
parental desires or proxy consent (Committee on Bioethics 1995). Parents can use their 
own values to decide what is best for their child, but their decisions cannot fall below a 
certain threshold of acceptable care (Kopelman 2007).
Limitations
Our study is subject to some limitations. First, there is a possible bias due to the refusal 
rate of parents and children to participate (21%). This may result in an overrepresenta-
tion of families who encountered substantial differences between family and professional 
views on what constituted the best interest of the child. On the other hand, this is more 
of a problem for quantitative than for qualitative research, as our aim was to explore pos-
sible differences in interpretation of best interests, and we were not so much interested 
in exact numbers regarding the existence of such  disagreement.  Second, there could be 
a regional bias in the results, because the study is based on respondents from only two 
of the eight hospitals in our country where children with cancer are treated. However, the 
group of respondents was diverse enough for our purpose to explore the differences in 
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interpretation of best interests between families and physicians. At the same time, the 
topic was compact enough to reach saturation across the sample: during the last inter-
views, no new information was yielded. 
Conclusion
In conclusion, the interviews give insight in how families define what is good for their 
child and how they contemplate their child’s best interest. Especially in the course of 
a long treatment, ‘what is best for the child’ is subject to change, and for families, the 
answer encompasses spheres other than the medical. It includes parts of the life per-
spectives of parents and child. Our data suggest that the Best Interest Standard is not 
defined only by abstract, philosophical, or legal terms. Eventually, the shared intention 
to do good to children should be guided by a standard that understands best interests 
as a matter that comes about through consultation. This consultation can be shaped by 
a ‘communicative ethics’. Future research should focus on the best way for physicians to 
recognize personal views and act on them without losing professional autonomy. 
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Background. Various regulations and guidelines stipulate the importance of involving 
adolescents in decision-making concerning research participation. Several studies have 
shown that in the context of pediatric oncology this involvement is difficult to achieve 
due to emotional stress, the complexity of research protocols and limited time. Still, up 
to 80% of adolescents with cancer enter onto a trial during their illness. The aim of this 
study was to determine physicians’ views and attitudes towards enrolling adolescents in 
research, considering the difficulties surrounding their involvement in decision-making.
Methods. A qualitative multicenter study was performed, using in-depth semi-structured 
interviews on the informed consent process with 15 pediatric hemato-oncologists. 
Results. Four central themes emerged that characterize physicians’ attitudes towards 
involving adolescents in the decision-making process: (1) physicians regard most ado-
lescents as not capable of participating meaningfully in discussions regarding research; 
(2) physicians do not always provide adolescents with all information; (3) proxy consent 
from parents is obtained and is deemed sufficient; (4) physician-investigator integrity: 
physicians judge research protocols as not being harmful and even in the best interest 
of the adolescent.
Conclusions. Physicians justify not involving adolescents in research discussions by refer-
ring to best interest arguments (adolescents’ incompetence, proxy consent, and investi-




Informed consent is a major issue in pediatric ethics, especially when it concerns par-
ents’ and children’s consent for research (Committee on Bioethics 1995; National Com-
mission for the Protection of Human Subjects 1979). While adults are assumed to have 
the requisite capacity to provide an informed consent, children are a protected popula-
tion and in most circumstances are not afforded the legal right to consent. Often, how-
ever, children who have not yet reached the legally established age of consent do have 
the mental capacity to understand the implications of participating in research. Several 
studies have assessed children’s comprehension of trials (Joffe et al 2006; Mårtenson 
and Fägerskiöld 2008). They studies suggest that children as young as 9-10 years can un-
derstand research-related information, whereas under optimal circumstances, children 
aged 14 and older can even approach the understanding expected of adults. Still, it is also 
recognized that age is at best a proxy for developmental capacity, and that experience, 
maturity and psychological state are important determinant factors. 
Numerous country-specific regulations as well as international treaties stipulate the 
importance of involving minors in decision making concerning research participation 
(Jaspan et al 2008; Office for Human Research Protections 2009). In addition to the 
legally required informed consent (permission) from parents, most of these regulations 
require that assent be obtained from those children who are deemed capable of provid-
ing it. Assent is defined as ‘a child’s affirmative agreement to research participation’ 
(Code of Federal Regulations 1991). Especially in the case of adolescents, serious consid-
eration should be given to their developing capacities for participating in decision mak-
ing, regardless of legal authority (Committee on Bioethics 1995; Leikin 1993). This mainly 
implies that meaningful agreement to enroll in a trial should be sought and that any 
refusal should be respected (Council for International Organizations of Medical Sciences 
2002; Council of Europe 2005; Whitney et al 2006). The Dutch Act on Medical Research 
Involving Human Subjects correspondingly states that the consent of the minor should 
be sought in addition to the written permission of the parents when the minor is aged 12 
or over and is deemed capable of participating meaningfully in decision making. It also 
states a clear duty to inform all children (whatever age) in a developmentally appropriate 
manner, while refusal of even young children needs serious consideration. 
The intensely emotional nature of pediatric oncology makes it difficult to involve ado-
lescents in decision making (Joffe et al 2006). Complex treatment and research-related 
decisions are brought up while facing a potentially life-threatening diagnosis, limiting 
good communication (Dermatis and Lesko 1990; Oleschnowicz et al 2002). Informed 
participation in decision-making requires the understanding of complex research-relat-
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ed concepts such as randomization, voluntariness, and risks. The consent documents 
explaining these concepts are hard to understand for the layman (Berger et al 2009). 
Furthermore, most pediatric oncologists are also investigators and consequently dis-
cussions regarding diagnosis and treatment often include dialog about participation in 
research. Due to this integration of research and treatment, it is difficult for adolescents 
to distinguish between scientific goals and treatment objectives (Chappuy et al 2008; 
Susman et al 1992; Broome et al 2001). Finally, decisions about research participation 
need to be made within days or even hours (Stevens and Pletsch 2002). Taken together, 
the above constraints are likely to limit the degree and quality of discussions concerning 
trial enrolment. Consequently, assent is difficult to obtain (Oleschnowicz et al 2002). 
Still, a remarkable percentage of children with cancer—up to 80% of 0- to 14-year-olds 
and up to 30% of children over 15—enroll in a trial during their illness, as compared to 
only 1–4% of adult patients (Bleyer 1997; Ferrari and Bleyer 2007).
Little is known about physicians’ attitudes towards involving adolescents in decision 
making. Few data are available on the presence and degree of participation of children in 
discussions regarding research (Oleschnowicz et al 2002) and what adolescents think of 
the assent process (Young et al 2003). No data are available on our research question: 
what are the views of physicians concerning their ethical and legal obligation to involve 
children in decision-making and how do they justify the limited extent to which assent 
is obtained? As we aimed to explore views, experiences, and attitudes, a qualitative in-
terview design was used (Patton 2002; Denzin and Lincoln 2000). The research setting 
is defined as the situation in which the patient will not receive person-specific standard 
treatment but will instead be treated according to a clinical research protocol (with or 
without randomization) in order to obtain generalizable results. Adolescents are defined 
as minors between the ages of 10 and 18 years.
METHODS
The study sample was drawn from data collected as part of a larger qualitative multi-
center project exploring patients’, parents’ and physicians’ experiences of the informed 
consent process for treatment and research decisions after initial cancer diagnosis or 
after relapse. The project was approved by the Institutional Review Boards at the study 
sites. Informed consent was obtained from all participants. The present study is based 
on the interviews with the subgroup of physicians. One-to-one, in-depth, semi-structured 
interviews were conducted with the entire medical staff of two pediatric oncology centers 
in two academic hospitals (n=15). Children and adolescents up to the age of 18 are gener-
ally treated in these centers. The interviews were carried out from June to August 2007. 
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Interview procedure and analysis
All physicians were interviewed by the author of this thesis. Initial interview topics (see 
table 8) were formulated after examination of the relevant literature and a preliminary 
observational study in the children’s oncological ward of one of the hospitals. In accor-
dance with qualitative research techniques, the interview topics evolved as the interviews 
progressed through an iterative process to ensure that the questions captured all rele-
vant emerging themes (Britten 1995; Guest et al 2006). The interviews contained general 
topics and no close ended questions, and lasted between 30 and 60 minutes. Thematic 
saturation was reached after the 11th interview.
The interviews were recorded and transcribed verbatim. Data analysis was based on 
the constant comparative method (Strauss and Corbin 1998; Malterud 2001). Two of the 
authors (MdV and EvL) independently coded the transcripts by identifying and labeling 
discrete units of texts that referred to one or more concepts relevant to the purpose of 
the study. Through comparison across transcripts, the open codes were developed into 
higher order themes to provide a framework for coding subsequent transcripts. An inde-
pendent researcher coded two transcripts to check for consistency and adequacy of the 
framework. No inconsistencies were found. 
We used qualitative software, Kwalitan 5.0 (Peters 2000), for multiple text manage-
ment including coding, locating, and retrieving key phrases. Finally, representative quo-
tations were chosen to demonstrate the themes identified. These quotations are includ-
ed in the text.
Table 8. Interview Topics
The in-depth interview topics covered:
Characteristics of pediatric oncology: integration of research* and treatment, emotional •	
setting
Possible difficulties in explaining research and treatment goals and risks•	
Physician-patient-parent relationship concerning treatment and research decisions•	
Adolescent’s participation in decision making•	
Ethical and legal obligations to involve adolescents in decision-making•	
Parents and patient autonomy•	
Physician’s ideas on non-maleficence and beneficence•	
*When talking about research, we confined ourselves to discussing phase III-trials, in which the 
overall contribution of a new approach (‘protocol’) was evaluated, often in a large, randomized 
controlled trial (RCT) setting in which the new approach was compared with the previously 




All 15 physicians who were contacted agreed to participate. The physicians varied in age, 
sex and working experience (see table 3, page 21). The physicians from center B were 
younger and had less working experience in pediatric oncology. There were, however, no 
differences in outcomes according to site.
In line with previous studies, almost all physicians stated that meaningful assent 
from adolescents, although an ethical (and legal) requirement, is difficult to obtain (12 of 
the 15 physicians, 80%). Four central themes that characterize the physicians’ attitudes 
towards involving adolescents in decision-making concerning research were identified. 
These themes emerged consistently in all interviews. 
Theme 1: physicians regard most adolescents as not capable of meaningful participation 
in research discussions
The interviews show that the physicians in our study started from the presumption that 
adolescents are incapable of participating meaningfully in research discussions, mostly 
because of the overwhelming situation. All physicians stated that most adolescents are 
unable to judge correctly what a research setting entails, even after ample discussion. 
In my opinion, these children are not able to judge these things at the time of diagnosis. 
As soon as I get the idea that they can, I try to involve them in the decision-making. But 
I think that only concerns the children who really have reached puberty, not the 12- and 
13-year olds. Most of them sit and watch their parents. – Physician B4
Four physicians stated that sometimes they did encounter adolescents who were capable 
of understanding what research entails, mainly because they were facing a relapse and 
had previous experience in participating in research.
It is true that children who suffer relapse, well they are sometimes wiser than you would 
expect. Not all of course, but some are. – Physician A5
Children who had almost reached the legally established age of maturity (in the Nether-
lands: 18 years) were also attributed more capabilities but this was not seen as a general 
rule. Physicians also encountered older adolescents who were too overwhelmed to par-
ticipate in research discussions.
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Theme 2: Physicians do not always provide adolescents with all information
The majority of physicians (11 of the 15 physicians, 73%) will omit information when talk-
ing to adolescents because they think they are too vulnerable. Sometimes information is 
also considered not to be useful for them at that particular moment. 
Most of the times I talk to parents and the child separately, because I’m more honest 
to parents than to the child about the ins and outs of the research protocol and possible 
complications. (…) It’s not that I lie about things, but some things you just don’t have to 
mention to a child. You don’t have to burden a child with things that might not happen 
at all. But we do have the obligation to articulate these things to parents. – Physician A3
If you have to explain randomization to a young adolescent, that is often very difficult. 
You can explain aspects of the treatment in general. […] But more difficult issues, like 
randomization and risks, I discuss with parents separately. – Physician B3
Adolescents hear about their condition, the proposed treatment and side effects (es-
pecially short term side-effects, like vomiting and hair loss), but they get little or no 
information on certain research issues, such as risks (stated by 9 of 15 physicians), ran-
domization (2 of 15 physicians), alternative treatments (5 of 15 physicians) and extra 
burdens (2 of 15 physicians). Leaving out information and thus enabling only incomplete 
participation in decision making was justified with the following arguments: first, proxy 
consent from parents was obtained (theme 3); and second, physicians judge research 
protocols as being not harmful and even in the best interest of the child (physician-
investigator integrity, theme 4). 
Theme 3: physicians regard proxy consent as a necessity
All physicians were confident that parents generally want to promote the welfare of their 
child and that parents understand the research setting. Therefore, proxy consent was 
seen as sufficient justification for enrolment.
Some adolescents just don’t understand what they are signing. Then I count on the par-
ents’ wishes. Parents always want what is best for the child. – Physician A6
Theme 4: Physician-investigator integrity: research is not harmful 
Thirteen of 15 physicians (87%) felt confident to include a child in a study since their own 
knowledge of the trial (e.g., its risks and burdens) and the Institutional Review Board 
(IRB) approval convinced them that the study was not inferior to known treatment op-
tions. Their own integrity and IRB control would protect the child. 
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I’ve seen the development of this trial and that’s why I’m very aware of what we offer the 
child. It is not something horrifying but something I can support completely. Well, that’s 
why I don’t have any difficulty that I let the child sign for a trial, although he doesn’t un-
derstand the ins and outs of it. – Physician B5
The accuracy that studies need to have these days to be accepted by IRB ruling…; then you 
can wholeheartedly say that it is not harmful. And that’s why I’m a vigorous advocate of 
studies and I always try enroll a child. – Physician A4
Some clinicians (3 of 15) said participation in a trial, independent of the arm the patient 
is in, ameliorates the treatment which could be received outside a trial.
I think that parents should become more familiar with the fact that studies actually pro-
vide a qualitatively better treatment. There is better control, there are fixed rules we have 
to abide by concerning inclusion, exclusion, adjusting chemotherapy because of side-ef-
fects, etc. That’s why I’m more inclined to think that participating in a study is an advan-
tage, rather than a disadvantage. – Physician A4 
Two physicians were skeptical about the benefits for children. 
It’s not true that participation in research is completely harmless. We are fallible. Some-
times experimental arms of research turn out not to work at all. Also, little things can go 
wrong during the treatment. It’s all human work. – Physician A6
All physicians felt bound to enroll children in the, usually international, clinical trials, be-
cause they considered it the state-of-the-art treatment and because the oncological team 
conformed itself to participate in these trials.
We also explain how things work in the Netherlands, that our hospital works with uniform 
protocols, that all children get the same treatment in the Netherlands. (…) I have to ad-
mit that I explain things [to parents] as if they have no choice. I usually say: your child has 
leukemia, or whatever form of cancer, and then most of the times I already made copies 
of the trial protocol outline and I say: well, In the Netherlands all children with this disease 




In pediatric oncology, treatment is often combined with research. The intertwinement 
between research methodology and clinical care has led to much progress in therapeutic 
options, but it makes the informed consent procedure difficult to perform. The physi-
cians in our study confirmed that they often do not fully involve adolescents in decision-
making concerning research participation. Assent by the adolescent is acknowledged as 
ethically and legally necessary but is said to be difficult to obtain. 
The four themes that characterize the physicians’ attitudes towards involving adoles-
cents in research discussions can be summarized as follows: Adolescents are not capa-
ble of meaningful participation in these discussions (theme 1) and are not fully involved 
in decision-making (theme 2). This is, however, not a problem, because proxy consent 
(theme 3) and investigator’s integrity (theme 4) safeguard the adolescent’s best inter-
est in a trial. Not involving adolescents in research discussions is justified by physicians 
with the use of best interest arguments (adolescents’ incompetence, proxy consent, and 
investigator integrity). Discussion should focus on the appropriateness of these best 
interest considerations in a research setting.
Best interest and research participation
Almost all pediatric oncologists in our study sincerely believed that enrolling children in 
clinical trials was in their best interest and constituted state-of-the-art treatment. These 
observations support Joffe et al’s findings about enrolment of children in trials and best 
interest considerations (Joffe et al 2002).
At first sight, it seems rather safe to rely on a best interest standard in research de-
cisions since the same standard is used in treatment decisions. In a research context, 
however, proxy consent and the best interest standard are not so easily applied. First, the 
function of proxy consent can be troublesome: literature shows that parents also have 
difficulties in understanding research related topics (Stevens and Pletsch 2002; Kodish 
et al 2004; Wiley et al 1999). What is more, there is evidence that there is a potential for 
disagreement between adolescents and parents on research participation (Young et al 
2003). One study even reports a consistent 40% discordance in views between adoles-
cents and parents across a variety of asthma research protocols (Brody et al 2005). It 
seems that the physicians we interviewed are unaware of the basic lack of understanding 
of research-related concepts in parents and the potential for disagreement between ado-
lescents and parents. At least it does not change the importance the physicians attach to 
proxy consent. Based on the literature however, it can be argued that parents may not be 
equipped to make decisions about research participation on behalf of their children. 
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Secondly, the contexts of treatment and research are fundamentally different and 
require different ethical approaches (National Commission for the Protection of Human 
Subjects 1979; Miller and Brody 2003; Spinetta et al 2003). In the treatment relationship, 
the best interest of the individual child is prevailing in the selection of the best available 
treatment. Any new knowledge generated is incidental to the overriding goal of provid-
ing therapy. The concept of presumed or implicit consent is often used in the therapeu-
tic setting. Pediatricians routinely carry out medically indicated procedures on children 
without obtaining assent, or even despite a child’s vigorous objections. This is accept-
able because it is the interest of the child which is the sole motivation prompting the 
intervention (Lee et al 2006). In the context of research, however, the researcher seeks 
to advance knowledge to improve the care of future children as well as to serve other in-
terests, like building an academic profile. Therapeutic benefits to the individual are, from 
a methodological perspective, secondary to the overriding goal of obtaining robust data 
and new knowledge (Miller and Brody 2003). The goals of research often require that 
children undergo non-therapeutic procedures, such as additional blood samples, spi-
nal taps and (PET) scans. These procedures may cause considerable pain, discomfort, 
inconvenience, or even harm (Miller and Brody 2003). Therefore, the research setting 
leaves no room for presumed consent. Subjects should voluntarily enter the research 
setting, with adequate information and only after explicit consent, because the best inter-
est standard is not the only demanding principle (National Commission for the Protec-
tion of Human Subjects 1979). 
Sometimes it is argued that an RCT preserves the basic treatment related duty to act 
in the best interest of the child through clinical equipoise, the uncertainty principle. After 
all, no subject is randomized to a treatment known to be inferior to the present standard. 
For example, Kumar et al (2005) found that new treatments in childhood cancer tested 
in randomized controlled trials are, on average, as likely to be inferior as they are to 
be superior to standard treatments, confirming that the uncertainty principle has been 
operating. However, the uncertainty principle also means that it is never known in ad-
vance what the actual risks and benefits will be: only after the completion of a study one 
genuinely knows which trial arm showed the best results and whether or not participants 
were exposed to extra risks and burdens. Most pediatric oncology trials have Data and 
Safety Monitoring Plans (DSMP) and stopping rules for the very purpose of dealing with 
unexpected risks and outcomes.
The physicians in our study argued that trial participation is beneficial as compared 
to non-participation because of a strict adherence to well-defined protocols. Various au-
thors have stated that the use of treatment protocols improves the end result of treat-
ment (Stiller and Eatock 1999; Karjalainen and Palva 1989; Stiller 1994). This could be 
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the result of the explicit description of the treatment phases and their follow up. Other 
authors, however, show that there are insufficient data to conclude that such a trial effect 
exists (Vist et al 2008; Peppercorn et al 2004). Until such data are available, patients with 
cancer should be encouraged to enrol in clinical trials on the basis of trials’ unquestioned 
role in improving treatment for future patients.
In conclusion, recognition of the fundamental conceptual difference between the care 
orientation and the research orientation is crucial in deciding to obtain explicit assent 
of adolescents. One cannot justify wavering assent from an adolescent for research ele-
ments in a protocol by pointing to the best interest standard, as the physicians in our 
study did.
Can adolescents decide for themselves?
The other reason given by the clinicians for not obtaining assent is that adolescents 
would not be capable of participating meaningfully in research discussions and that 
therefore obtaining proxy consent suffices. However, several studies have shown that 
children aged 14 and older can approach the level of understanding of adults (Joffe et 
al 2006; Mårtenson and Fägerskiöld 2008). Some studies even conclude that relatively 
young children (as young as 7 years) can participate meaningfully in the consent process 
(Committee on Drugs 1995). One study indicates that emotional factors are more fre-
quently related to understanding the implications of research participation than are age 
or cognitive development (Dorn et al 1995). This suggests that providing a medical en-
vironment that decreases anxiety and increases a sense of control may enhance adoles-
cents’ understanding of the research process, however difficult this may be to achieve in 
the situation of a child with newly diagnosed disease or relapse. The ability to understand 
research issues may also relate to experience rather than to age, as even young children 
appear to understand complex issues (British Royal College of Pediatrics 2000). The 
physicians in our study confirmed these latter findings. Some mentioned that they do 
encounter children who are wiser than expected and that their approach then is different, 
involving these children more in the decision-making process. From these data, we can 
at least conclude that adolescents as a class should not be regarded as incapable, but 
that an assessment is needed in each individual case. We must aim at avoiding two kinds 
of mistakes: imposing complex research decisions on adolescents who are unwilling or 
unable to make them, and excluding capable adolescents who desire to participate in 
decision making (Joffe et al 2006). Therefore, a case-by-case (psychological) assessment 
prior to concluding the consent process is necessary in order to evaluate the decision-
making capacity of the adolescent (Abrams et al 2007). Thus, justice may be done to the 
ethical ideal of respect for the developing autonomy of children in making decisions, as 
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stipulated in several international regulations and guidelines [Code of Federal Regula-
tions 1991; Directive 2001/20/EC 2001; Spinetta et al 2003). Unless they have a very 
pertinent reason to do so, physicians cannot put their judgment about the child’s best in-
terest in place of the child’s consent to participate. The opinion of the adolescent should 
be actively sought, which will sometimes mean that the views of parents will have to be 
overridden by oncologists. We would suggest that in the case of an adolescent with the 
capacity to understand the implications of research participation, both the adolescent 
and the parents need to consent to research participation. Especially an adolescent’s 
refusal needs serious consideration; in our view conducting research is not acceptable if 
this means overruling an adolescent’s refusal, even if parents did consent to it.
It is extremely difficult to explain complex research concepts to lay persons in a situ-
ation of acute, serious medical illness as well as emotional strain. Well-crafted informa-
tion materials (booklets, visual aids) could aid investigators in explaining to potential 
child research participants and their parents what these concepts mean, and which ele-
ments of their treatment are research procedures (for example additional blood samples 
or spinal taps) (Ungar et al 2006). 
Chapter 7
ATTITUDES OF PHYSICIANS AND PARENTS 
TOWARDS DISCUSSING INFERTILITY RISKS AND 
SEMEN CRYOPRESERVATION WITH MALE 
ADOLESCENTS DIAGNOSED WITH CANCER
 
De Vries MC, Bresters D, Engberts DP, Wit JM, Van Leeuwen E.




Background. In pediatric oncology, the risk of infertility due to treatment constitutes an 
important problem. For sexually mature male adolescents, sperm cryopreservation is an 
option, but discussing the topic is complex because of the sensitive nature and the lim-
ited timeframe. In this chapter we determine attitudes and preferred roles of physicians 
and parents towards discussing sperm banking with male adolescents.
Methods. Qualitative multi-centre study, using in-depth semi-structured interviews with 
14 physicians and 15 parents of male adolescents undergoing cancer treatment. 
Results. Although physicians and parents agreed that infertility would have a major im-
pact on the future quality of life, they sometimes disagreed on whether the topic should 
be discussed with adolescents. Physicians always wanted a separate discussion with 
adolescents because of the sensitive nature and the experience that parents sometimes 
misjudged the stage of maturity of their son. Parents, however, wanted control over 
whether physicians discussed the topic with their child and what was said. Physicians 
did not accept this control and, when necessary, were willing to bypass the parents and 
discuss the topic with the adolescent even when parents refused consent.
Conclusions. Physicians face the difficult task of balancing between their ideas of what 
is in the (future) interest of the adolescent and accommodating parental wishes. We 
argue that, because of the private character of sexuality and the potentially inadequate 
maturity assessment by parents, semen cryopreservation should be discussed separately 
with adolescent and parents. In addition, there should be an open communication with 




Children treated for cancer are increasingly likely to survive. For all childhood cancers 
5-year overall survival has improved markedly over the past 30 years, from less than 
20% to nearly 80%, due to improved treatments and better supportive care (American 
Cancer Society 2007). However, long-term survivors may face serious long-term side ef-
fects, including damage to the reproductive system. Rates of compromised fertility after 
cancer treatment vary and depend on many factors, like the chemotherapeutic agent or 
radiation field, the dose, dose-intensity, method of administration, disease, age, sex and 
pre-treatment fertility (Fallat et al 2008; Lee et al 2006a; Schrader et al 2001; Wallace et 
al 2001). Most at risk are those who are intensively treated with a treatment modality 
encompassing successive multiple toxicity, like bone marrow transplantation.
The inability to father genetically own children has a high impact on the future quality 
of life (Lee et al 2006; Saito et al 2005; Schover et al 1999; Schover et al 2002a; Schover 
2005; Van den Berg and Langeveld 2007). Both male and female cancer survivors report 
a large degree of stress regarding fertility (Schover 2005; Green et al 2003; Zebrack et al 
2004).  
In male adolescents with a risk of infertility, sperm banking can be offered, provided 
that the adolescent is sexually mature. Cryopreservation of semen for eligible adolescent 
boys is a well established and proven technique which should be considered routine 
(British Fertility Society 2003). The availability of ICSI makes it worthwhile to cryopre-
serve almost all semen samples, even when the sperm has extremely poor characteris-
tics of count, motility and morphology (Tournaye et al 2004). In adolescents who are at 
risk for infertility and have had spontaneous nocturnal ejaculations, but are unable to 
produce semen by masturbation, transrectal electro-ejaculation under general anaesthe-
sia is an option (Hovav et al 2001; Schmiegelow et al 1998). 
Notwithstanding the technical possibilities, semen collection in male adolescents 
can be complex because of communication difficulties. Discussing sperm banking in-
volves sensitive topics like body changes and developing sexuality, the grief of confront-
ing infertility as a side effect, the necessity of using masturbation to collect a semen 
sample, and the use of pornographic materials as an aid (Schover 1999; Crawshaw et al 
2007). Eligible patients and their parents must consider preserving fertility during the 
stressful period after having received a potentially fatal diagnosis. Usually the time frame 
until cancer treatment starts is short, which further adds to the experienced pressure. 
Because of the large variation in the stage of maturity among teenage boys, it is 
difficult to select the boys eligible for cryopreservation. Not only the Tanner stage is 
important in assessing possible success, but also whether the boy has spontaneous 
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nocturnal semen emissions and/or masturbates. To gain insight in the stage of matu-
rity, this sensitive topic is often discussed with parents first and subsequently with the 
patient (Müller et al 2000). The decision to initially talk with the parents requires ethical 
consideration. Talking to the parents first may be embarrassing for adolescents, because 
they value their privacy in this matter. But parents of teenagers may be protective and 
may prefer to have topics such as sexuality and reproduction not addressed without 
their consent. This may pose a dilemma for the oncology team about who to talk to first 
(Schover 1999). This dilemma raises special concern because of the need to balance the 
extent to which adolescents are able to participate in the discussion and the extent to 
which parents are able to judge the stage of maturity of their sons.
To date, not much data is available on the practice of discussing fertility preserva-
tion in the pediatric oncology setting. Most studies assessed the adult oncology setting 
(Green et al 2003; Quinn et al 2007). Previous reports on pediatric oncologists only 
concern their knowledge about infertility risks and fertility preservation techniques, and 
whether fertility issues are discussed before the start of treatment (Anderson et al 2008; 
Goodwin et al 2007). There are no data on how the topic is discussed and on physicians’ 
ideas about who should be present during the discussion. With regard to parents, there 
are publications on their knowledge about the infertility risks for their child (Van den 
Berg et al 2007), their concerns about fertility Oosterhuis et al 2008) and their presence 
during initial discussions (Ginsberg et al 2008), but none about the preferred roles of 
parents in the discussion about this topic. 
The purpose of the present study was to clarify the attitudes of parents and physi-
cians concerning various aspects of discussing fertility issues. Specifically, this study was 
conducted to: (1) assess the current communication practice of pediatric oncologists 
regarding fertility preservation, with emphasis on role delineation of physician, parents 
and adolescent, (2) explore the experiences of physicians and parents regarding their 
roles in fertility preservation communication, and (3) explore the ethical issues involved. 
Insight into the attitudes of physicians and the discomforts and preferences of parents 
may contribute to successful communication, and thereby positively affect parental sat-
isfaction with communication (Zwaanswijk et al 2007).
METHODS
Participants and design
Our sample was drawn from data collected as part of a larger qualitative multi-centre 
project in which we explored patients’, parents’ and physicians’ experiences with the 
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informed-consent process for treatment after initial cancer diagnosis or after relapse. In 
this project we invited patients (aged 8-18 years) attending the pediatric oncology units 
of two Dutch university hospitals, their parents and their physicians to participate in 
semi-structured interviews about the informed consent process. 
The present study is based on the interviews with the subgroup of parents of male ad-
olescents (n=14) and their physicians (n=15). Since we only focused on fertility preserva-
tion techniques available in the two clinics where the study was conducted (cryopreserva-
tion of semen collected through masturbation (both clinics) or electro-ejaculation (one 
clinic)), we did not use the interview data of the parents of prepubertal male patients or 
female patients. We had hoped to also include an analysis of the interviews with the male 
adolescents, but most of them were reluctant to talk about semen cryopreservation in 
the context of the broader research project. These interviews generated not enough data 
for assessment in this study. 
Figure 4 shows eligibility and recruitment of parents. Parents had a mean age of 42.8 
years (range 36-50 years). Their sons had a mean age of 13.8 years (range 11-17 years). 
The parents’ occupations varied, indicating social diversity. All families were of Dutch 
origin. Demographic and clinical characteristics of the parents and their sons are given 
in Table 9. 
The group of physicians comprised the entire medical staff of both pediatric oncology 
units. Physicians had a mean age of 42.1 years (range 32-52 years), worked in pediatric 
oncology for a mean of 7.6 years (range 1.5-20 years) and 7 (46.7%) were male. The proj-
ect was approved by the medical ethics committees at the study sites. All parents gave 
written informed consent. 
Interview procedure and data collection
All families were interviewed by the author of this thesis. The parent interviews lasted 
between 60 and 90 minutes and were conducted at the hospital. The interview topics 
covered general characteristics of the patient; the history of the disease; discussions with 
physicians about the recommended treatment and possible side effects like infertility; 
parents’ attitudes to these discussions, and the perceived role of parents in decision 
making regarding cancer therapy and related treatments, like fertility preservation op-
tions. 
Each physician was interviewed in their office. The interview lasted between 30 and 
60 minutes. The in-depth interview topics covered work experience; general goals of 
childhood oncology; the physician–patient-parent relationship, especially concerning 
decisions regarding therapy and related treatments, like fertility preservation options; 











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































All the interviews were audiotaped and transcribed verbatim. Data analysis was based 
on the constant comparative method (Malterud 2001; Strauss and Corbin 1998). The 
authors, MdV and EvL, independently coded the full transcripts by identifying and label-
ling discrete units of texts that referred to one or more concepts relevant to the study. 
Through comparison across transcripts, the open codes were developed into higher or-
der themes to provide a framework for coding subsequent transcripts. The simultaneous 
inclusion of parents and physicians enabled comparison of themes between the two 
groups. An independent researcher coded two transcripts to check for consistency and 
adequacy of the framework. When no new thematic content was found in the parent 
interviews, subject enrolment was stopped. This process, called thematic saturation, is 
a well-described qualitative method to avoid unnecessarily large and repetitive data sets 
(Guest et al 2006; Denzin and Lincoln 2000). 
We used qualitative software (Kwalitan 5.0, Peters 2000) for multiple text manage-
ment, including coding, locating, and retrieving key phrases. Finally, representative quo-
tations from parents and physicians were chosen to demonstrate the themes identified. 
RESULTS
We identified four central themes from the interviews: concerns about the future quality 
of life, child participation, parental control, and timing and approach for fertility discus-
sions. We discuss these themes for physicians and parents separately.
Attitudes of physicians on communicating fertility issues 
Concerns about the future quality of life
For all physicians, infertility was seen as having a major impact on the future quality of 
life of patients. All physicians therefore felt a duty to bring up the issue and offer cryo-
preservation.
I think it’s our duty as oncologists to offer fertility preservation, because only before start 
of treatment is there the possibility to do so. Once they have had chemotherapy, it’s over. 
And maybe later on, when they are 25 years old they come back to me and ask: doctor, 
why didn’t you offer it to me? – Physician A81
1 For the quotes: physician numbers refer to the physician numbers in Table 3 (page 21). Parent numbers refer 




                        
 
 Children 8-18 years with new 
diagnosis of cancer or 
relapse between 1-1-2006 and 
1-9-2007 in two oncology 
centres 
Male adolescents 11-18 years 
n = 25 
NOT ASSESSED FOR ELIGIBILITY: 
 
• Refusal by patient’s own physician because of 
psychosocial situation n=1 
Assessed for eligibility 
n = 24 
EXCLUDED (Total is 11): 
 
1. Not Meeting Inclusion Criteria 
• child IQ < 75   n=1 
• critically ill *   n=4 
• Unable to read/write Dutch  n=2 
 
2. Refusal by child or parents  n=4 
Total recruited 
n = 13 adolescents 
DATA AVAILABLE FOR ANALYSIS: 
• Interview one parent n=12 
• Interview two parents  n=1 
14 parent interviews 
Figure 4. Enrollment, eligibility and recruitment of parents. 
 
* For critically ill adolescents, therapy had to start immediately and there was no time to cryopreserve semen. 
Figure 4. Enrollment, eligibility and recruitment of parents.




Child participation and parental control
There was unanimity among physicians that children should participate in the decision-
making process. Most of the times physicians talked to the parents first to find out their 
thoughts on the sexual development of their child. Subsequently, the opinion of the child 
was sought.
I always first discuss it with the parents. Even with older adolescents I first talk to the 
parents and ask them whether they think that the boy is ready to discuss the topic and 
produce semen. Only after that I talk to the boy. – Physician A7
Physicians, however, knew from experience that parents cannot always correctly predict 
whether their child masturbates or has nocturnal semen emissions. 
I remember one mother who had it completely wrong. She thought her son didn’t do 
anything yet, but he was [masturbating]! She just didn’t know and she was shocked to 
find out, because she thought she knew her child very well, but now found out that she 
didn’t. – Physician B4  
We have been mistaken once or twice. Parents sometimes said that their child was not 
ready, but then we talked to the child alone, and it turned out that the child was ready. 
And that he was able to produce sperm for preservation. On such occasions we almost 
let a chance pass by because parents had said that the boy was not ready. I learned from 
those experiences that you always have to talk to the adolescent alone, and not leave the 
issue to the parents. – Physician B3
Because of the alleged inability of the parents to make reliable predictions on this topic, 
and the importance of the issue, the physicians always talked to the adolescent, even if 
parents doubted whether the issue should be discussed with their son.
If you think that a patient will become infertile from the treatment, and the boy has 
reached an age at which sperm can be preserved, then I think it’s your duty to do so. 
You can only do it once. I think it should be offered and I feel justified in passing over the 
parents. If I think the child is ready and parents doubt that, then I think it’s in the best 
interest of the child to go ahead. – Physician A3
Fourteen of the 15 physicians would even discuss the topic with the adolescent when par-
ents straightforwardly refused them permission to talk to their son. Only one physician 
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said she would then follow the preferences of the parents. Because of the delicate issues 
to be discussed, physicians in fact sometimes talked to the adolescent alone, without the 
parents knowing.
Once, with a 14-year old boy, I first talked to the boy, without his mother knowing. Be-
cause I thought it was too delicate an issue to discuss with everyone present. The mother 
was furious when she found out. ‘It’s MY child and I have a right to know!’, she claimed. 
I replied that she had a right to know, but that the child had the right to know FIRST, 
because with this issue you enter a private domain. – Physician B4
Experiences of parents
Concerns about the future quality of life
Just like the physicians, many parents were thinking of the future quality of life of their 
son when pondering over the fertility issue.
What counted for us was the thought that, well, let’s suppose that he wants to start a 
family, that his future wife has a strong child wish, and we would have blocked the way. 
If you say no [to fertility preservation], then that’s final. That would be too much control 
from our side. In my opinion, that would be unwise. – Parent 14
For him to have a choice in the future to start a family or not, that was the reason why we 
made the decision to preserve semen. It is his life after all. And I don’t want to intervene in 
it. I don’t want to deny him choices in the future by deciding for him now. – Parent 13
Child participation and parental control
In contrast to the physicians, there was no unanimity among parents with respect to 
their views on the participation of children in the decision making process. Some par-
ents were explicit in their views that it is eventually the child who decides what happens, 
because it relates to his own future. 
He [the child] initially said that we [the parents] had to decide what to do. Well, that was 
something! I thought it was too much. We couldn’t decide over something that he might 
regret 10 years from now. So we talked it over with him. And he eventually cut the knot. 
And we supported him. He generally very easily passes the buck to us. As soon as he has 
to think something through, he makes us decide. But in this case that was not realistic. 
It’s about your life, I told him. – Parent 14
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Many parents (8 of 14) however doubted whether the issue should be discussed with 
their son. They wanted to protect their child from this information, or at least wanted 
control over what was being discussed with their child.
At one point I said to the nurse: ‘I want to protect him from this [fertility] conversation 
with the physicians. I will tell him myself what he needs to know’. – Parent 6 
[Patient was approached first, without his mother knowing] Well, the fact that they ap-
proached him first, that they let him decide, I found it hard to come to terms with that. 
His whole life I’ve been responsible and the one people talked to concerning him. Of 
course we always discuss things, me and the children, but in the end, I’m the one with 
the most life experience. So I take the final decisions. But now, they approached the child 
directly. So I said to them [the physicians]: ‘I think the sequence is wrong. You should first 
contact me, when you want to discuss things with my child.’ – Parent 3
The main reason parents wanted control over the discussion was because they doubted 
whether their son was sexually mature. 
We had to think about whether he already has ejaculations. I just knew this was not the 
case. I mean, he is almost 14 years old, but it’s just not the case. Is it reasonable then to 
confront him with this side-effect? We told the physician not to mention it to him. – Par-
ent 5
Three parents were reluctant to discuss the issue because they felt that the conversations 
were ill-timed and confronting due to the sensitive nature.
The evening before the start of the chemotherapy he [the child] was told about possible 
infertility and semen preservation. Later on we told them [the physicians] that the timing 
was really bad. For a child to be in such a big hospital and then to have to think about 
something like that. Even adults wouldn’t be able to do that. We felt it was mentioned too 
late. They should have mentioned it during the first conversation. (…) Because then the 
child has 2 or 3 weeks to think about it in his own environment. – Parent 11
That he had to think about whether he could produce semen or not, that was really shock-
ing. He had to make such a leap in his development. Of course, to hear that you have 
cancer is also very shocking. But in a way that just happens to you. It’s just a fact. While 




Unanimity existed among parents and physicians with respect to the impact of possible 
infertility on the future life of the child. The child’s best interest in the context of treat-
ment was seen as to include both its present interests in surviving and future interests 
such as fertility preservation. Maintaining future options is a well-known theme in pedi-
atric ethics, and various authors have argued that physicians and parents act unethical 
if they make choices that limit a child’s range of future options (Feinberg 1992; Davis 
2001). A child’s right to fertility preservation is acknowledged in bioethical literature as a 
right in trust. If the medical risk is acceptable, it seems that parents have an ethical right 
to ask for fertility preservation and an ethical duty not to constrain the choices of their 
children regarding future reproduction (Fallat et al 2008; Davis 2001). 
Although physicians and parents agreed that infertility would have a major impact 
on the future quality of life of their child, they sometimes disagreed on how the topic 
should be discussed. Physicians always wanted a separate discussion with adolescents 
because of the sensitive nature of the topic and the experience that parents can misjudge 
the stage of maturity of their son. Some parents, however, felt that there were barriers 
to discussing the topic with their son because they felt he was too immature and under 
pressure of time. Discussing infertility with adolescents was a sensitive topic for parents 
and they wanted control over whether physicians discussed the topic with their child 
and what was said. In the literature this control over physician-child communication has 
been described before and termed strategic control. Parents tend to filter and modulate 
what children are told by their physicians, relegating children to a passive role in medical 
decision-making (Tates and Meeuwesen 2000, 2001). Literature shows that physicians 
normally deem this mode of communication acceptable (Levetown et al 2008). Studies 
in pediatric oncology describe a general tendency from physicians to protect children 
from too much information (Young et al 2003; Olechnowicz et al 2002). Parents and 
physicians jointly discuss the ways to encounter the child, whether to involve the child 
in the decision making process and the information given to the child. The parents in 
our study wanted to exert strategic control in fertility issues as with other topics. The 
physicians we interviewed, however, did not accept this strategic control when fertility 
preservation was involved. The future potential of fertility seemed too important to them 
and they wanted to discuss it with the child, even when the parents did not give consent. 
This confronts physicians with the difficult task of finding a balance between their view of 
the (future) interest of the adolescent and accommodating parental wishes. Most physi-
cians in our study were ultimately willing to bypass the parents. This could potentially 
lead to an undesirable situation of conflict between parents and physicians at the outset 
of a long treatment relationship.
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Because of the potential differences in opinion between parents and physicians, fer-
tility preservation can be used as an example case to discuss the limitations of parental 
discretion to regulate information disclosure to their child. In general, parents want to 
promote the welfare of their children. It is this intention that makes parents the pre-
sumed decision makers for their children and legitimises parental discretion to act as 
they think is best for them (Ross 1998).  In the delicate issue of fertility discussions 
however, the parental role can become problematic and it could be assumed that the 
adolescent is the most appropriate discussion partner and does not need a custodian. 
After interviewing young cancer survivors, Schover et al (2002b) came to the conclu-
sion that the fertility topic should first be raised with the adolescent in private and then 
be discussed separately with the parents. The patients in the study by Schover et al re-
ported that it was acutely uncomfortable to be informed about sperm banking in front 
of their parents. Ginsberg et al (2008) showed that almost half of the male adolescents 
would have preferred to have initial discussions without their parents present. One study 
suggested that male adolescents may be more successful at masturbation if a parent 
does not accompany them to the sperm bank (Bahadur et al 2002). Various guidelines 
and protocols state that adolescents can in some circumstances be considered mature 
enough to give or refuse informed consent for medical procedures, without the need 
for parental involvement, especially when reproductive health services are at stake (so-
called mature minor doctrine) (British Fertility Society 2003; Sigman and O’Connor 1991; 
Committee on Bioethics 1995; Dickens and Cook 2005). Strategic control from parents 
therefore seems inappropriate concerning fertility discussions. 
There can be many reasons not to discuss fertility preservation with an adolescent, 
like the inclination to prioritize discussions about treatment and its immediate side-
effects, emotional discomfort with discussing fertility issues, lack of time or the predic-
tion that the adolescent is probably not mature enough (Lee et al 2006; Vadaparampil 
et al 2007). The ease with which physicians can discuss fertility issues also depends on 
the existing practice of educating teens about sexuality, which may differ from country to 
country. However, if we want to preserve future reproductive choices for adolescents and 
if we take the adolescents’ ability to discuss their own sexual development and behaviour 
seriously, these reasons do not relieve physicians and parents of the obligation to initi-
ate early discussions with adolescents in private about conservation of future fertility 
potential. 
It should be noted that communication, especially on a potentially difficult topic such 
as fertility, is culturally sensitive. A basic knowledge of the norms and values about sexu-
ality and fertility associated with specific groups is helpful for this purpose. On the other 
hand, we need to be aware that there is also a great diversity within groups, communi-
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ties, and families. Simon and Kodish (2005) therefore emphasize the danger of making 
assumptions based on ethnicity or socioeconomic factors, which may contribute to the 
omission of important information for families.
In our study, 3 of 15 parents were surprised by the late announcement of fertility prob-
lems and cryopreservation options. Other studies show that adolescents and parents 
want information regarding sperm cryopreservation early (within a week of diagnosis) in 
order to have the opportunity to think about it and to avoid unnecessary delays in treat-
ment (Ginsberg et al 2008). Two surveys suggest that lack of timely information is the 
most common reason for not banking sperm (Schover et al 1999; Schover et al 2002a). 
Therefore, fertility preservation should be mentioned as early as possible, and should 
not be delayed because of the sensitive nature or a feeling of inappropriateness during a 
time of emotional stress. An educational brochure answering key questions could help 
facilitate discussion in a time of medical urgency and initial lack of relationships of trust 
between physicians, adolescents and parents (Nagel et al 2008). 
CONCLUSION
Discussing the storage of sperm of an adolescent with cancer is a challenging aspect of 
pediatric oncology care. Because of the private character of the issue and the potentially 
inadequate assessment by parents of the stage of maturity of the adolescent, semen 
cryopreservation deserves to be discussed with the adolescent in private. In addition, 
there should be timely, open communication with parents, in which it is made clear that 
the issue is private and deserves separate discussion with their child. Addressing po-
tential discomforts of parents about approaching their child may contribute to parents’ 
eventual satisfaction with communication.
Future research should address adolescents’ opinions on timing and approach for 
fertility discussions, as well as how to proceed once an adolescent wants to bank sperm 
(for example timeframe, use of erotic material, design of collection rooms). Since these 
topics turned out to be so sensitive for the adolescents, this research should be done 
anonymously (for example by using a questionnaire) or by a sexologist / andrologist to 






In the following paragraphs, the principal results of this thesis are put into perspective. 
We will focus on two issues: first, we will give methodological considerations: does our 
methodology prove valuable for answering ethical questions in practice, and what are the 
limitations?; and second, what are the implications of our study for our thinking about 
child participation, the use of a best interests standard and parental authority in pediatric 
oncology and in pediatrics in general? Finally, directions for future research are given.
METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS
The use of third person moral experiences in empirical medical ethics. Reflective equili-
brium and empirical data
A familiar criticism of bioethics charges it with being more conceptual than practical - 
having little to do with the ‘real world’ and its moral issues. In order to answer this criti-
cism and to keep its feet on the ground, bioethics has started to utilize methods from 
the social sciences. Empirical research data are believed to provide the bridge between 
conceiving a moral vision of a better world, and actually enacting it (Solomon 2005). This 
belief is not without counteraction, causing a debate about the question whether empiri-
cal studies can truly inform ethical reasoning (Pellegrino 1995, Düwell 2009). By using 
empirical data, are we not confusing the descriptive, the analytical-metaethical, and the 
normative domains of ethics? In short, ethics is not a democratic process. In this field 
of tension and debate, empirical ethics is still developing, and studies actually using 
empirical data, as well as studies on how to combine the ‘is’ and ‘ought’ are increasingly 
published (Salloch et al 2012).
In chapter 2, we defended our version of a Reflective Equilibrium (RE) method, name-
ly the Network Model with Third Person Moral Experiences, which allows for a two-way 
relation between empirical and normative data. We concluded that various aspects can 
strengthen the search for coherence between the various data used (theories, principles 
and considered moral judgments) and eventually the credibility of the moral judgment of 
the ‘thinker’. All these aspects have to do with using empirical data.
Our methodology can be questioned. First, one can ask why we use coherence as 
starting point to develop our methodology, and not deductivism or inductivism. De-
ductivism and inductivism both have attracting features (Beauchamp and Childress 
2009). Deductivism rightly notes that once we have a fairly settled body of guidelines, 
in many cases a direct appeal to these guidelines leads to satisfactory moral judgments. 
And inductivism rightly emphasizes the role of new experiences and problems to refine 
guidelines. On the other hand, accounts only from the ‘top’ (principles, rules) and the 
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‘bottom’ (cases, individual intuitions) both have their problems. The content of rules 
and principles is often too abstract to determine the acts we should perform. Principles 
need to be made specific for cases. Furthermore, a top-down model creates a potentially 
infinite demand for final justification. And no single normative theory has shown yet to 
be a sufficient basis for moral justification. Case analysis needs illumination from general 
principles or norms to link and interpret various cases. Furthermore, a solely bottom-up 
approach cannot identify unjust practices or prejudice by the persons who make the 
judgments about cases. Eventually, neither general principles nor paradigm cases can 
guide the formation of justified moral beliefs. As Beauchamp and Childress (2009) state: 
‘there is no fixed order of inference or dependence from general to particular or from 
particular to general’ (p 381). That is why we support a coherence theory. Justification 
is a reflective testing of our moral beliefs, moral principles, theoretical postulates, and 
the like, to make them as coherent as possible (Rawls 1971; Daniels 1979). If we want to 
develop realistic ethical constructs, we need to understand the ethical norms as well as 
the empirical data.
Then, is it truly possible to reach a reflective equilibrium? How do we refrain from 
merely looking for evidence for our own (prejudiced) opinion, and conveniently disre-
garding other evidence? As discussed in chapter 2, the subjective character and therefore 
the credibility of considered judgments are often questioned. With our interpretation of 
the initial judgment of the ‘thinker’ as a hypothetical equilibrium we at least try to be 
transparent about what elements or premises constitute this judgment. Furthermore, 
judgments can alter during the RE process. In this way, the RE process itself can function 
as a filter, which can separate reliable from unreliable judgments. The process of weigh-
ing and balancing judgments, principles, background theories and empirical data can let 
us identify judgments that are apparently wrong or prejudiced. The ‘thinker’ consequent-
ly gains a distanced view, while remaining attached to the concrete situation (cf. Nagel 
1986). The Network Model with Third Persons Experiences gives the opportunity for the 
‘thinker’ to stay susceptible to a wide range of experiences and facts, and to accept that 
his own judgments can change due to the RE process (the ‘conversion’).
Finally, how much time does reaching a RE need? Is it not too time consuming, and 
therefore not practical in a medical setting, especially when we include empirical data 
(which we have to find first)? We admit that there is no reason to expect that the process 
of revising moral judgments and specifying and balancing principles will come to an end 
in a perfect equilibrium. It is continuous work in a dynamic process. Our basic postulate 
is therefore that moral experiences, values, virtues and norms are part of a constantly 
moving process in which we create stability by using moral frameworks which are inher-
ently temporary. Instead of a fixed rationalized framework built on principles we there-
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fore face a never-ending search for coherence which is challenged by counterexamples 
to our beliefs, and by novel situations, technological possibilities and scientific insights 
that challenge the relative stability of our moral framework (Beauchamp and Childress 
2009; Rawls 1971).
 
Qualitative research: moral experiences and considerations of parents, children and phy-
sicians in treatment and research decisions in pediatric oncology
In order to enrich the deliberation of ‘the thinker’ in RE with the norms and practical 
wisdom of the field of pediatric oncology, we collected experiences of relevant actors 
in our qualitative interview study. Several aspects of how we conducted our qualitative 
study warrant discussion.  Many of them have already been discussed in chapters 3, 5, 
6 and 7. First, our interview study used a retrospective design. This means there can be 
uncertainty whether the parents’, patients’, and physicians’ recollections were accurate 
representations of how they felt and what their thoughts were at the time of diagnosis 
and during treatment decisions. Examining parents’ and children’s narratives of decision 
making is not tantamount to studying decision making per se. The introspective gap be-
tween ‘true’ decision-making processes and those that subjects report is a limitation in 
this realm of research, and could introduce biases. Second, the study had small sample 
sizes. These two limitations could be partially surmounted by other study designs, like 
direct observation of decision making, recorded conversations between parents, child 
and physician, or mixed methods research in combining questionnaires with qualitative 
methods, but only by departing from the complexity and weight of real-world decision-
making experiences. Future research with larger samples and a prospective design will 
be able to ascertain the relationship between the specifics of the informed consent dis-
cussion and parental, child and physician recollection. Third, we interviewed only par-
ents and children who were willing to participate in the study. This may have resulted in 
an overrepresentation of families who had outspoken ideas on patient-parent-physician 
interaction or who had encountered substantial differences between family and profes-
sional views on the research topics. Although this kind of bias constitutes a well-known 
pitfall for quantitative methodology, in qualitative research it poses less of a problem, 
as our aim was to explore the moral content of experiences in decision making in pedi-
atric oncology, and we were not so interested in quantifying the variety of experiences 
in statistics. Finally, there could be a regional bias in the results, because the study is 
based on respondents from only two of the eight hospitals in our country where children 
with cancer are treated. However, the group of respondents was diverse in its social 
demographics and well spread over the western part of the country. For our purpose to 
explore the moral experiences of families and physicians, the interviews were saturated 
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with participants from various moral backgrounds. The only group missing were immi-
grants (with limited comprehension of the Dutch language). Furthermore, the topic was 
compact enough to reach saturation across the sample: during the last interviews, no 
new information was yielded.
Eventually, one central question remains: can our results be generalized to pediatric 
oncology in general and even pediatrics in general? 
Generalizability refers to the applicability of findings to settings and contexts different 
from the one in which they were obtained. The goal of our RE, however, and thus of the 
use of empirical data herein, is firstly to understand what is happening in a concrete situ-
ation of decision-making. The equilibrium reached does not exist outside this concrete 
situation, since the description of and experiences within the context of the situation are 
an integral part of the equilibrium. In that sense, speaking of generalizability within our 
use of RE is a bit odd. As described in chapter 2, the RE enterprise is continuous work in 
progress, in which we readjust an equilibrium reached whenever new data come along. 
Although the results of the RE in terms of a moral framework -  e.g. how principles like 
the respect for autonomy are experienced, used and evaluated by the actors – cannot be 
generalized, the construct of the RE can prove to be an adequate instrument in the ethics 
of decision-making in pediatric oncological care. Our empirical data are robust enough 
to be used in a RE, and can also be the starting point to develop our understanding of 
the use of the concepts of best interests, child participation and parental authority in the 
concrete context of pediatric oncology. This understanding can subsequently be used as 
a new starting point, a so-called hypothetical equilibrium (see chapter 2) for reaching a 
new empirical reflective equilibrium, after obtaining new empirical data in other pediatric 
contexts. The process which evolves could imply that we end up with an unworkable situ-
ation, in which we are ad infinitum looking for a new equilibrium. By using the ‘Third Per-
son’ perspective, which implies mainly a rationalization of the RE that has been reached, 
we however arrive at a relatively stable framework, which stands until new empirical data 
force us to rethink the equilibrium. In that sense parallels can be made with the falsifi-
ability principle of Karl Popper (1959). Knowledge is irreducibly hypothetical, including 
moral knowledge, and we have to look for data that contradict it. In other words, as long 
as our empirical reflective equilibrium is not totally shaken, stirred or refuted, it stands 





Best interests, child participation and parental authority
This thesis has highlighted several issues which combined show the shapes that the 
concepts of best interests, parental authority and child participation take in pediatric 
oncology. In every chapter, we confronted the experiences of relevant actors, collected in 
our interview study, with existing theoretical ethical concepts about pediatrics and child 
welfare. In other words, the theoretical ethical concepts were the starting point and were 
subsequently enriched by the emergent themes from the interviews. The experiences of 
parents, children and physicians give us unique insights in pediatric oncology practice 
and the way ethical concepts function in this practice. Because we use empirical findings 
we come much closer to the reality of the ethical challenges faced than a theoretical view 
could.
Central themes that emerged from the interviews were:
The nature of the pediatric oncology practice, with its almost complete integration of re-1) 
search and treatment. In this context, it is a demanding requirement to bring diverse 
moral commitments together, like putting the patient’s interests first, clinical equi-
poise, generation of new knowledge, true informed consent and voluntariness.
Interpretations of best interests2) . In the course of a long treatment, ‘what is best for the 
child’ is subject to change, and for families, the answer encompasses spheres other 
than the medical. It includes parts of the life perspectives of parents and child.
Difficulties to demarcate parental authority to balance future and present interests in de-3) 
cision making. Sometimes parental authority goes no further than to guide a child to 
adulthood with as many opportunities open as possible. In other situations, parents 
have substantial discretion to act on personal views.
Difficulties to ascribe decision making capacities to children. 4) The same adolescent in 
one situation can be deemed capable and in another situation incapable of decision 
making.
In what follows we will take these themes together and try to integrate them in a reflec-
tive equilibrium.
The concept of the child’s best interest at the interface of clinical care and research 
The ‘best interest’ standard has become the prevailing standard in pediatric decision-
making (Kopelman 1997). Like most of bioethics’ ventures, best interests can be formu-
lated in ways that sound appropriate or even compelling. However, as shown in chapter 
5, close examination of the standard reveals significant problems with its definition and 
application in practice. 
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There have been many attempts to formulate ‘objective’ criteria for the best interest 
standard in pediatrics. Some authors claim that every child has a right to reach adult-
hood with as many opportunities left open as possible. Maintaining future options is a 
well-known theme in pediatric ethics, and various authors have argued that physicians 
and parents act unethically if they make choices that constrain a child’s range of future 
options (Feinberg 1992; Davis 2001). Feinberg (1992) proposed recognition of a child’s 
‘right to an open future’, in which a child has a right ‘while he is still a child [ ] to have 
[ ] future options kept open until he is a fully formed self-determining adult capable of 
deciding among them’. Feinberg’s ‘right to an open future’ relies upon giving the child 
the opportunity to take advantage of those talents that her genetic traits, her ‘initial bias 
from heredity’ confer. In chapter 7 on discussing fertility issues with male adolescents di-
agnosed with cancer, we showed an example of using the child’s right to an open future. 
In our interviews, physicians stated that they would always discuss fertility preservation, 
because they wanted to maintain future options for the adolescent.
Other authors, like Kopelman (1997; 2010) describe the best interest standard as a stan-
dard of reasonableness. The best interest standard ‘requires us to focus on the child and 
select wisely from among alternatives, while taking into account how our lives are woven 
together. It instructs us to try and pick the option that most informed, rational people 
of good will would regard as maximizing the child’s net benefits and minimizing the net 
harms to the child without ignoring the rights, needs, and interests of others.’ (Kopel-
man 1997)
However, calling on an uncertain future or on ‘informed, rational people of good will’ still 
does not solve the problem of what the best interest standard should require when the 
actual clinical practice is so maddeningly complex and varied as is pediatric oncology. 
First, chapter 3 showed that in pediatric oncology there is an unprecedented integration 
of research and care, which leads to an intertwinement between patient interests and 
research interests. In this setting, uncertainty (for example, over which arm one will be 
randomized in) is a new dimension. Furthermore, the starting point of treatment within 
a research setting is what children have in common, not how they differ. Parents’ role on 
the other hand is to promote their child’s best interests, also when they are asked to con-
sider enrolling their child in a trial. Parents are almost never in equipoise on trial partici-
pation, which leaves them with the agonizing situation of wanting to do what is best for 
their child, while being fearful of making the wrong decision. Furthermore, a therapeutic 
misconception endangers correct assessment of participation, making parents inaccu-
rately attribute therapeutic intent to research procedures. Chapter 3 and 6 showed that 
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physicians prefer the perspective of a therapist over a researcher. Consequently they may 
truly believe that in the research setting they promote the child’s best interests, which 
maintains the existence of a therapeutic misconception between them and parents.
Second, chapter 5 showed that in the course of a pediatric oncology treatment we 
can distinguish a medical and a patient-family domain. At that point, the notion of best 
interests turns out to inherently be a matter of balancing different values, and not only of 
medical judgment. In the course of treatment, as the initial shock of diagnosis subsides, 
children and parents begin to more actively participate in decision-making. Parents no 
longer focus only on the protocol, and the way children are generally treated, but also on 
their child with his or her own ways to cope with the situation. This leads to a re-evalua-
tion of what they think is important. The interpretation of what constitutes best interests 
starts to contain more than only the medical perspective. Parents discover that their 
child’s interests are also affected by control over certain aspects of care (e.g., nutrition), 
the wish to lead a life as normal as possible (e.g., particulars in upbringing and school-
ing), and the wish to maintain one’s identity and family values (e.g., through religion). 
These values can sometimes collide with medical protocols, leading to different profes-
sional and family views as to what course of action is appropriate. 
Third, chapter 7 showed that, when thinking about the interests of a child, there is 
always a friction between future and present needs, which is not so easily settled, even 
when future needs seem evident, like fertility preservation.
In conclusion, the pediatric oncology context is so complex that it depends on the point 
of view one takes (research versus treatment, medical versus personal, future versus 
present), how one interprets what is in the interest of the child. And every point of view 
can be refuted or put in perspective by another point of view. Only a comprehensive 
analysis of all points of view gives insight in what best interests can mean in the pediatric 
oncology practice. In short, and to phrase Hegel (2000): ‘Das Wahre ist das Ganze’.
In adult medicine, multiple models have been proposed to resolve disagreement over 
what constitutes the best interest of the patient, including informed decision making and 
shared decision making (Bensing 2000; Charles 1997). Both these models use an ethical 
paradigm in which the principle of respect for autonomy has general priority to the prin-
ciple of beneficence. Physicians are expected to respect an adult patient’s autonomous 
wishes to refuse treatment, even if those wishes are not what the physician thinks is in 
that patient’s medical interests. This ‘adult’ paradigm puts a strong focus on patient 
participation in clinical decision making by taking into account the patients‘ perspective, 
and tuning medical care to the patients‘ needs and preferences (Bensing 2000). 
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In contrast, in the ‘pediatric’ paradigm, the principle of beneficence has general pri-
ority to the principle of respect for autonomy (Miller 2003, p 2-3). However, since the 
complexity of the context and our pluralistic beliefs about child-rearing and child welfare 
do not lead to a uniform interpretation of what is in the best interests of the child, also in 
the ‘pediatric’ paradigm we need to find a way to discuss the weight of various perspec-
tives, and to give guidance as to how a decision should be reached, which considerations 
apply, and how future, as yet unknown life perspectives should be weighed.
To do that, we need to discuss the various ways to look at parental discretion and 
child participation.
How far does parental discretion go? Parental authority and physicians’ professional au-
tonomy
The family is a cardinal moral institution and a major source of moral as well as bioethi-
cal controversy (Wang et al 2010). It seems obvious to state that the primary responsibil-
ity of parents is to care for and to protect their children, and that parents are devoted to 
promote the interests of their children. Some philosophers therefore state that parental 
authority can only be instrumental to the best interest of the child. This interpretation 
can already be found in Kant’s philosophy (Kant 1986). According to Kant, a child is not 
the property of parents. Parents cannot freely decide over their children, but have the 
duty to provide for and take care of their children. Their rights as parents derive from this 
duty to care: they have the right to keep the child with them and raise it. Childhood is 
defined as a passing phase of impaired maturity. 
‘Der Mensch aber braucht eigene Vernunft. Er hat keinen Instinkt und muß sich selbst den 
Plan seines Verhaltens machen. Weil er aber nicht sogleich imstande ist, dieses zu tun, sondern 
roh auf die Welt kommt, so müssen es andere für ihn tun.’ (Kant 2005, p697)
It is in the interest of the child to be disciplined, cultivated, civilized and moralized to 
grow into maturity (Schapiro 1999). The possible wishes and desires of parents are only 
dealt with indirectly, as far as they promote or harm the interests of the child.
Other thinkers share this view. Dupuis (Dupuis 1991, p175) for example states that 
the aim of parental authority is to guide a child to self-determination, not to assign an 
inalienable dispositional right over their children. And Leenen (2007, p168) adds: paren-
tal authority exists not for the sake of the parents, but for the very reason to protect the 
child. In the early eighties, Feinberg (1992) developed his, abovementioned, influential 
theory on ‘the right to an open future’. It was a reaction on the US Supreme Court deci-
sion that permitted the Amish, a self-sufficient religious farming community in America, 
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to end their children’s public schooling at 14, two years short of the legal limit. According 
to the Amish, sending their children to public schools would undermine their community 
as they would be influenced by the modern secular world. The Court majority accepted 
the Amish argument that the continued existence of their 19th century religious farming 
community was at stake: if their children attended public high school, they would be 
less likely and less able to take up their roles in the community. Feinberg criticized the 
US Supreme Court decision. He argued that the Amish violate their children’s ‘right to 
an open future,’ namely, the right to be ‘permitted to reach maturity with as many open 
options, opportunities, and advantages as possible.’ This complex right has as its gen-
eral basis the right to autonomy or self-determination, that is, ‘the sovereign authority 
to govern oneself, which is absolute within one’s own moral boundaries’. The child’s 
right to autonomy is a right-in-trust, to be fully granted when a child has developed 
the capacities necessary for its exercise. On this view, it is a principal parental duty to 
help a child to develop the capacity for autonomy, and in that sense parenthood is only 
instrumental to reaching the goal of self-determination, with as many options open as 
possible. In Feinberg’s footsteps, Davis (1997) formulated it as follows: ‘All parenthood 
exists as a balance between fulfillment of parental hopes and values and the individual 
flowering of the actual child in his or her own direction. (…) Good parenthood requires a 
balance between having a child for our own sakes and being open to the moral reality of 
that the child will exist for her own sake, with her own talents and weaknesses, propensi-
ties and interests, and with her own life to make’. In chapter 7 we showed an example of 
describing parental tasks as instrumental to the child’s right to an open future. When the 
moral focus is on preserving as many options as possible for the future child, then the 
physician’s task is to do all that is possible to protect a child’s future health, using only 
medical facts as starting point for proposed treatments. In these situations the pediatri-
cian’s responsibility to his or her patient exists independently of parental desires or proxy 
consent (Committee on Bioethics 1995).
Other authors repudiate the thought that parental authority is only instrumental. Schoe-
man (1985) claims in this context that: ‘Certain decisions seem legitimate when made 
within the context of a family, even though they seem to violate the liberal principles for 
treating incompetents’. And: ‘the family is to be thought of as an intimate arrangement 
with its own goals and purposes. It is inappropriate to impose upon that arrangement 
abstract liberal principles’. A family has his own complex of values, relationships and 
goals that is highly autonomous. In the discussion in the early eighties on the school-
ing of Amish children, the American philosopher William Ruddick came to a nuanced 
conclusion. He did not support either the Amish viewpoint, since it gives parents too 
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much power over their children’s future lives, nor Feinberg’s right to an open future, that 
gives parents too little power (Ruddick 1988). To steer between the parental extremes of 
parental self-perpetuation and parental self-denial, Ruddick developed a family-centred 
use of the best interest standard, the ‘Life Prospect Principle’ (Ruddick 1988). In his 
theory he uses an analogy of gardener and guardian when talking about parents and the 
way they have to fill in the interests of their child. The gardening analogy reflects the fact 
that a child is a parent’s product, the result of intentional effort, but a product with the 
unique capacity to become the equal of its producers. Hence, child-producers may not 
treat children as if they were and would remain artifacts or property. Children have the 
capacity for becoming autonomous beings, and a presumed interest in becoming that 
imposes restraints on their producers and requires protection. Hence, the virtue of the 
(legal) metaphor of parents as guardians. A parent is, as it were, a Guardian-Gardener, 
a provider of ‘life prospects’. This reflects a child’s product-origin and its autonomous 
future, while respecting parental productive hopes (Ruddick 1979). A child cannot be 
fully distinguished from his parents and surroundings. ‘In short, there are no criteria for 
individuating child from parent, or for defining the beginning or end of parenthood and 
childhood. In various respects at various times, parent and child are not distinct indi-
viduals’ (Ruddick 1979, p124). That means that we cannot easily use an individual noting 
of interests. The child’s interests are always intertwined with those of his parents. This 
description fits more with the view on parental authority as described in chapter 5, where 
we described that families have substantial discretion to act on personal views, as long 
as their decisions do not fall below a certain threshold of acceptable care. In this view, 
the physician needs to put medical facts into the context of familial values, and needs to 
discuss how to weigh the medical facts in this specific context. 
Child participation
Children develop powers of self-determination as they mature, and this affects all inter-
actions between adults and young people. Pediatrics is special as compared to other spe-
cialties that deal with incompetence (like geriatrics) in the hope that the incompetence 
ends, and in the investment in bringing a child to competence. 
Several studies have assessed and reviewed children’s capacity to participate in medi-
cal decision making (Dorn et al 1995, Mårtenson and Fägerskiöld 2008, Ondrusek et al 
1998). The data on this topic have been ambiguous. All that these studies suggest is that 
the major period of rapid change and individual variability in children’s capacities occurs 
between age 9 and 14 years. Some have concluded that relatively young children can 
participate meaningfully in the assent process (Committee on Bioethics 1995), whereas 
others raise doubts about what children can understand (Wendler and Shah 2003; Par-
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tridge 2010). When interpreting these studies, it is important to realize that the way 
in which researchers define assent drives their conclusions. It greatly depends on the 
capacities one requires for children to be deemed capable of providing assent (Miller 
and Nelson 2006). The closer the definition of these capacities comes to the capacities 
needed to be an ideal adult, the older the child will be before it can meet the criteria. 
In fact, it also depends on the broader social context of ascribing moral capacities and 
rights to children (James and Prout 1990; James et al 1998; Jenks 1996). Childhood as 
an institution (not individual children) is a set of beliefs and practices determining how 
children are treated and how they respond (Hilliard 1981). It differs radically in time and 
place; individuals aged twelve years are treated as responsible adults in one society and 
as fairly helpless dependants in another. Beliefs about childhood influence assessment 
of competence and also whether adults inform children and encourage them to take 
decisions, and whether children want and feel able to learn, choose and act. The care of 
children in hospitals is affected as much by changing beliefs about childhood, as by the 
changing medico-legal context (Alderson 1996).
Our study confirmed that it is not so straightforward to ascribe decision making capaci-
ties to children, even though the Netherlands have specific regulations that stipulate the 
age at which minors should be involved in decision-making concerning their treatment 
(Ministry of Health 1995). In chapter 7 on discussing infertility risks and semen cryo-
preservation with adolescents, physicians in general deemed the adolescent capable of 
participating in these discussions. In chapter 6 on involving adolescents in decision 
making concerning research participation, however, physicians deemed (the same!) ado-
lescent incapable of participating in these discussions, even leading to the provision of a 
lower level of information to adolescents than to their parents. In both situations, physi-
cians seem to be directed by their interpretation of what is in the best interest of the child 
in the concrete context at hand. Concerning research, physicians deemed research proto-
cols in the best interest of their patients, and therefore they were confident to include an 
adolescent in a trial. Physicians recognized that the intense emotional context in which 
decision-making occurred, the extremely complex research protocols being explained to 
families, and the relatively short time frame during which treatment decisions had to be 
made introduced barriers to integrating adolescents into decision-making. Physicians 
therefore used attention to the best interest (also ensured by proxy consent and inves-
tigator integrity) as a substitute for the adolescent’s true consent. Quite the reverse, in 
the context of fertility discussions, physicians used their interpretation of what is in the 
best interest of the child (namely future fertility preservation) as a reason for involving 
adolescents in the decision making process, even though the topic was delicate.
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In chapter 7 we described the term strategic control: the parental control over phy-
sician-child communication. Parents tend to filter and modulate what children are told 
by their physicians, relegating children to a passive role in medical decision making. 
Literature shows that physicians normally deem this mode of communication accept-
able (Levetown 2008). Chapter 6 shows that for research discussions physicians use 
the same ‘strategic control’, when informing adolescents. Other studies in pediatric on-
cology describe the same tendency from physicians to protect children from too much 
information (Olechnowicz et al 2002; Young et al 2003). In other words, parents and 
physicians determine the ways to encounter the child, whether to involve the child in the 
decision-making process and the information given to the child.
Concluding, in the complex, emotional practice of pediatric oncology, there seems 
to be a constant weighing by physicians of burdens versus benefits in involving adoles-
cents in decision making. This explains why the same adolescent in one situation can 
be deemed capable and in another situation incapable of decision making. In pediatric 
oncology, respect for adolescents accounts for their developing capacities as well as their 
vulnerability due to their illness and the emotional situation they are in.
A uniform decision making framework: the moral landscape of pediatric oncology
We can conclude from the above paragraphs that in the case of parental authority, physi-
cian’s professional autonomy and child participation there are different points of view. 
Again, as was the case with the interpretation of best interests, it depends on the con-
crete context which view is acceptable. Due to the complexity of the pediatric oncology 
context and due to our pluralistic beliefs about child development, child-rearing, child 
welfare and parental discretion herein, we cannot present a uniform interpretation of 
what is in the best interest of the child and how far child participation and parental 
discretion should go. Using RE, we may however come to a uniform decision making 
framework. Our RE framework describes the moral landscape of pediatric oncology as a 
complex interaction between seemingly incompatible viewpoints: research versus treat-
ment, medical versus personal, technological perfection versus communication skills, 
future versus present, family versus individual, competent versus incompetent. In this 
moral landscape, physicians are challenged to provide medically effective care while re-
specting the wishes of the parents and children involved. Inevitably there are conflicts. 
Some conflicts are minor and would be resolved by more compassion or flexibility on 
the part of physicians (for instance, more respect for family beliefs and values), and by 
a similar adjustment on the part of the parents and children. Some conflicts are severe, 
as when parents refuse lifesaving therapy. These are discussed in chapter 5. And some 
conflicts are in the middle zone, raising challenging questions of which decision should 
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be taken when doctors and families disagree. As described in chapter 5, in these middle 
zone situations, the model of ‘communicative ethics’ can guide us. The aim of commu-
nicative ethics, as described by Moody (1992), is that all parties involved, including the 
patient (when possible), come to an agreement about shared goals and talk about deci-
sions to be made. The emergence of personal views that are potentially different from 
the professional perspective can be recognized, understood, and, if necessary, dealt with 
(Coyne 2007). The various viewpoints are given a prima facie character (Beauchamp 
and Childress 2009, p14; Kopelman 1997, p276). We can (almost) never assume a com-
pletely clear-cut scenario in which one viewpoint prevails. As stated above, even the basic 
rules ‘put the patient’s interests first’ or ‘child participation needs to be encouraged’ are 
not absolute when we consider the moral landscape of pediatric oncology. It is an accept-
able starting premise, a hypothetical equilibrium, but not acceptable as final conclusion. 
For a final conclusion we need to weigh it against other viewpoints. It is a demanding 
requirement first to identify and then bring together the diverse moral commitments that 
function in pediatric oncology. Sometimes an external party (for example an ethicist) is 
needed to function as the ‘thinker’ and to make the moral landscape explicit, and posi-
tion the various viewpoints. 
Due to the complex and high-tech character of oncology treatments the physician has 
a substantial role in the decision-making process. Parents and children can be reluctant 
to act as advocates for their own views in this setting (Young et al 2002). To recognize 
the personal views of parents and children, physicians need to actively discuss parents’ 
preferences, customs, and concerns, especially in circumstances when there are tradeoffs 
possibly involving individual values and preferences (Elliston 2007; Hardart 2000; Tan 
2002; Whitney et al 2006). The physician can also discuss limits to these wishes, as long 
as mutual understanding, awareness, and reasoning are maintained (D’Aloja et al 2010; 
Bensing 2000; Kai 1996). Eventually, it is the duty of all actors to reach consensus about 
what course of action is appropriate. When someone’s view is outweighed or overridden, 
it does not simply disappear. It leaves a ‘moral trace’ (Beauchamp and Childress 2009, 
p16), which should be reflected in the course of action eventually taken. A ‘communica-
tive ethics’ structured in this way leads to a shared decision in which the contribution 
of all actors is considered. Furthermore, in our RE the third person moral experiences 
are rationalized in a way that remains focused on the specific context, while at the same 





There is still a great deal to learn about the complex processes that underlie joint de-
cision-making in the context of pediatrics. Process-oriented qualitative methodologies, 
such as those employed in this thesis, lend themselves well to an examination of the 
multiple factors that contribute to this decision-making. 
The moral landscape drafted in our RE can prove to be an adequate instrument in the 
ethics of decision-making in pediatric oncological care, and maybe in pediatric care in 
general. When the shared intention to act in the best interest of the child is based on a 
decision making framework that understands it as a matter that comes about in true con-
sultation, the decision making process can nurture and enlarge children’s and parents’ 
understanding, trust and confidence, through the sharing and transferring of insights 
and responsibilities between physicians, children and parents.
FUTURE RESEARCH
The empirical reflective equilibrium we reached gave us an understanding of the use 
of the concepts of best interests, child participation and parental authority in the con-
crete context of pediatric oncology. As mentioned, this understanding can subsequently 
be used as a new starting point, the so-called hypothetical equilibrium for reaching a 
new empirical reflective equilibrium. We therefore need to obtain novel empirical data 
in other pediatric treatment and research contexts.  We are currently gathering new em-
pirical data from children who are asked to participate in medical research to answer 
the question whether these children can and want to be approached as moral subjects 
concerning research participation. These data can subsequently modify our hypothetical 
RE about child participation in research.  We are planning a new empirical study on the 
ethical issues regarding puberty suppression in adolescents with gender identity disor-
der. The data gathered in this study will give us insight in whether children are competent 
to make far-reaching decisions, the role of parents and the role of society to define illness 
and health. 
Not only new research will inform our RE. In the future we will also need to be aware 
of new realities, like the development of ‘personalized’ medicine, and the impact of 
whole-genome sequencing technology. All these realities will influence a future equilib-
rium reached.
Eventually, the aim of future projects and modifications of our RE will be to develop 
a stable decision making tool which incorporates the best interest standard, parental au-






Few medical specialties encounter so many ethical challenges as pediatrics does. It is a 
specialty that inherently has features that are morally charged. Pediatric ethics examines 
the broad issues of (1) the concept of the child’s best interest; (2) parental responsibility 
and authority in decision-making about the life and health of a child; (3) the emerging 
desire and capacity for self-determination of an older child, and (4) the professional ob-
ligation of a pediatrician to act in the best interests of the child. Much is written about 
these issues, but often the literature on these topics is either ‘academic’ and theoretical 
in nature, or casuistic. It remains difficult to utilize what is written in the reality of pediat-
ric practice. In this thesis we reflect on the question how the concepts of best interests, 
parental authority and child participation can and should be translated and made opera-
tional in the everyday encounter between parents, physicians and children. We therefore 
combine theoretical conceptions of the best interest standard, child participation and 
parental authority with a close look on how these concepts actually function in pediatric 
practice, and how they are conceived by actors in the pediatric field. Taking the view that 
people’s actual moral beliefs, intuitions, experiences and reasoning in a (medical) prac-
tice yields information which is meaningful for the operationalization of ethical concepts, 
we refine an existing empirical ethical methodology that successfully combines empiri-
cal research and ethical reflection, namely Reflective Equilibrium. Subsequently, we use 
this methodology to study one specific pediatric medical practice, namely pediatric on-
cology. Our goal is to describe in detail the forms that the concepts of best interests, 
child participation and parental authority take in the studied pediatric oncology practice. 
Furthermore, we reflect on the question whether the insights gained in this particular 
research setting can be translated to pediatric oncology in general and, where possible 
and appropriate, even to pediatrics in general. 
Chapter 1 gives a general introduction to the thesis. We describe the philosophical quin-
tessence of pediatrics and the aims of the thesis. We subsequently explain our reasons to 
use an empirical ethical approach. Empirical ethics denies the structural incompatibility 
of empirical and normative approaches, and believes in their fundamental complemen-
tarity. It is an answer to the critique of bioethics for being too abstract, too general, too 
dogmatic, too top-down as well as too far removed from clinical reality, insensitive to 
the peculiarities of specific situations. The alliance with practice is a prerequisite for 
practicing ethics well-informed and pro-actively and for avoiding armchair philosophy. 
Attention to the experienced reality of pediatric practice however raises the question how 
to integrate experiences from clinical practice in ethical theory and analysis. Although 
intuitions and experiences are highly valuable as moral markers, it is generally stated that 
in ethics they need to be subjected to systematic, rational analysis in order to prevent 
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violation of the so-called ‘fact-value distinction’. In other words, if one wants to use infor-
mation from practice, one needs to reflect on the methodology applied to integrate this 
information in normative-ethical analysis and decision making. This reflection is done in 
chapter 2, in which we justify the use of Reflective Equilibrium.
We end chapter 1 with a description of the pediatric oncology practice and of the 
interview study, which produced the empirical data we incorporate in our reflective think-
ing. Our interview study comprised a qualitative multicenter project in which we explored 
patients’, parents’ and physicians’ experiences with the informed-consent process for 
treatment and research decisions in pediatric oncology. We invited patients (aged 8-18 
years; n=24) attending the pediatric oncology units of two Dutch university hospitals, 
and their parents (n=26), to participate in semi-structured in depth interviews about the 
informed consent process. We also interviewed all pediatric oncologists (n=15) from the 
two hospitals.
Chapter 2 describes our methodology of Reflective Equilibrium (RE) in detail. First, we 
discuss the use of RE as method of justification in ethics. RE tries to facilitate a real 
dialogue between theory and practice by not assigning a preferential status to either of 
them. Considerations on different levels of abstraction have an equal status at the start 
of the ethical enterprise. Justification is a reflective testing of our moral beliefs, moral 
principles, theoretical postulates, and other elements, to make them as coherent as pos-
sible. Coherence is achieved by an interaction between the different elements in RE, 
which can have an effect on all these elements. Thus, some elements need to be altered 
or removed, others kept. The equilibrium reached is a dynamic one; it can change due 
to new elements in the reasoning process. In RE the reasoning is normally done by one 
individual, whom we will call: ‘the thinker’. 
Second, we describe the adjustments we made to the traditional RE method, to come 
to our own methodology: the Network Model with Third Person Moral Experiences. In 
this model, empirical data, namely the moral experiences of the various actors in a prac-
tice, are added to the elements used in reflective thinking. We explain the need to include 
empirical data in RE (especially third-person experiences): one reduces the risk of self-
justification, prejudiced judgments and bias by the ‘thinker’, and subsequently increases 
the credibility of the RE reached. The risk of self-justification is one of the main weak-
nesses of the RE model: coherence is not a sufficient guarantee for credibility or moral 
truth. By including third-person experiences, one reduces the risk of self-justification in 
two ways: since the experiences of many are brought into the RE process, there is a good 
chance of getting a pluralistic view on the matter at hand. Furthermore, minority posi-
tions can also gain attention in the process of reasoning. The process of weighing and 
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balancing judgments, principles, background theories and empirical data can let us iden-
tify judgments that are apparently wrong or prejudiced. In this way, the RE process itself 
can function as a filter, which can separate reliable from unreliable judgments of the 
‘thinker’. The ‘thinker’ consequently gains a distanced view, while remaining attached 
to the concrete situation. The Network Model with Third Persons Experiences gives the 
opportunity for the ‘thinker’ to stay susceptible to a wide range of experiences and facts, 
and to accept that his own judgments can change due to the RE process (the so-called 
‘conversion’).
Chapter 3 is a theoretical introduction to the ethical concepts studied empirically in chap-
ter 4. Pediatric oncology has a strong research culture. Most pediatric oncologists are 
investigators involved in both clinical care and research. Consequently, various concepts 
studied in research ethics are relevant for our investigation. We describe the ethical crite-
ria for valid informed consent: knowledge, competence and voluntariness. We pay extra 
attention to the concept of therapeutic misconception, i.e. the tendency to mistake the 
scientific aim of the trial for the therapeutic aim of a treatment. Subjects may have dif-
ficulty to recognize that the aim of the trial is to obtain scientific information, and that 
potential benefits for the subjects themselves are formally a mere by-product of gaining 
such information. We conclude with the fundamental point of departure in research eth-
ics, namely the important distinction between the treatment relationship which exists 
between clinician and patient, and the research relationship which exists between re-
searcher and subject.
In Chapter 4 we discuss the ethical consequences of the unprecedented integration of 
research and care in pediatric oncology from the perspective of parents and physicians. 
We use an empirical ethical approach, combining (1) a narrative review of (primarily) 
qualitative studies on parents’ and physicians’ experiences of the pediatric oncology re-
search practice, and (2) comparison of these experiences with existing theoretical ethical 
concepts about (pediatric) research. Analysis of the 22 studies reviewed revealed that the 
integration of research and care has consequences for the informed consent process, 
the promotion of the child’s best interests, and the role of the physician (doctor vs. sci-
entist). True consent to research is difficult to achieve due to the complexity of research 
protocols, emotional stress and parents’ dependency on their child’s physician. Parents’ 
role is to promote their child’s best interests, also when they are asked to consider en-
rolling their child in a trial. Parents are almost never in equipoise on trial participation, 
which leaves them with the agonizing situation of wanting to do what is best for their 
child, while being fearful of making the wrong decision. Furthermore, a therapeutic mis-
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conception endangers correct assessment of participation, making parents inaccurately 
attribute therapeutic intent to research procedures. Physicians prefer the perspective of 
a therapist over a researcher. Consequently they may truly believe that in the research 
setting they promote the child’s best interests, which maintains the existence of a thera-
peutic misconception between them and parents. We conclude that the challenges that 
a lack of parental equipoise and the therapeutic misconception pose may be very difficult 
to overcome. Thorough attention to the quality of communication of research informa-
tion could improve understanding of the research perspective. We summarize points of 
awareness with respect to research discussions and give recommendations to improve 
communication.
Chapter 5 describes the various interpretations by parents, children and physicians of the 
best interest of the child in the course of a pediatric oncology treatment. In pediatrics, 
the ‘best interest’ standard has become the prevailing standard in decision-making. Of-
ten there is no discussion about what constitutes this standard. It is used as if its mean-
ing is self-evident and uncontroversial.  For a number of reasons, however, the best inter-
est standard proves difficult to apply. We first summarize the various problems with the 
standard. Subsequently, we describe the most commonly used solution to these prob-
lems, namely the definition of the best interest standard as a standard of reasonableness 
by Loretta Kopelman. This definition states that we must try to pick the option that most 
informed rational people of good will would regard as maximizing the child’s net ben-
efits and minimizing the net harms to the child without ignoring the rights, needs, and 
interests of others. Used in this way, the best interest standard does not require people 
to act in accord with what is literally best for a child. Sometimes this means that the least 
bad alternative for the child should be selected. However, problems can still arise in the 
use of this standard, namely when reasonable and informed people of good will cannot 
agree on the interpretation of what is in the best interest of a child. Differences in values 
can lead to different views by families and physicians of what is in the interest of a child. 
With our interview study we aimed at gaining insight into the views of parents, children, 
and physicians in the pediatric oncology setting. The study shows that at the start of 
treatment children, parents, and physicians have the same view on what is best for the 
child: being treated according to the best available treatment protocol. Parents and chil-
dren feel ill-equipped to judge the medical information, and most of the time they let 
physicians decide on treatment options. Deference to physician authority is a common 
rule of thumb. The medical view on what is best for a child prevails. In the course of treat-
ment, however, a transition takes place. For families, what constitutes the best interests 
expands beyond medical considerations, to include the wish to lead a normal life, having 
139
Summary
control over certain aspects of treatment, and maintaining one’s identity (e.g. through 
religion). These aspects sometimes collide with medical aspects, leading to different 
professional and familial views about what course of action is appropriate. When family 
and professional views differ widely, the question inevitably arises whose perspective 
should prevail. Integrating the empirical data and theories on shared decision making 
we present a model of ‘communicative ethics’ to make the differing views a subject of 
discussion. In the model of communicative ethics, the various views of what is best for 
a child are given a prima facie character. It is the duty of all actors to reach consensus 
about the resulting definition of the best interest of the child. The emergence of personal 
views that are potentially different from the professional perspective can be recognized, 
understood, and, if necessary, dealt with.
Chapters 6 and 7 deal with the possibilities of true child participation. Chapter 6 discusses 
child participation in decision making concerning research participation. Various regula-
tions and guidelines stipulate the importance of involving adolescents in this decision-
making. Literature shows that in the context of pediatric oncology this involvement is 
difficult to achieve due to emotional stress, the complexity of research protocols and 
limited time. Still, a remarkable number of adolescents with cancer enter onto a trial 
during their illness. We performed an empirical study to determine physicians’ attitudes 
towards enrolling adolescents in research and towards involving adolescents in deci-
sion making concerning research participation. The physicians’ views can be brought 
together into four themes: (1) physicians regard most adolescents as not capable of par-
ticipating meaningfully in discussions regarding research; (2) physicians do not always 
provide adolescents with all information; (3) proxy consent from parents is obtained 
and is deemed sufficient; (4) physician-investigator integrity: physicians judge research 
protocols as not being harmful and even in the best interest of the adolescent. In other 
words, physicians justify not involving adolescents in research discussions by referring 
to best interest arguments (adolescents’ incompetence, proxy consent, and investigator 
integrity), although this is not in line with legal regulations and ethical guidelines. Inte-
grating theoretical knowledge from research ethics and our empirical data, we argue that 
the fundamental differences between a research and treatment relationship should be 
seen as an incentive to truly involve adolescents in decision-making and not simply rely 
on best interest considerations. Physician-investigators should assess the capabilities of 
adolescents on a case-to-case basis and, when appropriate, should thoroughly explain 
the differences between research and standard care.
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In Chapter 7 we present another discussion on child participation in decision making. 
This time the focus is on parental discretion to regulate information disclosure to their 
child, thus influencing true child participation. In pediatric oncology, the risk of infertility 
due to treatment constitutes an important problem. For sexually mature male adoles-
cents, sperm cryopreservation is an option, but discussing the topic is complex because 
of the sensitive nature and the limited time frame. In our empirical study, both parents 
and physicians spontaneously mentioned the problem of infertility discussions as an ex-
ample of involving children in decision making. Although physicians and parents agreed 
that infertility would have a major impact on the future quality of life, they sometimes 
disagreed on whether the topic should be discussed with adolescents. Physicians always 
wanted a separate discussion with adolescents because of the sensitive nature and the 
experience that parents sometimes misjudged the stage of maturity of their son. Parents, 
however, wanted control over whether physicians discussed the topic with their child and 
what was said. Physicians did not accept this control and, when necessary, were willing 
to bypass the parents and discuss the topic with the adolescent even when parents re-
fused consent. Integrating our empirical data with ethical theories on the child’s ‘right to 
an open future’, parental authority, and child participation, we conclude that physicians 
face the difficult task of balancing between their ideas of what is in the (future) interest 
of the adolescent and accommodating parental wishes. We discuss the concept of ‘stra-
tegic control’: the parental control over physician–child communication. Parents tend 
to filter and modulate what children are told by their physicians, relegating children to a 
passive role in medical decision making. Literature shows that physicians normally deem 
this mode of communication acceptable. Parents and physicians jointly discuss the ways 
to encounter the child, whether to involve the child in the decision-making process and 
the information given to the child. We conclude however in the fertility case that, because 
of the private character of sexuality and the potentially inadequate maturity assessment 
by parents, semen cryopreservation should be discussed separately with adolescent and 
parents. In addition, there should be an open communication with parents to address 
potential discomforts.
Finally, in Chapter 8 the principal results of this thesis are put into perspective. We fo-
cus on two issues. First, we give methodological considerations by answering additional 
methodological questions, of which the most important is: can our results be generalized 
to pediatric oncology in general and even pediatrics in general? Generalizability refers to 
the applicability of findings to settings and contexts different from the one in which they 
were obtained. The goal of our RE, however, and thus of the use of empirical data herein, 
is firstly to understand what is happening in a concrete situation of decision-making. The 
equilibrium reached does not exist outside this concrete situation, since the description 
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of and experiences within the context of the situation are an integral part of the equilib-
rium. We conclude therefore that speaking of generalizability within our use of RE is a bit 
odd. We do argue however, that, by using the ‘Third Person’ perspective, which implies 
mainly a rationalization of the RE that has been reached, we arrive at a relatively stable 
framework, that stands until new empirical data force us to rethink the equilibrium. In 
that sense parallels can be made with the falsifiability principle of Karl Popper. Knowl-
edge is irreducibly hypothetical, also moral knowledge, and we have to look for data that 
contradict it. In other words, as long as our empirical reflective equilibrium is not totally 
shaken, stirred or refuted, it stands as an understanding of the use of the concepts of 
best interests, child participation and parental authority.
Second, we reflect on the implications of our empirical study for our thinking about 
child participation, the use of a best interests standard and parental authority. We take 
the themes from the interviews together and try to integrate them in a reflective equi-
librium with existing theories, norms and principles. We conclude that due to the com-
plexity of the pediatric oncology context and due to our pluralistic beliefs about child 
development, child-rearing, child welfare and parental discretion herein, we cannot pres-
ent a uniform interpretation of what is in the best interest of the child and how far child 
participation and parental discretion should go. Using RE, we may however come to a 
uniform decision making framework. Our RE framework describes the moral landscape 
of pediatric oncology as a complex interaction between seemingly incompatible view-
points: research versus treatment, medical versus personal, technological perfection 
versus communication skills, future versus present, family versus individual, competent 
versus incompetent. In this moral landscape, physicians are challenged to provide medi-
cally effective care while respecting the wishes of the parents and children involved. We 
can (almost) never assume a completely clear-cut scenario in which one viewpoint pre-
vails. Even the basic rules ‘put the patient’s interests first’ or ‘child participation needs 
to be encouraged’ are not absolute when we consider the moral landscape of pediatric 
oncology. It is an acceptable starting premise, in our methodology: a hypothetical equi-
librium, but not tolerable as final conclusion. For a final conclusion we need to weigh it 
against other viewpoints. It is a demanding requirement first to identify and then bring 
together the diverse moral commitments that function in pediatric oncology. Sometimes 
an external party (for example an ethicist) is needed to function as the ‘thinker’ and to 
make the moral landscape explicit, and position the various viewpoints. Eventually, when 
the shared intention to act in the best interest of the child is based on a decision making 
framework that understands it as a matter that comes about in true consultation, the 
decision making process can nurture and enlarge children’s and parents’ understanding, 
trust and confidence, through the sharing and transferring of insights and responsibili-
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ALL Acute Lymphoblastic Leukemia
AML Acute Myeloid Leukemia 
CCMO Centrale Commissie Mensgebonden Onderzoek (Central Committee on Re-
search Involving Human Subjects)
CCT Clinical Controlled Trial
DSMC Data and Safety Monitoring Committee
DSMP Data and Safety Monitoring Plan
HSCT Haematopoietic Stem Cell Transplantation
MDS Myelodysplastic Syndrome
NHL  Non-Hodgkin Lymphoma
IRB Institutional Review Board
RCT Randomized Controlled Trial
RE Reflective Equilibrium
SKION Stichting Kinderoncologie Nederland
WMO Wet Medisch-wetenschappelijk Onderzoek met Mensen (Medical Research 





In de kindergeneeskunde wordt men bijna dagelijks geconfronteerd met ethische vragen. 
Het vakgebied heeft unieke kenmerken die maken dat veel behandelbeslissingen ethisch 
geladen zijn. De kindergeneeskunde houdt zich bezig met de gezondheid en de fysieke 
en mentale groei en ontwikkeling van ieder kind, vanaf de geboorte tot in de adolescen-
tie, met als uiteindelijke doel zo gezond mogelijke volwassenen af te leveren. Kinderen 
zijn kwetsbaar en verdienen bescherming. Meestal zijn het de ouders die in de medische 
setting opkomen voor de belangen van hun kind. Soms ontstaat echter twijfel of de ou-
ders die belangen wel juist zien en of ze de beste vertegenwoordigers zijn van hun kind. 
Kinderen zijn ook in ontwikkeling en verdienen op een gegeven moment de vrijheid om 
zelf te beslissen over hun lijf en leven. Maar kunnen ze dat altijd even goed? De ethiek 
van de kindergeneeskunde houdt zich bezig met vragen over de interpretatie van wat 
goed is voor een kind, de grenzen van de ouderlijke macht en de grenzen van profes-
sionele bemoeienis. Kort maar krachtig gezegd onderzoekt zij de volgende kwesties: (1) 
wat moeten we verstaan onder het belang van het kind; (2) hoever reiken de ouderlijke 
verantwoordelijkheid en het ouderlijk gezag om beslissingen te nemen over leven en 
gezondheid van een kind; (3) hoe moeten we omgaan met het toenemende vermogen en 
verlangen van oudere kinderen tot zelfbeschikking, en (4) hoever reikt de professionele 
plicht van de kinderarts om in het belang van het kind te handelen?
Er is veel over deze kwesties geschreven, maar de literatuur is vaak ofwel te theo-
retisch, ofwel juist te casuïstisch. Het blijft daardoor moeilijk om het geschrevene toe 
te passen in de alledaagse kindergeneeskundige praktijk. Dit proefschrift draait om de 
vraag hoe we de concepten ‘het belang van het kind’, ‘ouderlijke macht’ en ‘kindpartici-
patie’ kunnen vertalen en bruikbaar kunnen maken in de dagelijkse ontmoetingen tussen 
artsen, ouders en kinderen. Om die vraag te beantwoorden combineren we theoretische 
noties van het belang van het kind, kindparticipatie en ouderlijke macht met een nauw-
keurige beschrijving van de manier waarop deze concepten daadwerkelijk functioneren in 
de kindergeneeskundige praktijk en hoe ze worden geïnterpreteerd door de verschillende 
actoren in het kindergeneeskundige veld. Het uitgangspunt daarbij is de overtuiging dat 
de ervaringen, intuïties en gedachten van mensen in een (medische) praktijk informatie 
opleveren die van toegevoegde waarde is bij het bruikbaar maken van ethische concep-
ten. In dit proefschrift verfijnen we een al bestaande empirische ethische methode die 
empirische data (de ervaringen, intuïties en gedachten) combineert met ethische reflec-
tie, namelijk het Reflectief Evenwicht. Vervolgens passen we deze methode toe in een 
specifieke kindergeneeskundige praktijk, te weten de kinderoncologie. Ons doel daarbij 
is om in detail de vormen te beschrijven die de concepten het belang van het kind, kind-
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participatie en ouderlijke macht aannemen in de kinderoncologische praktijk. Bovendien 
reflecteren we op de vraag of de inzichten die we in deze research setting verkrijgen ook 
vertaald kunnen worden naar de kinderoncologie in het algemeen en eventueel zelfs naar 
de kindergeneeskunde in het algemeen. 
Hoofdstuk 1 is een algemene introductie op het proefschrift. We beschrijven de filosofi-
sche kwintessens van de kindergeneeskunde en de doelstellingen van het proefschrift. 
Vervolgens lichten we toe waarom we een empirische ethische methode gebruiken. De 
empirische ethiek ontkent dat empirische en normatieve benaderingen incompatibel 
zijn, maar gelooft juist dat ze elkaar aanvullen. De empirische ethiek is het antwoord 
op de vaak gehoorde kritiek dat de bioethiek te abstract, te algemeen, te dogmatisch, 
te top-down, en te ver verwijderd is van de klinische realiteit, ongevoelig voor de bijzon-
derheden van specifieke situaties. De alliantie met de praktijk is een voorwaarde voor 
het goed geïnformeerd en proactief praktiseren van de ethiek en voor het vermijden 
van ivoren-toren filosofie. Het leidt echter ook direct tot de vraag hoe ervaringen uit een 
klinische praktijk geïntegreerd kunnen worden in een ethische analyse en in ethische 
theorievorming. Natuurlijk zijn intuïties en ervaringen waardevol als morele markers, 
maar in de ethiek moeten ze onderworpen worden aan een systematische, rationale ana-
lyse om te voorkomen dat men verstrikt raakt in het zogenaamde feit-waarde-probleem. 
Anders gezegd, als je informatie uit de praktijk wilt gebruiken, moet je ook reflecteren op 
de toegepaste methodologie om deze informatie te integreren in een normatief-ethische 
analyse en in besluitvorming. Deze reflectie wordt uitgevoerd in hoofdstuk 2, waarin een 
rechtvaardiging wordt gegeven voor het gebruik van Reflectief Evenwicht als methode. 
Hoofdstuk 1 eindigt met een beschrijving van de kinderoncologie en van de inter-
viewstudie die de empirische data opleverde om te integreren in ons reflectief denken. 
De interviewstudie betrof een kwalitatief multicenter project waarin we de ervaringen van 
kinderen, ouders en artsen hebben verkend met de informed-consentprocedure voor be-
handeling en wetenschappelijk onderzoek in de kinderoncologie. We nodigden kinderen 
(leeftijd 8-18 jaar; n=24) uit die behandeld werden op de afdeling kinderoncologie van 
twee Nederlandse Academische ziekenhuizen om deel te nemen aan semigestructureer-
de diepte-interviews. We interviewden ook de ouders van deze kinderen (n=26) en alle 
kinderoncologen van de twee ziekenhuizen (n=15). 
Hoofdstuk 2 beschrijft in detail onze methode, het Reflectief Evenwicht (RE). Allereerst 
bespreken we het gebruik van RE als rechtvaardigingsmethode in de ethiek. RE probeert 
een echte dialoog te bewerkstelligen tussen theorie en praktijk door geen van de twee 
een voorkeursstatus te verlenen. Overwegingen op verschillende niveaus van abstractie 
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hebben een gelijke status aan het begin van de ethische onderneming. Volgens het RE 
ligt de rechtvaardiging van morele uitspraken in een reflectief testen en coherent maken 
van onze morele intuïties, morele principes, theoretische postulaten en andere elemen-
ten. Coherentie wordt bereikt door een interactie tussen de verschillende elementen in 
RE, waarbij deze interactie een effect kan hebben op al deze elementen. Sommige zul-
len veranderd of verwijderd moeten worden, andere juist behouden. Het evenwicht dat 
wordt bereikt is dynamisch; het kan veranderen ten gevolge van nieuwe elementen in 
het redeneerproces. In RE wordt het redeneren over het algemeen uitgevoerd door één 
individu, genaamd ‘de Denker’. 
Vervolgens beschrijven we de aanpassingen die we hebben gemaakt op de gangbare 
RE-methode om te komen tot onze eigen methodologie: Het Netwerk Model met Mo-
rele Ervaringen van Derden. In dit model worden empirische data, namelijk de morele 
ervaringen van verschillende actoren in een praktijk, toegevoegd aan de al bestaande 
elementen uit het reflectief denken in RE. We leggen uit waarom deze empirische data 
nodig zijn in RE: hiermee wordt de kans op zelfrechtvaardiging verminderd en worden 
vooringenomen oordelen en bias bij ‘de Denker’ voorkomen. Uiteindelijk leidt dit tot een 
toename van de geloofwaardigheid van het bereikte reflectief evenwicht. Vooral het risico 
op zelfrechtvaardiging is een van de voornaamste zwakten van het RE-model: coherentie 
is niet een voldoende garantie voor geloofwaardigheid en morele waarheid. Door de er-
varingen van derden toe te voegen verkleint men de kans op zelfrechtvaardiging op twee 
manieren. Aangezien de ervaringen van velen in het RE-proces worden ingebracht, is de 
kans groot dat er een pluralistische kijk op het bestudeerde onderwerp ontstaat. Boven-
dien krijgen minderheidsstandpunten ook aandacht in het redeneerproces. Het proces 
van afwegen en balanceren van oordelen, principes, achtergrondtheorieën en empirische 
data zorgt ervoor dat we oordelen herkennen die kennelijk verkeerd of bevooroordeeld 
zijn. Op deze manier functioneert het RE-proces als een filter, dat geloofwaardige van 
ongeloofwaardige oordelen van ‘de Denker’ kan onderscheiden. Dientengevolge verkrijgt 
‘de Denker’ een afstandelijk gezichtspunt, maar blijft tegelijkertijd verbonden met de con-
crete situatie. Het Netwerk Model met Morele Ervaringen van Derden geeft ‘de Denker’ 
de mogelijkheid om gevoelig te blijven voor een diversiteit aan ervaringen en feiten, en 
om zijn eigen oordeel te veranderen door het RE-proces (de zogenaamde ‘conversie’).
Hoofdstuk 3 is een theoretische inleiding op de ethische concepten die empirisch be-
studeerd worden in hoofdstuk 4. De kinderoncologie kent een sterke onderzoekscul-
tuur. De meeste kinderoncologen zijn ook onderzoekers en betrokken bij zowel klinische 
zorg als wetenschappelijk onderzoek. Dientengevolge zijn verscheidene concepten die 
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bestudeerd worden binnen het vakgebied van de onderzoeksethiek ook relevant voor 
onze onderneming. We beschrijven de ethische criteria voor een valide informed con-
sent: kennis, wilsbekwaamheid en vrijwilligheid. We besteden extra aandacht aan het 
concept ‘therapeutische misvatting’, de tendens om de wetenschappelijke oriëntatie van 
het onderzoek te verwarren met de therapeutische oriëntatie van een behandeling. De 
therapeutische misvatting werd voor het eerst beschreven in 1982 als de misvatting dat 
deelname aan een wetenschappelijk onderzoek hetzelfde is als het krijgen van een door 
een arts op de persoon afgestemde behandeling. Proefpersonen kunnen moeite hebben 
om in te zien dat het doel van het onderzoek is om wetenschappelijke kennis te verkrij-
gen; zij kunnen soms moeilijk inzien dat eventueel voordeel voor de proefpersoon zelf 
formeel slechts een ‘bijproduct’ van die kennis is. 
We eindigen met het beschrijven van het belangrijkste uitgangspunt in de onder-
zoeksethiek, namelijk de gedachte dat er een fundamenteel verschil is tussen de be-
handelrelatie (tussen arts en patiënt) en de onderzoeksrelatie (tussen onderzoeker en 
proefpersoon). 
Hoofdstuk 4 beschrijft de ethische consequenties van de ongekende integratie van weten-
schappelijk onderzoek en zorg in de kinderoncologie vanuit het perspectief van ouders 
en artsen. Er wordt gebruik gemaakt van een empirisch-ethische benadering, waarin een 
narratieve review van (voornamelijk) kwalitatieve studies naar de ervaringen van ouders 
en artsen met de kinderoncologische onderzoekspraktijk wordt gecombineerd met een 
vergelijking van deze ervaringen met bestaande theoretische ethische concepten over 
(pediatrisch) onderzoek. 
De analyse van de 22 studies in de review toont aan dat de integratie van research 
met zorg gevolgen heeft voor de informed-consentprocedure, het behartigen van het 
belang van het kind, en de rol van de arts (dokter versus wetenschapper). Een valide ge-
informeerde toestemming voor onderzoek is moeilijk te verkrijgen door de complexiteit 
van studieprotocollen, de stress rondom de diagnose kanker en de afhankelijkheid die 
ouders voelen ten opzichte van de behandelend arts. De rol van ouders is het beharti-
gen van het belang van hun kind, ook wanneer hun wordt gevraagd na te denken over 
deelname aan wetenschappelijk onderzoek van hun kind. Ouders zijn echter bijna nooit 
in equipoise over onderzoeksdeelname, waardoor ze zich in de onmogelijke situatie be-
vinden dat ze die strategie willen kiezen die het beste is voor hun kind, maar steeds 
angstig zijn dat ze de verkeerde beslissing nemen. Bovendien bedreigt de therapeutische 
misvatting een juiste beoordeling van onderzoeksdeelname, waarbij ouders onterecht 
therapeutische intenties toeschrijven aan onderzoekshandelingen.
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Artsen handelen over het algemeen meer vanuit het perspectief van dokter dan van 
onderzoeker. Dit kan tot gevolg hebben dat ze oprecht geloven dat ze binnen een on-
derzoekssetting het belang van het kind behartigen, waarmee ze het bestaan van een 
therapeutische misvatting tussen henzelf en ouders in stand houden. We sluiten af met 
de stelling dat de therapeutische misvatting en het ontbreken van equipoise bij ouders 
moeilijk te voorkomen zijn. Nauwgezette aandacht voor de kwaliteit van het bespreken 
van wetenschappelijk onderzoek zou echter wel het begrip voor het research-perspectief 
kunnen vergroten. Als handvat om de communicatie te verbeteren geven we een opsom-
ming van aandachtspunten die van belang zijn bij het bespreken van wetenschappelijk 
onderzoek.
Hoofdstuk 5 beschrijft de verschillende interpretaties van het belang van het kind door 
ouders, artsen en kinderen zelf gedurende de kinderoncologische behandeling.
In de kindergeneeskunde is ‘het belang van het kind’ de overheersende norm ge-
worden bij behandelbeslissingen. Er is zelden discussie over wat deze norm (of, in het 
verlengde van het Engels, ‘standaard’) inhoudt. ‘Het belang van het kind’ wordt gebruikt 
alsof de betekenis ervan vanzelfsprekend en onomstreden is. Er zijn echter meerdere 
redenen waarom deze standaard moeilijk toepasbaar is in de praktijk. We beginnen het 
hoofdstuk met een samenvatting van de verschillende problemen met de standaard. 
Vervolgens beschrijven we de meest gebruikte oplossing voor deze problemen, namelijk 
de definitie door Loretta Kopelman van de standaard als een ‘standaard van redelijkheid’. 
Deze definitie houdt in dat we moeten proberen om die optie te selecteren waarvan de 
meeste goed geïnformeerde, rationele mensen van goede wil zouden beamen dat deze 
de meeste netto voordelen heeft en de minste netto schade voor het kind, zonder echter 
de rechten, behoeften en belangen van anderen te veronachtzamen.
Gebruikt op deze manier, vereist de standaard ‘het belang van het kind’ niet dat we 
altijd moeten handelen in overeenstemming met wat letterlijk het beste voor het kind is. 
Soms betekent het bijvoorbeeld dat het minst slechte alternatief voor het kind gekozen 
moet worden.
Ondanks deze mooie definitie kunnen er nog steeds problemen ontstaan met het 
gebruik van de standaard, namelijk als ook rationele en goed geïnformeerde mensen 
van goede wil het niet eens kunnen worden over wat nu in een specifieke situatie in het 
belang van het kind is. Verschillen in waarden en levensperspectieven kunnen leiden tot 
verschillende opvattingen bij ouders, kinderen en artsen over wat nu in het belang van 
het kind is.
Met onze interviewstudie beoogden we inzicht te verkrijgen in de opvattingen van 
ouders, kinderen en artsen over het belang van het kind in de kinderoncologische prak-
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tijk. Onze studie toont aan dat aan het begin van de behandeling ouders, kinderen en 
artsen dezelfde ideeën hebben over het belang van het kind, namelijk behandeld worden 
volgens het beste beschikbare behandelingsprotocol. Ouders en kinderen voelen zich 
slecht toegerust om de medische informatie te begrijpen en meestal laten ze de behan-
delbeslissingen over aan artsen. Het zich voegen naar de autoriteit van de arts is eerder 
regel dan uitzondering. Versterkt door het medisch-technisch karakter van de oncologi-
sche behandeling heeft het professionele perspectief de overhand. Ouders ervaren deze 
eerste periode als een tijd van enorm controleverlies. 
In de loop van de behandeling vindt een omslag plaats. Voor ouders en kinderen 
gaat het belang van het kind meer behelzen dan alleen medische overwegingen. Het 
omvat dan ook een persoonlijke visie, waarin begrepen de wens om een zo normaal 
mogelijk leven te leiden, het willen controleren van sommige aspecten van de behande-
ling en het vasthouden aan de eigen identiteit (bijvoorbeeld door middel van religie). 
Deze persoonlijke visie botst soms met de medische overwegingen, wat kan leiden tot 
verschillende visies bij het gezin en bij het medisch team over het te volgen beleid. Wan-
neer persoonlijke en professionele opvattingen ver uiteen lopen, komt onvermijdelijk 
de vraag op wiens perspectief de overhand moet hebben. We beantwoorden deze vraag 
door in het reflectief-evenwichtmodel onze empirische data te integreren met onder an-
dere theorieën over ‘shared decision making’. We presenteren vervolgens een model van 
‘communicatieve ethiek’ waarin de verschillende gezichtspunten onderwerp van gesprek 
kunnen worden. In het ‘communicatieve ethiek-model’ krijgen de verschillende visies 
op het belang van het kind een prima facie karakter, dat wil zeggen dat geen van hen bij 
voorbaat de overhand heeft. Het is vervolgens de taak van alle betrokken actoren (me-
disch team, ouders, kind) om in gesprek consensus te bereiken over de uiteindelijke de-
finitie van het belang van het specifieke kind. Persoonlijke gezichtspunten die potentieel 
kunnen afwijken van de professionele visie kunnen in dit gesprek herkend en begrepen 
worden, en er kan in gezamenlijkheid een behandelplan ontwikkeld worden. 
Hoofdstukken 6 en 7 behandelen de mogelijkheden van het kind zelf om te participeren 
in de besluitvorming. 
Hoofdstuk 6 bespreekt het meebeslissen van het kind over onderzoeksdeelname. De 
Nederlandse wetgeving en ook verscheidene (internationale) richtlijnen schrijven voor 
dat kinderen vanaf een bepaalde leeftijd (in Nederland 12 jaar) betrokken moeten worden 
bij de besluitvorming over deelname aan wetenschappelijk onderzoek. Recente studies 
laten echter zien dat in de context van de kinderoncologie deze betrokkenheid moeilijk 
te realiseren is door de ervaren stress rondom de diagnose kanker, door de complexi-
teit van researchprotocollen en door de ervaren tijdsdruk. Desondanks participeert een 
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opmerkelijk grote groep kinderen met kanker in wetenschappelijk onderzoek. In onze 
interviewstudie onderzochten we de opvattingen van kinderoncologen over het inclu-
deren van kinderen in wetenschappelijk onderzoek en over het betrekken van (oudere) 
kinderen bij de besluitvorming over onderzoeksdeelname. 
De opvattingen van de kinderoncologen kan samengevat worden in vier thema’s: 
(1) zij achten kinderen (ook degenen ouder dan 12 jaar) over het algemeen niet in staat 
om zinvol te participeren in gesprekken over wetenschappelijk onderzoek; (2) zij geven 
de (oudere) kinderen niet alle relevante onderzoeksinformatie; (3) de toestemming van 
ouders wordt wel verkregen en wordt over het algemeen als voldoende gezien; (4) inte-
griteit van de onderzoeker: de artsen oordelen dat onderzoeksdeelname niet schadelijk 
is en zelfs in het belang van het kind kan zijn, omdat binnen een onderzoeksprotocol de 
beste behandeling wordt gegeven. Met andere woorden: de kinderoncologen rechtvaar-
digen het niet betrekken van (oudere) kinderen bij gesprekken over wetenschappelijk 
onderzoek door te verwijzen naar aandacht voor het belang van het kind - gewaarborgd 
door proxy consent en integriteit van de onderzoeker -, hoewel dit niet strookt met wet-
telijke voorschriften en ethische richtlijnen.
Vervolgens integreren we in ons reflectief-evenwichtmodel deze empirische data met 
theoretische kennis vanuit de onderzoeksethiek. We concluderen dat het verschil tus-
sen de onderzoeksrelatie (onderzoeker-proefpersoon) en de behandelrelatie (arts-patiënt) 
zodanig fundamenteel is, dat dit juist gezien moet worden als een impuls om oudere 
kinderen werkelijk te betrekken bij de besluitvorming en niet kortweg af te gaan op over-
wegingen van het belang van het kind. Arts-onderzoekers zouden van geval tot geval het 
vermogen van kinderen om mee te beslissen moeten beoordelen en duidelijk moeten 
zijn over het verschil tussen wetenschappelijk onderzoek en de standaard behandeling. 
In hoofdstuk 7 wordt een andere discussie beschreven rondom kindparticipatie, namelijk 
de discretionaire ruimte van ouders om de informatievoorziening aan hun kind te regu-
leren en daarmee de betrokkenheid van het kind bij besluitvorming te beïnvloeden.
In de kinderoncologie vormt het risico op infertiliteit door de behandeling een groot 
probleem. Voor jongens die al in de puberteit zijn is semencryopreservatie een optie, 
maar het bespreken hiervan is complex door de gevoeligheid van het onderwerp en de 
beperkte tijd om sperma voor opslag te produceren.
In onze interviewstudie benoemden zowel ouders als artsen spontaan de gevoelighe-
den rondom het bespreken van infertiliteit als een voorbeeld van het wel of niet betrek-
ken van kinderen bij de besluitvorming. Hoewel ouders en artsen het met elkaar eens 
waren dat onvruchtbaarheid een enorme impact zou hebben op de toekomstige kwaliteit 
van leven, verschilden ze soms van mening over de vraag of het onderwerp besproken 
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moest worden met adolescenten. De kinderoncologen waren unaniem in hun mening 
dat er altijd een apart gesprek met adolescenten moet plaatsvinden over infertiliteit en 
semencryopreservatie. Hun argumenten hiervoor waren de gevoeligheid van het onder-
werp en hun ervaring dat ouders de puberteitsontwikkeling van hun kind niet altijd goed 
inschatten. Ouders daarentegen wilden controle over of het onderwerp besproken werd 
met hun zoon en over wat er besproken werd. De kinderoncologen accepteerden deze 
controle niet en waren zelfs bereid om voorbij te gaan aan de wil van ouders en het on-
derwerp met de adolescent te bespreken ondanks de weigering van ouders.
In ons reflectief-evenwichtmodel integreren we deze empirische data met ethische 
theorieën over ‘het recht op een open toekomst’, ouderlijk gezag en kindparticipatie. De 
kinderoncologen zien zich voor de moeilijke taak gesteld om te balanceren tussen hun 
ideeën over wat in het (toekomstig) belang van het kind is en de wensen van ouders. 
We bespreken het concept ‘strategische controle’: de controle die ouders willen hebben 
over de gesprekken tussen arts en kind. Ouders neigen tot het filteren en moduleren 
van de medische informatie aan hun kind, waarmee ze het kind automatisch een pas-
sieve rol in de besluitvorming toebedelen. Recente literatuur laat zien dat artsen deze 
manier van communiceren vaak acceptabel vinden. Ouders en artsen bespreken samen 
de manier waarop het kind benaderd moet worden, of het kind betrokken moet worden 
in de besluitvorming en welke informatie het kind mag krijgen. We beargumenteren dat 
in het geval van het bespreken van infertiliteit deze strategische controle niet acceptabel 
is, vanwege het privékarakter van seksualiteit en de mogelijk inadequate inschatting van 
de puberteitsontwikkeling door ouders. Semencryopreservatie moet daarom altijd apart 
met een adolescent besproken worden. Aanvullend moet er een open communicatie zijn 
met ouders om eventuele zorgen bespreekbaar te maken.
Tenslotte worden in hoofdstuk 8 de voornaamste resultaten van dit proefschrift in per-
spectief geplaatst. We concentreren ons daarbij op twee kwesties. Allereerst bespreken 
we opnieuw onze methodologie en beantwoorden de volgende vraag: kunnen onze re-
sultaten gegeneraliseerd worden naar de kinderoncologie in het algemeen en misschien 
zelfs naar de kindergeneeskunde in het algemeen?
Generaliseerbaarheid verwijst naar de mate waarin onderzoeksresultaten en con-
clusies van een onderzoek ook opgaan voor personen, situaties en gevallen die in dat 
onderzoek niet onderzocht zijn. Het doel van ons Reflectief Evenwicht, en dus van de 
empirische data die erin zijn gebruikt, is echter op de eerste plaats om te begrijpen wat 
er in een concrete situatie van besluitvorming gebeurt. Het bereikte evenwicht bestaat 
niet buiten deze concrete situatie, aangezien de beschrijving van en de ervaringen bin-
nen de context van de situatie een integraal onderdeel vormen van het evenwicht. We 
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concluderen derhalve dat het spreken over generaliseerbaarheid binnen onze versie van 
het Reflectief Evenwicht eigenlijk een beetje merkwaardig is. We beargumenteren ech-
ter dat, door het gebruik van het perspectief van derden (wat hoofdzakelijk een verdere 
rationalisering inhoudt van het bereikte evenwicht), we uitkomen op een relatief stabiel 
raamwerk dat stand houdt totdat nieuwe empirische data ons dwingen om het evenwicht 
te heroverwegen. Dit is te vergelijken met het falsificatieprincipe van Karl Popper. Ken-
nis, ook morele kennis, is onvermijdelijk hypothetisch van aard en we moeten steeds op 
zoek zijn naar data om deze kennis te weerleggen. Anders gezegd, zolang ons empirisch 
reflectief evenwicht niet door elkaar wordt geschud of wordt weerlegd, geldt het als een 
inzicht in het gebruik van de concepten belang van het kind, kindparticipatie en ouderlijk 
gezag.
Vervolgens reflecteren we op de implicaties van ons empirisch onderzoek voor het 
denken over het belang van het kind, kindparticipatie en ouderlijk gezag. We nemen de 
thema’s van de interviews samen en proberen ze te integreren in een reflectief evenwicht 
met bestaande theorieën, normen en principes. We concluderen dat door de complexi-
teit van de kinderoncologische context en door onze pluralistische opvattingen over de 
ontwikkeling van een kind, het welzijn van het kind en de discretionaire ruimte van ou-
ders, we geen uniforme interpretatie kunnen geven van wat het belang van een kind 
inhoudt en hoe ver kindparticipatie en ouderlijke discretionaire ruimte zouden moeten 
gaan. Door het gebruik van het Reflectieve Evenwicht kunnen we echter wel komen tot 
een uniform raamwerk voor besluitvorming. Ons reflectief raamwerk beschrijft het mo-
rele landschap van de kinderoncologie als een complexe interactie tussen ogenschijnlijk 
onverenigbare gezichtspunten: onderzoek versus behandeling, professioneel versus per-
soonlijk, technologische perfectie versus communicatievaardigheden, toekomst versus 
heden, gezin versus individu, wilsbekwaam versus wilsonbekwaam. In dit morele land-
schap worden artsen steeds uitgedaagd om effectieve zorg te leveren en tegelijkertijd de 
visies van ouders en kinderen op zorg en onderzoek te respecteren. Slechts zelden is er 
sprake van een overduidelijk scenario waarin één gezichtspunt overheerst. Zelfs basisre-
gels als ‘het belang van de patiënt gaat voor alles’, of ‘de stem van het kind moet gehoord 
worden’ zijn niet absoluut wanneer we het morele landschap van de kinderoncologie 
beschouwen. Het zijn acceptabele premissen, in onze methodologie: een hypothetisch 
equilibrium, maar niet aanvaardbaar als laatste conclusie. Voor een definitieve conclusie 
moeten we deze premissen afwegen tegen andere gezichtspunten. Het is een zware taak 
om de verschillende morele verplichtingen die functioneren in de kinderoncologie te 
identificeren en vervolgens bij elkaar te brengen. Soms kan een externe partij (bijvoor-
beeld een ethicus) van waarde zijn om te functioneren als ‘de Denker’ en om het morele 
landschap en de verschillende gezichtspunten inzichtelijk te maken. Wanneer uiteinde-
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lijk de gezamenlijke intentie om in het belang van het kind te handelen gebaseerd is op 
een raamwerk voor besluitvorming dat dit belang begrijpt als een zaak die tot stand komt 
in werkelijk overleg, dan pas kan het besluitvormingsproces het begrip en het vertrouwen 
van kinderen en ouders vergroten, namelijk door het delen en overdragen van inzichten 
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De totstandkoming van dit proefschrift was niet mogelijk geweest zonder de hulp en 
steun van heel veel mensen. 
Oneindige dank gaat uit naar de kinderen en ouders die ik interviewde. Hun bereid-
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voor hun openhartige interviews en inzichten in de dagelijkse praktijk.
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en voor de unieke begeleiding tijdens onze zoektocht naar een invulling van het belang 
van het kind. Jij leerde me dat alles ethiek is (maar dat een ethicus niet altijd ethisch ver-
antwoord handelt); wat mis ik onze dagelijkse gesprekken tijdens onze CEL-tijd! 
Prof. D.P. Engberts, beste Dick, ook jij dank voor de plek die je me bood binnen je 
afdeling, en het inzicht dat ethiek in de kliniek een eigen sensitiviteit behoeft. Je filosofi-
sche en theologische kennis zijn ongeëvenaard, het is altijd weer een voorrecht om naar 
je te mogen luisteren!
Prof. J.M. Wit, beste Jan Maarten, dank voor de geboden mogelijkheid om ethiek-
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popte je tot de meest kritische lezer van mijn papers. Dank voor je relativering van mijn 
ethische doordraverij!   
Michel Zwaan, Netteke Schouten en Gert Jan Kaspers. Dank voor het helpen opzetten 
van het onderzoek in het VUmc, de inclusie van patiënten en ouders, en het schrijven van 
de artikelen. Jullie gastvrijheid is een voorbeeld voor mij. 
Oud collega’s van het Centrum voor Ethiek en Levensbeschouwing, lieve Elisa, Eric, 
Titia, Rien, Berna, Gerrit, Henk en Joy, dank voor jullie collegialiteit en gezelligheid, ook 
in moeilijke tijden. Eric, je bent nu de laatste der Mohikanen, op naar jouw promotie!
Collega’s van de Sectie Ethiek en Recht van het LUMC, lieve Mirjam, Dorothea, Hans, 
Annette, Rachèl en Sytske, dank dat ik al zo lang ‘duurzame gast’ mag zijn, en af en toe 
jullie rust mag komen verstoren. 
Prof. H.M. Dupuis, beste Heleen, jouw propedeusecollege ‘Inleiding in de medische 
ethiek’ was de aanzet tot wat uiteindelijk culmineerde in dit proefschrift. Je ongebrei-
delde enthousiasme en activisme over ethische onderwerpen blijft aanstekelijk. Dank dat 
je me op het ethiek-spoor zette en voor je blijvende interesse in mijn vorderingen. 
Kiek Tates en Christine Dedding, als jonge onderzoeker lieten jullie me kennis maken 
met de wereld van de Kindparticipatie. Dank voor jullie inzichten en gezelligheid. Ik zal 
ons briljante optreden tijdens het NHG-congres nooit vergeten! 
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